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The Cold War and Decolonization in British Guiana: The Anglo-American Intervention and 
Guianese Nationalist Politics  
Joshua David Esposito 
This thesis examines the end of colonial rule in British Guiana and what it tells us about the 
relationship between decolonization and the Cold War. It explores how the end of a four hundred 
year period of European nation-state domination of the world led to a complex shift in global 
power structures and considerable conflict. From 1953 to 1966 nationalist leaders in British 
Guiana struggled to achieve independence from Great Britain and fought to establish their 
position in the future government of Guyana. Colonialism, however, left a unique imprint on 
British Guiana’s cultural development, and created a volatile society that left the colony marred 
by racial violence. Additionally, Guianese autonomy was limited by Anglo-American Cold War 
imperatives in the Caribbean. The decolonization of British Guiana became a struggle, and 
eventually a compromise, between British and American officials, as well as between the Anglo-
American alliance and Guianese nationalists.  
This thesis explores one aspect of that power struggle in detail. It shows how Cheddi Jagan’s 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in British Guiana pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign 
policy after the Cuban Revolution in 1959 that was in conflict with United States Cold War 
goals. Meanwhile, Forbes Burnham and the People’s National Congress (PNC) sought to 
establish a working relationship with the United States. As a result, the United States and Great 
Britain chose to subvert the elected PPP government and grant independence to British Guiana 
under a government led by Burnham. The experience of independence in British Guiana 
illuminates then, the intricate relationship between the Cold War, decolonization, and the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Twentieth Century was a period of extensive transformation in the global power 
structure, which had been dominated by European nation states for over four hundred years. 
Competition between European powers for control of global markets, people, and resources 
culminated in two massive world wars from 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. Two of the most 
important consequences of this tumultuous period were the rapid global decolonization of 
European empires and the Cold War. Most of the former colonized world had achieved, or was 
well on the way to achieving independence within twenty years of the armistice ending the 
Second World War in 1945. Simultaneously, the United States and its Western allies were 
heavily engaged in a conflict with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations for ideological, 
as well as physical, control over the newly autonomous areas. The people of formerly colonized 
territories sought to take advantage of this international climate, which was hostile to 
imperialistic policies toward the developing world. People who had been recently under the 
formal control of empires, as well as others who had been informally controlled by powerful 
outside influences, attempted to assert their self-interest by appealing to the rhetoric of the post-
war international community. Third world nationalism developed as third world peoples asserted 
what they saw as their right to self-determination asserting that powerful nations should not 
threaten the sovereignty of developing areas by interfering in their domestic affairs.1  
                                                            
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1983); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). Hyam discusses in detail the impact of international opposition to European colonization on 
imperial policy in Great Britain. Specifically, he explains how institutions such as the United Nations altered the 
international community by creating a unified opposition to colonialism and thus further eroded the ability of the 
British to maintain an empire in light of their weakened post-war economic and military position, hastening the end 
of formal control of peripheral areas by powerful nations. 
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However, nationalist leaders frequently discovered that rhetorical overtures and practical 
actions were not the same, and that powerful nations continued to protect their interests by 
intervening in developing nations, even while formal empires were fading into the annals of 
history. The end of European hegemony signaled the beginning of a period of redefinition of 
international relationships. Thus, conflict was likely as nationalist leaders, former colonizers, and 
the new leading nations of the international community, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
competed for supremacy in newly restructured regions.  
This thesis will use the independence process in British Guiana from 1953 to 1966 as a 
microcosm to explore the correlation between the Cold War and post-World War II 
decolonization. Specifically, it will contextualize the Anglo-American decision to undermine the 
popularly elected Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) government and its leader, Cheddi Jagan, and 
in its place, support a regime fronted by Forbes Burnham, who was understood to be racist, 
irresponsible, and vehemently anti-British. However, what is important was that, at least initially, 
Burnham was anti-communist.2 The British and American decision to intervene in and 
manipulate local politics was a consequence of the impact of the Cold War and decolonization 
on policymaking. Additionally, this thesis will examine how the foreign policy decisions of 
Guianese politicians impacted the British and American policy toward the colony.  British 
Guiana offers a unique opportunity to explore how nationalist leaders and policymakers in the 
United States and Great Britain struggled with and against each other within the framework of 
the Cold War as they attempted to reshape the post-colonial world.  
                                                            
2 Melby to Rusk, 20 March, 1962, 841d.06/3-2062, Central Decimal Files Box 2478, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 
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Although studies of the decolonization process in British Guiana have focused on the 
actions of the United States and Great Britain, this thesis will also examine the considerable 
impact Guianese leaders had on the development of Anglo-American policy and the overall 
decolonization process in British Guiana. Scholars such as Stephen Rabe have clearly established 
that the United States and Great Britain manipulated the decolonization process in British Guiana 
to achieve a specific political goal, the establishment of a pro-American government after 
independence. Rabe’s work answers the question of how that happened, essentially through 
intervention by the United States, both physically in British Guiana and diplomatically in Great 
Britain.3This thesis will not refute that conclusion; rather, it will provide a nuanced explanation 
of why the United State and Great Britain determined that intervention was necessary to avert a 
crisis in post-colonial Guyana and why that decision was crucial to regional Cold War strategy.  
Ultimately, this thesis argues that Guianese leaders pursued foreign policies that actively shaped 
Anglo-American strategy in British Guiana. This thesis thus reinforces the conclusion reached by 
scholars such as Odd Arne Westad and Jason Parker, who explain how the interrelated dynamics 
of the Cold War and global decolonization impacted and were impacted by developing areas of 
the world.4 
The first chapter examines how the characteristics of British colonization created the 
setting for a complex and volatile struggle for an autonomous government in British Guiana. 
Colonial structures defined immigration, internal migration, as well as economic, social, and 
political developments in the colony. During the independence period, defined in this thesis as 
the period between 1953 to1966, opportunistic politicians, primarily Burnham and Jagan 
                                                            
3 Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005). 
4 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK: 2005), 3; Jason Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire 
in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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exploited ethnic loyalties resulting from the culturally segregated society brought on by colonial 
development to build their base of support. The consequence of such political measures was a 
movement toward self-government characterized by racial violence and domestic instability.5 
Simultaneously, limited suffrage during the colonial period ensured that political organization in 
British Guiana before 1950 was almost entirely the product of liberal organized labor 
movements.6 The liberal ideology of nationalist leaders in the colony and the connection between 
international worker movements and national communist parties was a source of concern for the 
United States during the Cold War as leftist politics became increasingly associated with an 
international communist conspiracy.7 Thus, colonial development created two main challenges 
for British Guiana as it advanced toward independence from 1953 to1966. First, Guianese 
leaders and British colonial officials struggled to establish a viable government which could 
maintain stability and general domestic peace after the withdrawal of British soldiers from the 
colony. Secondly, Guianese leaders needed to develop a foreign policy which best convinced the 
United States that mild domestic reforms and relations with communist nations were not a veiled 
attempt to establish an anti-American, communist government in British Guiana after 
independence. The general history of colonialism in British Guiana and an overview of the 
decolonization process provided in chapter one will lay the groundwork for the research of 
subsequent chapters. 
                                                            
5 There are a number of comprehensive explanations of the connection between colonial development and the 
independence period in British Guiana. See:  Leo A. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British 
Guiana (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967); Cheddi Jagan, The West On Trial: My Fight For Guyana’s 
Freedom (New York: International Publishers, 1966); Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana; Thomas Spinner, 
Political and Social History of Guyana 1945-83 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).  
6 There are several effective explanations of the impact of organized labor on Guianese politics. See: Robert J. 
Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in the English –Speaking West Indies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Kay 
Saunders, ed. Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920 (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984). 
7 The terms liberal and leftist are used frequently throughout this thesis to describe the political ideology of 
nationalist leaders in British Guiana and the Caribbean. In short, they refer to the ideological belief in heavy 
government involvement in social programs and domestic reform. The liberal ideology in Guianese politics was 
influenced by its origin in workers movements. The United States frequently saw this ideology in Latin America as 
anti-capitalist and closely related to or easily manipulated by communism. 
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The second chapter will explore the strategic imperatives of the United States and Great 
Britain during the period leading up to Guianese independence within the context of the Cold 
War and global decolonization. The United States interpreted events in British Guiana almost 
entirely through the prism of a Cold War lens; therefore, American policymaking in the colony 
was skewed by Cold War geo-strategic imperatives.8 There were several factors which 
convinced the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to make British Guiana a priority. 
Geographically, the small enclave on mainland South America occupied a critical location for 
hemispheric defense during the Cold War. British Guiana’s proximity to Venezuela, the main 
outlet for capital from the United States in Latin America; Brazil, the largest and potentially most 
powerful nation in South America; the Panama Canal, perhaps the most important point of 
defense of all for the United States; and the islands of the Caribbean, made it strategically 
significant despite the diminutive size of the colony. The presence of a modern airfield in the 
colony made its geographic location even more relevant. However, the overriding concern for 
the United States in British Guiana was its ideological significance. The progression of the 
Cuban Revolution toward communism and its eventual alliance with the Soviet Union was an 
ideological loss that the United States determined to avoid repeating elsewhere in the region. 
Arthur Schlesinger, special advisor to President John F. Kennedy, described British Guiana as a 
target of convenience; however from an ideological perspective, it was a target of the utmost 
priority.9 
The primary objective of the British Colonial Office in British Guiana was to prepare the 
colony for independence as quickly and efficiently as possible. Tactically, that meant 
                                                            
8 The direct relationship between American Cold War imperatives and policymaking toward British Guiana is 
clearly explained by Arthur Schlesinger. See: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965). 
9 Ibid, 774. 
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establishing a government capable of sustaining domestic stability and avoiding post-colonial 
violence similar to events that occurred in India or the Congo.10 Strategically, however, the 
foremost objective of the British Foreign Office was the maintenance of a special relationship 
with the United States, making American regional Cold War anxieties British concerns as well. 
Maintaining close ties to the United States meant that the British would accede to American 
demands with regards to the political make-up of the soon to be independent British West Indian 
territories. Certainly Great Britain had Cold War objectives of its own; however, its association 
with the United States demanded that American strategy take precedence. Despite considerable 
disagreements and contentious exchanges between the Colonial Office and Foreign Office, as 
well as between the United States and Great Britain, in the end the two nations formulated a 
coherent and unified policy toward British Guiana.11 Ultimately, the continuation of the Anglo-
American special relationship proved to be the most important objective of British policy and 
Colonial Office concerns about the American strategy in British Guiana were overlooked to 
formulate a cohesive policy with the United States. 
The focus of the third chapter is on acknowledging the critical role of Guianese 
nationalist politicians in influencing Anglo-American policy toward British Guiana. The United 
States, eventually with British approval, funded subversive attempts against the PPP despite the 
fact that the party had won all three elections in the colony since the implementation of universal 
suffrage in 1953. Scholars traditionally attribute the American policy to overzealous anti-
communists in Washington who viewed foreign policy through a narrow Cold War lens. Richard 
                                                            
10 There was considerable discord and violence which resulted from an ill-conceived process of British 
decolonization in India . See: Yasim Kahn, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007); William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez 
and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 496-499,701-702. 
11 The most overtly aggressive exchanges occur between Sir Alec Home of the Foreign Office and Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk. See: Home to Rusk, 26 February 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, 12:266. 
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Barnet, for example, explains American Cold War policy as overly rigid when classifying 
emerging governments, arguing that the presence of some or all of a number of liberal policies 
was sufficient to establish the basis for opposition to that government from the United States. 
Most of the characteristics that Barnet identified, including land reform, possible nationalization 
of private industry, acceptance of Chinese or Soviet aid, and the pursuance of a non-aligned 
foreign policy, were aspects of PPP strategy in British Guiana. 12 Similarly, Stephen Rabe 
interprets American intervention in British Guiana as an overreaction by American officials to 
domestic reforms, fearing that they were a precursor to communism, and a misunderstanding of 
the political position of the PPP leadership, specifically Cheddi Jagan.13 This thesis does not 
directly dispute the assertions of these renowned scholars; however, by focusing on the actions 
of Guianese officials, it does present a more nuanced explanation for events in British Guiana by 
addressing the actions of Guianese leaders themselves.  
Rather than focusing primarily on how Cold War ideology impacted policymakers in the 
United States, this thesis will explain how leaders in the developing world impacted American 
foreign policy. In British Guiana, the failure of the PPP to conduct an effective foreign policy, 
specifically, its inability or unwillingness to work with the United States, was the catalyst for 
American inspired or directed subversive attempts against party leadership. The Cuban 
Revolution caused American leaders to fear spreading communism in the Caribbean and 
influenced PPP leadership to a considerable degree. PPP leadership, specifically Jagan, 
misinterpreted the consequences of the Cuban Revolution as it related to other Caribbean nations 
                                                            
12 Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1968). 
13 Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 78-79, 81-83. 
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and their alignment in the Cold War. Thus, the PPP engaged in a foreign policy which 
undermined its position in British Guiana.  
Finally, this thesis will challenge the idea that the British decision to undermine the PPP 
was solely the result of acquiescing to American demands. It suggests rather that Great Britain 
pursued its own self interest in respect to British Guiana, although American pressure influenced 
the British decision making process. However, American pressure does not alone explain the 
British course of action in the colony. Financial concerns and fear of instability in British Guiana 
played a critical role in determining British policy. This work will examine the PPP’s foreign 
policy and contextualize Cheddi Jagan’s political decisions rather than dismiss him as 
ideologically confused.14 Jagan pursued consistent and coherent domestic and foreign policies 
for twenty years from his earliest involvement in labor movements to his eventual loss of power 
in 1964. Conversely, after ending his association with Jagan in 1955, Forbes Burnham and the 
People’s National Congress (PNC) courted United States officials effectively and avoided open 
rhetorical opposition to American leaders or association with communist nations. Ultimately, the 
third chapter will explain how the foreign policy conducted by Guianese leaders largely 
determined the outcome of events in British Guiana. 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
This thesis speaks to a broad historiography in developing a comprehensive analysis of 
the relationship between British Guiana, the United States, and Great Britain during the Cold 
War and decolonization. Specifically, it will address the historical literature concerning the 
special relationship between the United States and Great Britain during the Cold War, the Cold 
                                                            
14 Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 78. 
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War in general, British decolonization, British Guiana, United States-Latin American relations, 
and the role of nationalist leaders in the developing world. One of the key aspects of the Cold 
War was the special relationship that developed between the United States and Great Britain, 
forged in the anti-Axis struggle of World War II, but maintained after the Second World War to 
more effectively combat the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and international 
communism. From the perspective of Great Britain and the United States, the soon to be 
independent colonies were not prepared for self-rule until their incoming governments were 
evaluated within a Cold War strategic context. It was necessary for former colonies to show that 
they could successfully repel any communist influence within their nation, which implied, 
primarily, the ability to maintain internal stability and willing alignment with the West. A 
number of authors have effectively discussed the importance of international relations in British 
decolonization. Ronald Hyam’s Britain’s Declining Empire adequately explains the implications 
of the post-World War II international setting and the effects of organizations such as the United 
Nations on influencing Great Britain’s colonial policies. He contextualizes the major factors 
leading to the dissolution of the British Empire within the international community, while 
discussing several areas which decolonized in an exceptional manner, such as British Guiana. 
Hyam discusses the interplay between the United States and Great Britain, specifically the 
paradox between British attempts to cultivate a special relationship with the United States while 
maintaining the ability to act independently of their America counterparts.15  
Like Hyam, William Roger Louis acknowledges the primacy of international affairs in 
determining the direction of British decolonization. In Ends of British Imperialism, Louis 
discusses the evolution of the principle of self-determination for British colonies during the early 
                                                            
15 Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire,12-14. 
10 
 
to middle twentieth century from the mandates system of the League of Nations to the 
trusteeship system of the United Nations. Louis suggests that one of the most significant factors 
leading to decolonization was the reinterpretation of the meaning of self-determination from a 
manner of extending moderate autonomy to colonized regions to political independence for 
European colonies. Louis also notes that a key characteristic of decolonization was the British 
attempt to maintain influence in former colonial areas, in part through cooperation with the 
United States and the strategic use of American aid to developing areas.16 Louis further 
contextualizes the United States pursuit of trusteeship during and after World War II and its 
implications for the future of the British Empire in Imperialism at Bay.17 Many of the same 
issues that impacted the special relationship between Great Britain and the United States during 
the decolonization process in British Guiana began during the diplomatic wrangling of the 
Second World War. Specifically, Franklin Roosevelt’s firm anti-colonial stance created tensions 
between the United States and Great Britain before the rise of the Soviet Union in 1943 and led 
to a re-evaluation of American policy toward colonial areas. Louis suggests that in mid-1943 the 
United States began pursuing a policy of military security which led to occasional support for the 
British imperial system as a counter to growing Soviet influence.18 Fifteen years later, the United 
States still struggled with balancing rhetorical support for colonial self-determination with 
American security concerns in British Guiana. Louis also notes the use of the lend-lease 
agreements with Great Britain as a means of advancing American interests during World War 
                                                            
16 Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, xi, 26-29. 
17 William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire 1941-
45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
18 Ibid, 537, 567. 
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II.19 The United States used similar economic enticements to help convince the British to support 
Forbes Burnham in 1963.20  
In addition to Louis, Christopher Thorne’s Allies of a Kind also considers the contentious 
aspects of the Anglo-American alliance during World War II. Thorne suggests that the 
maintenance of the Anglo-American alliance took precedence over either nation’s individual 
interests.21 In British Guiana, British and American decisions were impacted at every turn by the 
significance of continuing a cooperative Anglo-American relationship during the Cold War. In 
Bitter Rehearsal , Charlie Whitham discusses the dialog between the United States and Great 
Britain during and immediately after the Second World War and how it set the tone for 
decolonization in the West Indies twenty years later.22 
Traditionally, scholars have defined the Cold War as an East-West struggle for political 
supremacy in which the main actors were the United States and its Western European allies, and 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Increasingly, however, historians have expanded thought 
on the subject to include what were originally considered peripheral, third world, or developing 
nations.23 The increased study of developing nations has shifted the focus of the Cold War from 
East-West relations to a more complex East-West-North-South dynamic, explained best in Odd 
Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War, as well as by Jason Parker, and Gerald Horne.24 Westad 
considers the role of superpowers, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, in impacting 
the post-colonial development of former European colonies; while at the same time 
                                                            
19 Ibid, 566. 
20 Memorandum of Conversation at Birch Grove, England, 30 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, 12:295. 
21 Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the war against Japan, 1941-45 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978). 
22 Charlie Whitham, Bitter Rehearsal: British and American Planning for a Post-War West Indies (London: Praeger 
Publishers, 2002). 
23 The terms, third world, peripheral, and developing areas have all been used to describe former colonial regions. 
The term developing areas will be used for the purposes of this thesis. 
24Westad, The Global Cold War, 3; Parker, Brother’s Keeper; Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone. 
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acknowledging the ways in which developing nations established political agendas in response to 
superpower intervention.25 Matthew Connelly’s A Diplomatic Revolution considers the close 
relationship between the Cold War and decolonization, specifically the significance of 
international relations and non-governmental institutions in influencing colonial powers and 
creating the post-colonial world. Connelly also considers the critical role of nationalist leaders in 
impacting colonial policy.26 
Several academics who specialize in the history of inter-American relations have 
conducted similar studies of individuals. Eric Roorda’s The Dictator Next Door evaluates the 
ways in which Rafael Trujillo maintained power in the Dominican Republic, despite oppressive 
dictatorial policies and the massacre of about 12,000 Haitians by establishing a working 
relationship with the United States.27 Kyle Longley describes a similar relationship between Jose 
Figueres in Costa Rica and the United States in The Sparrow and the Hawk. Figueres engaged in 
the type domestic reform policies, specifically land reform, which resulted in United States 
intervention in other Latin American nations such as Guatemala and British Guiana. However, a 
well-established cooperative relationship with the United States enabled him to undergo those 
changes without the same reprisals from Washington. 28 Roorda and Longley describe how 
establishing pro-United States, rather than non-aligned foreign policies, allowed regional leaders 
to pursue domestic policies with minimal fear of American intervention.  
                                                            
25 Westad, The Global Cold War. 
26 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold 
War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
27 Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican 
Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 126. 
28 Kyle Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States During the Rise of Jose Figueres 
(Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1997). 
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Colin Palmer’s Eric Williams and the Making of the Modern Caribbean examines the 
crucial role of Eric William, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, in shaping the post-
colonial Caribbean. 29 Williams was a central figure in the British West Indies during the period 
covered in this thesis, both as an academic and political leader and Palmer provides evidence of 
Williams’ insights on several important aspects of the independence process in British Guiana. 
Specifically, he notes that Williams was concerned about the prospect of prematurely granting 
independence in British Guiana, in large part because Jagan and Burnham were more concerned 
with pursuing their own personal political ambitions than cooperating to end racial strife and 
prepare the colony for self-government.30Thus, Westad, Palmer, Connelly, Longley, and Roorda, 
have begun to acknowledge the critical role of political leaders and political and social groups in 
the developing world in effecting the trajectory of the Cold War-decolonization era. This thesis 
will build on their work by showing how nationalist leaders influenced Anglo-American policy 
towards British Guiana. 
Charles Ameringer’s The Democratic Left in Exile suggests that individuals, such as 
Figueres, were part of a broad Latin American movement which embraced revolutionary 
political ideology as a means of challenging the existing political structure in the region, namely, 
the authority of dictators, such as Trujillo.31  Ameringer’s work argues that the Caribbean 
underwent significant political and social change between World War I and the Cuban 
Revolution, in part because of the influence of revolutionary movements in Mexico and the 
                                                            
29 For a summary of Williams’ relationship to Guianese politics, and his evaluation of Jagan and Burnham , see: 
Colin A. Palmer, Eric Williams and the Making of the Modern Caribbean (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006), 198-234. 
30 Ibid, 205, 222. 
31 Charles Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile: The Antidictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 1945-59 (Coral 
Gables, FL, 1974). 
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Soviet Union.32 In examining the collaboration between regional leaders, Ameringer illustrates 
how, at times, there was a fine line between the democratic left and communist regimes.33Most 
significantly, the success of the Cuban Revolution was the catalyst for a reinterpretation of the 
ideology which had guided the Democratic Left since 1945 and a re-evaluation of the 
movement’s goals.34This is perhaps most clear in Venezuela, where a schism developed between 
moderate, older members of the Accion Democratica (AD), and the younger, more radical, 
“muchachos”.35 Thomas Wright further explores the impact of the Cuban Revolution on regional 
ideology and political movements in Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution.36 Wright 
suggests that after the split in the AD, the Venezuelan Communist Party became the most active 
communist party in Latin America and in 1962 it formally embraced armed struggle against the 
existing Venezuelan government.37 The work of Ameringer and Wright further proves that 
Caribbean activists and nationalist leaders were active participants in the Cold War, not simply 
pawns in a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. This thesis will build on 
their work by showing that Guianese nationalists were influenced by the Cold War. Additionally, 
it will examine how Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham developed foreign policies based on their 
perception of the impact of Cold War events in British Guiana. 
                                                            
32 Ibid, 19-20.  
33 Throughout his work, Ameringer chronicles the relationships of regional leaders who struggled against Caribbean 
dictatorships. What becomes clear in his work, that is essential for the purposes of this thesis, is that while the 
Democratic Left was generally anti-communist, the relationship was never black and white. In discussing the future 
of Latin American dictatorships at the Santiago Conference in 1959, the Venezuelan delegation sided most closely 
with the representatives from Cuba. At the time, the Venezuelan contingency sought to promote leftist democracy; 
however, its interpretation of how to achieve needed regional reforms was closer to the Cuban model than that of 
moderate democratic regimes, such as Brasil or the United States. See: Ibid, 284-289. 
34 Ameringer defines the Democratic Left as embracing the ideals of equal rights and representative government and 
seeking far-reaching economic and social change, national planning for economic planning and diversification, an 
equitable distribution of wealth, liberation of the economy from foreign control, agrarian reform, and improved 
housing, education, and health care. See: Ibid, 15. 
35 Ibid, 289-293. 
36 Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 
37 Ibid, 52, 78. 
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 However active regional leaders were, the United States was the most powerful nation in 
the region and its policies impacted every facet of regional politics during the Cold War. There 
has been considerable research into United States Cold War policy as it relates to the Caribbean 
and Latin America. Richard Barnet is critical of American policy, which he interprets as an 
overly strict adherence to anti-communism. Barnet suggests that United States officials had 
difficulty making foreign policy decisions because their worldview was obscured by a Cold War 
lens.38 Similarly, Stephen Rabe is critical of United States policy toward British Guiana. He 
suggests that the Kennedy Administration’s inflexible Cold War agenda did not permit a realistic 
understanding of the subtleties of the Guianese political situation.39 Arthur Schlesinger’s A 
Thousand Days provides key insight into Kennedy Administration policymaking in the 
hemisphere as well as important contextualization of the internal dynamics of the White House 
from 1961-1963. Most importantly for the purposes of this study, Schlesinger, a historian who 
served in the John F. Kennedy Administration, describes how the Cuban Revolution, the failed 
Bay of Pigs invasion, and the Cuban Missile Crisis impacted policymaking toward British 
Guiana. Schlesinger’s explains that the primary objective of American policy toward the 
Caribbean was to avoid a second communist revolution. Crucially, however, Schlesinger notes 
that Kennedy sought to carry out a pragmatic policy in the hemisphere after the Bay of Pigs 
disaster, potentially working with governments of varying ideologies and domestic agendas, as 
long as they were anti-communist. Schlesinger’s description of White House policymaking 
suggests that interpretations which attribute the PPP failure in British Guiana to a paranoid anti-
communist policy are incomplete.40 Schlesinger’s work suggests that hemispheric leaders could 
engage in a degree of independent domestic policymaking, as suggested by Kyle Longley in The 
                                                            
38 Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, 257. 
39 Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana 71-73. 
40 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 773-781. 
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Sparrow and the Hawk and Eric Roorda’s The Dictator Next Door, so long as they supported 
American opposition to communism, specifically in the Western Hemisphere.41 
 Nonetheless, a critical component of United States Cold War policy in Latin America, 
and much of the developing world, was covert intervention. Philip Agee’s Inside the Company is 
an early depiction of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intervention. Agee, a former CIA agent, 
discusses how the United States government, with the assistance of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), conducted operations to subvert the 
Jagan-led PPP beginning in 1959.42In addition to Agee, James McDonald, Nick Cullather, 
Jennifer Dale Kibe, and Gordon Oliver Daniels, have produced important studies which have 
contributed to the understanding of American covert subversion activities.43 
 Anglo-American intervention significantly influenced decolonization in British Guiana; 
however, British Guiana’s colonial history created the social and political setting which British 
and American policymakers exploited as the colony transitioned to self-government. The 
secondary literature on the development of Guianese culture begins with Leo Despres’ Cultural 
Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana who explains the instability of the Guianese 
independence period as a consequence of the sociological development of the colony.44 He 
attributes the physical as well as cultural separation of ethnic groups in British Guiana, 
specifically the Afro-Guianese and East Indian communities, to colonial development. Despres 
argues that the Christian missionary run educational system alienated East Indians seeking to 
                                                            
41 Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk; Roorda, The Dictator Next Door. 
42 Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), 416. 
43 James L. McDonald, “Overriding Interests: Subversion as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy” (Ph.D. diss., 
American University, 1997); Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in 
Guatemala, 1952-54 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); Jennifer Dale Kibe, “Presidents as 
Kingmakers: U.S. Decisions to Overthrow Foreign Governments” (Ph.D. Diss., University of California Los 
Angeles, 2002); Gordon Oliver Daniels, “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan: The Kennedy Administration and 
British Guiana, 1961-63” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Mississippi, 2000). 
44 Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana. 
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preserve their Hindu culture. He emphasizes that the physical separation of Afro-Guianese, who 
primarily resided in urban areas, and East Indians, who mostly remained on rural plantations, led 
to the emergence of a culturally pluralistic society in British Guiana.45 Despres asserts that 
cultural pluralism was the basis for eventual strife as the nationalist movement progressed. He 
concludes that the culturally pluralistic nature of Guianese society and the willingness of 
politicians, specifically Jagan and Burnham, to exploit racial differences for political advantage, 
were the primary factors which destroyed the unified nationalist movement in the colony and 
defined the independence period. 46 Rishee Thakur takes issue with Despres and traditional 
cultural pluralists who subordinate the important role of political ideology among third world 
nationalists to simplistic cultural explanations. He contextualizes cultural pluralism as the 
Caribbean variant of Modernization Theory.47  Although cultural divisions existed in Guianese 
society, their ability to fragment the nationalist movement was significant only within the 
broader context of political and ideological differences within the movement itself. Thakur 
concludes that most of the racial violence was a manufactured product of Jagan and Burnham’s 
political maneuvering and of American subversion efforts.48 
 Alan H. Adamson describes the early development of British Guiana’s political economy 
as the result of indentured immigration to the colony in the aftermath of the emancipation of 
slaves in the British Empire in 1834 in Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920. 
                                                            
45 Despres defines a pluralistic society as one in which two or more societal groups coexist with minimal 
interrelation. Groups remain culturally differentiated through specific institutional activities which maintain cultural 
differentiation as the basis for socio-cultural integration. See: Ibid, 13-14, 21-23. 
46 Ibid ,220-224. 
47 Michael Latham defines modernization theory as a set of assumptions, essentially: 1. Traditional and modern 
societies are separated by a sharp dichotomy; 2. Economic, political, and social changes are integrated and 
interdependent; 3. Development tends to proceed toward the modern state along a common, linear path; and 4. The 
progress of developing societies can be dramatically accelerated through contact with developed ones. See: Michael 
E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 4. 




Adamson concludes that the system of indentured servitude in British Guiana resulted in an 
economic monoculture based on sugar and, like Despres, a culturally pluralistic society.49 In A 
History of Organized Labor in the English-Speaking West Indies, Robert J. Alexander examines 
how the political development of British Guiana, as with most of the British West Indies, grew 
out of organized labor movements.50 Alexander describes how severe limitations on suffrage in 
the colony forced the majority of the population to seek political voice through labor unions. 
However, as suffrage expanded unions maintained considerable influence over political parties 
and parties sought to develop alliances with established unions or replace them with 
organizations loyal to the parties themselves.  
The intimate relationship between organized labor and political parties was the impetus 
for much of the conflict and violence of the independence period.51 In Cold War in a Hot Zone, 
Gerald Horne describes how organized labor in the British West Indies played a critical role in 
influencing the timing and trajectory of independence movements in the Caribbean after World 
War II. Horne explains that radical labor movements were the impetus for political organization 
throughout the region as well as the source of considerable strife with the United States and 
Great Britain.52 The radical Marxist ideology of many regional movements, specifically the 
Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC), was incompatible with British colonial and American Cold 
War imperatives in the hemisphere, and thus led to Anglo-American intervention. Additionally, 
                                                            
49 Alan H. Adamson, “The Impact of Indentured Immigration on the Political Economy of British Guiana” in 
Saunders, Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920, 53. 
50 Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in the English –Speaking West Indies. 
51 Ibid, 330, 368-370. 
52 Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone. 
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Horne elaborates on the racial politics within British Guiana which led to the disintegration of 
unified labor movements in the colony.53 
 The secondary literature on the decolonization and independence of British Guiana tends 
to focus on the involvement of the United States in the overthrow of Cheddi Jagan and the 
general decolonization process of the British West Indies. Early interpretations of the 
independence process in British Guiana, such as Cheddi Jagan’s The West On Trial, interpreted 
events in the colony during the independence period as part of a Cold War struggle wherein the 
Guianese became victims of overzealous anti-communists within the United States government. 
Jagan’s autobiography attributes the violence of the independence process in British Guiana, and 
ultimately the failure of the PPP government to remain in power, to subversive efforts by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Kennedy administration.54 Richard Barnet’s 
Intervention and Revolution echoes Jagan’s argument, concluding that land reform measures, 
acceptance of aid from communist nations, and the PPP attempt to formulate a non-aligned 
foreign policy, caused United States officials to assume that the Guianese government was a 
threat to American national security, which in turn, led to covert intervention in the colony.55 
Barnet’s work is an early criticism of the tendency of American policymakers to view the world 
through a narrow Cold War lens.56 Thomas Spinner’s Political and Social History of Guyana 
1945-83 draws similar conclusions to Jagan and Barnet.57 Spinner describes Jagan as a “romantic 
                                                            
53 Ibid, 157, 171-172. 
54 Jagan, The West On Trial. 
55 Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, 106. 
56 Ibid, 9-10. 
57 Spinner, Political and Social History of Guyana. 
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Stalinist” unjustly removed from his position by a Kennedy Administration obsessed with 
avoiding a Cuban-like revolution in British Guiana.58 
 More recently, Stephen Rabe’s U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, determines that in the 
wake of the Cuban Revolution, the Kennedy Administration’s fear of confronting a communist 
government in the hemisphere resulted in an inflexible and irrational policy of covert subversion 
toward a moderate PPP government in British Guiana. Rabe analyzes the interaction between the 
Kennedy Administration and high ranking officials in Great Britain, concluding that the British 
bowed to American pressure and assisted in destroying democracy in their colony to achieve 
American Cold War aims. He also considers the role of non-governmental actors, specifically 
American labor unions such as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organization (AFL-CIO), to add depth to the conclusions drawn from earlier works.59 Rabe 
provides a more focused analysis of United States anti-communist policymaking toward Latin 
America under the administration of President John F. Kennedy in The Most Dangerous Area in 
the World.60 Similarly, Gordon Oliver Daniels’ “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan” suggests that 
British and American opposition to Cheddi Jagan was unjustified. Daniels suggests that Jagan 
was a nationalist, who British and American officials deemed communist because of his 
aggressive attempts to achieve independence for the Guianese people.61Daniels acknowledges 
that Jagan’s “reckless diplomacy” had a considerably negative impact on his relationship with 
American officials; however, he concludes that the Kennedy Administration’s strict Cold War 
                                                            
58 Ibid, xii. 
59 Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 11. 
60 Rabe also considers the Kennedy Administration policy toward British Guiana in an earlier work . See: Stephen 
Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist  Revolution in Latin 
America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 79-95. 
61 Daniels, “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan”, 1. 
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policy drove events in British Guiana.62 Rabe and Daniels show the significant influence of 
American intervention in British Guiana, and this thesis will seek to add to their work by 
explaining how Jagan influenced British and American policy in British Guiana. 
 Finally, Jason Parker best explores the role of race in the decolonization of the Caribbean. 
Brother’s Keeper contributes substantially to the understanding of the roles of race and the Cold 
War during the decolonization process in the British West Indies. Parker, like Gerald Horne, 
considers the relationship between British and American imperatives in the Caribbean. He 
elaborates on how the United States and Great Britain worked together to maintain stability in 
the region, diffusing potentially volatile independence movements as power was transferred from 
colonial power to newly emerging governments.63 Additionally, Parker discusses how black 
Caribbean leaders such as Marcus Garvey and Norman Manley helped forge political ties 
between the British West Indies and the American civil rights movement, which had a growing 
influence on domestic politics in the United States.64 Thus, domestic racial politics made it 
somewhat difficult for United States policymakers to oppose regional leaders of African descent. 
Like Parker, Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War considers the interconnectedness of the 
Cold War and decolonization and exemplifies the trajectory toward a more inclusive literature 
involving actors in developing areas as well as superpower nations.65This thesis briefly explains 
how domestic politics in the United States impacted the Kennedy Administration policy toward 
British Guiana, and thus, shows how nationalist leaders engaged the American public as a means 
of influencing policymakers in Washington. 
                                                            
62 Ibid, 124-125, 168-172. 
63 Parker, Brother’s Keeper; Gerald Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone: The United States Confronts Labor and 
Independence Struggles in the British West Indies (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007). 
64 Ibid, 6, 16-17, 43, 53. 
65 Westad, The Global Cold War, 5. 
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  In addition to the secondary literature outlined above, this thesis will make use of a 
several key archival resources. Records from the State Department housed at National Archives 
II in College Park, Maryland provide most of the information United States officials generated 
and thus the primary source for American perspectives on British Guiana and later Guyana. 
Additional United States governmental documents are incorporated from the Foreign Relations 
of the United States (FRUS) volumes concerning British Guiana from 1961-63 and volume 
XXXII Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guiana 1964-68. The FRUS volumes are particularly 
valuable in their ability to fill in the gaps despite the considerable number of documents between 
high level American officials still classified in the State Department records. Memorandums 
from the United States Consulate in Georgetown to the State Department as well as from other 
posts in the Caribbean have yielded revealing insight on the evolution of the United States 
attitudes toward Forbes Burnham, especially from American officials in the region. Equally 
useful are memorandums from upper-level United States administrative officials and high 
ranking members of Great Britain’s Foreign Office. Diplomatic exchanges between senior 
officials in Whitehall and Washington will be used to determine how United States and British 
leaders conceived of their strategic concerns on the ultimate strategy pursued in British Guiana. 
 The major sources for understanding British perspectives and strategy will be based on 
Parliamentary records, records of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, and Cabinet 
Minute Papers housed at the British National Archives. This project will consider the varying 
agendas of the different institutional components of British government and how collective 
decisions were made as well as the interplay between the White House and British Parliament. 
As in the United States, memoranda and letters between various government posts reveal that 
there was a persistent evaluation and re-evaluation of potential leaders in British Guiana. These 
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sources suggest that officials were engaged in an evolving assessment of Burnham and Jagan and 
search consistently for a third alternative to lead British Guiana to independence. When 
compared with U. S. State Department Records, a picture emerges which makes clear the 
complexity of Anglo-American cooperation in British Guiana. The significance of cooperation 
between Whitehall and Washington is considered at length by a number of important British 
officials whose conversations are accessible through these archives. 
Conclusion 
 Nearly twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and with time a more 
nuanced historical perspective is beginning to develop. Historians have concluded that histories 
of the Cold War that focus exclusively on great-power cooperation and conflict do not present a 
complete story of the Cold War. To obtain a more accurate view of how the Cold War unfolded, 
it is necessary to examine the agency of political actors who were not leaders of the great 
powers, including nationalist leaders in the developing world. The early 1960’s represented the 
height of the Cold War as well as the climax of the long process of global decolonization. The 
complex relationship between these two phenomena is evident in the degree to which British 
Guiana presented a unique and crucial challenge to the Anglo-American cooperation which 
continued after the Second World War.  
 Events in Cuba throughout the 1960s resulted in a focused Cold War lens through which 
the United States contextualized international affairs. Realistic fears existed in regard to 
instability and communist infiltration in the Caribbean at the exact moment Great Britain sought 
to withdraw from the region. British fears of civil war and instability in their former colony were 
well founded. Such a scenario was likely to have occurred if the decolonization process was not 
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carefully attended to. The potential for regional instability demanded a coordination of policy 
between Great Britain and the United States. The difficulties of collaboration are evident as the 
decolonization process is examined.  
 Ultimately, Guyana provides an excellent example of how Great Britain and the United 
States overcame their differences in individual strategic goals and coordinated a Cold War 
strategy for decolonization. As such, the process in which the country became the independent 
nation of Guyana is an insightful snapshot of the dual actions of both decolonization and Cold 
War reality and how they affected one another. Additionally, and perhaps most crucially, British 
Guiana presents an opportunity to acknowledge that while the United States drove Western Cold 
War policy, American leaders could not ignore events or political leaders in the developing 
world. Nationalist leaders in former colonies struggled to assert themselves in a newly 
restructured world and they too were forced to comprehend and work successfully within the 
framework established by the dual dynamics of the Cold War and decolonization. Nationalist 
leaders contributed immensely to the trajectory of the Cold War. It is outrageous that nationalist 
leaders in the developing world were forced to consider the imperatives of great powers or risk 
intervention; however, it is significant to consider the ways in which nationalist leaders 
influenced superpower policy. The actions of men like Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham 
influenced to a significant degree they way the great powers of the era pursued the Cold War. 
This project, therefore, will examine the complex decolonization process in British Guiana in 
light of the power struggle between nationalist leaders, the United States and Great Britain 




Chapter 2: The Impact of Colonial History on the Decolonization Process in British Guiana  
 On May 26, 1966 the largest empire in world history granted independence to its only 
colony on the South American mainland, the small enclave of British Guiana. The colony, 
known after independence as Guyana, has experienced negligible population growth since its 
independence forty-four years ago. Comparatively, it would be the sixtieth largest metro area in 
the United States in 2009, slightly edging out Syracuse, New York.1 Guyana encompasses 
roughly 83,000 square miles, about the same as Utah or Idaho, although the vast majority of the 
population is concentrated on a thin coastal plain.2 Notwithstanding the diminutive size of the 
territory in respect to land area and population, British Guiana held a vast significance for Great 
Britain and the United States from 1953 to 1966 as the colony struggled to establish a viable 
internal government and become an independent nation. Cold War geo-strategic concerns, the 
liquidation of the British Empire, and chaos within the colony all contributed to a decade and a 
half of intense concern, contention, and cooperation within the Anglo-American alliance.  
 This chapter will provide a general narrative history of British Guiana as an introduction 
to a more involved study of the decolonization and independence process in the colony from 
1953 to1966. It will introduce a number of important themes, such as union-based politics, racial 
discord, and Anglo-American intervention, which will be further developed in subsequent 
chapters and explain how colonization created the societal characteristics which framed 
decolonization in British Guiana. Politics in British Guiana in the late colonial period was 
intricately connected to organized labor unions. These unions were formed as a result of 
relationships fostered in worker movements during episodes of economic crisis, specifically in 
                                                            
1 1 CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the -world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html, 
www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t3/tables/tab03. 
2 CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147/rank.html. 
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the 1930s. Popular labor movements were a necessary outgrowth of colonial social structures 
which limited suffrage and forced the majority of the population to seek political voice through 
means other than a democratic vote. The liberal nature of international labor movements in the 
1920s and 1930s left a permanent impression on Guianese political leaders seeking self-
government. Similar peculiarities of colonial society impacted race relations, international 
affairs, and economic development. These themes will be developed in this chronology of 
Guianese history in such a manner that they can be properly understood when drawn upon in 
subsequent chapters of this work.  
The road to autonomous government in British Guiana was marred by a legacy of 
violence and racial conflict, often described as a phenomenon which “enflamed” the colony. Fire 
is literally and figuratively a fitting analogy for the events which preceded the establishment of 
an autonomous government in the colony. Literally, arson played a prominent role in the racial 
warfare which poisoned Georgetown and razed East Indian villages in 1962, 1963, and 1964.3 
Fire is even more useful as a metaphor to explain the eventual strife which plagued British 
Guiana. Three elements are necessary for a fire to burn: fuel, heat, and an igniter. British 
Guiana’s colonial history provided 130 years of tension between Afro-Guianese and East 
Indians. Colonial structures compounded antagonisms between the two largest ethnic groups in 
the colony and provided ample fuel for conflict. A small, but prominent upper-middle class of 
white merchants only added to the explosive mix of ethnic rivalry in the colony. Geo-strategic 
Cold War imperatives framed the Anglo-American perspective on how decolonization would 
occur in the British West Indies. The result was an increasingly rigid structure within which 
                                                            
3 Cheddi Jagan, The West On Trial: My Fight For Guyana’s Freedom (New York: International Publishers, 1966), 
263-265; 357. Thomas Spinner, Political and Social History of Guyana 1945-83 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 
98; 100-105; Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), 110-112, 126. 
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Guianese were forced to work. Outside influences heated up an already tense situation in the 
British Guiana. The ultimate catalyst which ignited the flames of racial warfare came from the 
politically opportunistic leadership of key Guianese nationalist leaders, especially Cheddi jagan 
and Forbes Burnham. Those politicians spoke to embedded fears warning that cultural 
subjugation would be the consequence if either ethnic group lost the election. The evolution of 
Guianese society made for a volatile situation as the colony prepared for self-government. This 
chapter will survey the historical background which led up to this volatile situation. 
Initial European Colonization and the Development of a Sugar Economy 
The early history of Guyana, like most European colonies in the Caribbean, was defined 
by two main characteristics: sugar and African slaves.4 Most of the area which today comprises 
the nation of Guyana was initially settled in 1621 by the Dutch West India Company. The Dutch 
established small colonies primarily located along the coastal belt, about three or four miles from 
the sea.5 Less than one hundred Europeans populated the Essequibo colony at the beginning of 
the eighteenth-century, and the population remained consistent until the West India Company 
opened the region to British settlers in the middle of the eighteenth-century. The population 
surged upward as British planters from neighboring Caribbean islands immigrated to the region 
during the last half of the eighteenth-century in search of fertile soils.6 Between 1781 and 1803 
European wars shifted control of the colony between The Netherlands, Great Britain, and France. 
In 1803 Great Britain established rule over the colony permanently and that authority was 
                                                            
4 Many scholars have discussed the influence of a sugar based economic system and the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 
terms of its developmental influence on the Caribbean. See: Robert J. Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in 
the English –Speaking West Indies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 327-328; Leo A. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and 
Nationalist Politics in British Guiana (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), 3-4; Franklin W. Knight & 
Colin A. Palmer, The Modern Caribbean (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 6-9. 
5 Spinner, Political and Social History of Guyana, 3-4. 
6 Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 15. 
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ratified at the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. In 1831 the British unified their holdings in the region as 
the colony of British Guiana in the geographical structure that it holds today.7 
Colonial Guianese society was dominated by a sugar plantation based economic system 
throughout the nineteenth-century. The labor intensive cash crop was the catalyst for the influx 
of racially diverse workers during the period. Initially the British found their primary source of 
labor in African slaves; however, the reformation of slave laws in the British Empire during the 
early to mid nineteenth-century, and subsequent abolition of slavery and the apprenticeship 
system in the 1830s, created a demand for alternative sources of low-cost labor. The majority of 
freed slaves in British Guiana refused to become wage laborers working for their former masters 
and migrated to the towns and villages, gradually becoming an urban proletariat.8 It was under 
these transformational circumstances that British planters sought salvation from their labor 
shortage problem. The planters’ deliverance came with the importation of multitudes of 
indentured servants from across the globe. Immigrant laborers, in theory would work for an 
agreed upon number of years, usually five.9 However, wealthy planters strong armed workers, 
manipulated colonial laws, and benefited from lax application of Colonial Office trusteeship over 
servants. As a result, most indentures found themselves bound to plantations in slave-like 
conditions after their period of servitude expired.10 The majority of indentured workers were 
migrants from Britain’s jewel colony, India, and smaller numbers of indentured workers 
immigrated from Portugal and China as well, transforming the colony into an enclave of eclectic 
cultures on the mainland of South America.11 About 30,000 Portuguese immigrated to the 
                                                            
7 Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in the English –Speaking West Indies, 327; Rabe, U.S. Intervention in 
British Guiana, 15; Spinner, Political and Social History of Guyana, 5. 
8 Spinner, Political and Social History of Guyana, 6. 
9 Ibid, 6. 
10 Saunders, Indentured Labour in the British Empire, 44-45. 
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colony, most arriving between the abolition of apprenticeship in 1838 and 1860. Chinese 
workers numbered about 14,000 and entered the colony primarily from 1850-1870. In addition, 
about 240,000 East Indians were imported into British Guiana between1838 and 1917.12 The 
sugar plantation system turned the colony into a monocrop economy that was hard to diversify 
once sugar prices collapsed. Additionally, the system of indentured servitude framed 
immigration to the colony and the demographic segregation of Guianese society along ethnic 
lines. 
Immigration and Social Development 
The early development of the colony established the basis for its social evolution during 
the ensuing century and into the independence period. Indentured servitude provided the impetus 
for multi-cultural immigration but did not create an integrated society. Workers received passage 
to British Guiana in exchange for an agreement to work for five years, primarily on one of the 
colony’s sugar plantations. Indentures had the option to obtain an industrial residence upon the 
expiration of required service until 1862 when the Court of Policy established reindenture for a 
period of five years to quell competition with the free labor market. Immigrant laborers were 
virtually imprisoned on the estates to which they were bound as a result of such modifications to 
colonial policy. High levels of immigration continued until the combination of a numerically 
significant labor force and the world sugar crisis of 1894-95 decreased the need for additional 
cheap labor in the colony. By the mid-1890s there were enough poor laborers in British Guiana 
for planters to establish a system of cheap wage labor, thus ending the indenture system in the 
colony.13 East Indians’ desire to retain cultural traditions and their economic dependence on 
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plantation owners left them isolated from the rest of Guianese society. The structural isolation of 
East Indian indentures was the first of several examples of colonial systems segregating the 
ethnic communities of the British Guiana. 
Despite racial and cultural diversity, immigrant groups formed communities based on 
ethnic affiliation and employment was organized along racial lines. The majority of Portuguese 
and Chinese workers moved into towns and villages to pursue retail trades upon the completion 
of their period of servitude and the Chinese especially assimilated well into the existing 
European culture of the urban areas. The Portuguese community suffered through periods of 
antagonism from other cultural groups because of their Roman-Catholic heritage. Additionally, 
the indebted lower classes occasionally blamed Portuguese retailers for price hikes during 
periods of economic stagnation, leading to anti-Portuguese riots in 1856, 1889, and 1905.14 The 
majority of the East Indian population in British Guiana, however, remained based in rural areas 
hoping to preserve cultural traditions and become independent land owners through rice 
cultivation.15 
The two largest ethnic groups were those of African and East Indian origin. Afro-
Guianese and East Indians developed quite separate cultures despite the limited geographical size 
of the colony and its few population centers. In addition to the system of indenture, cultural 
exchange was limited by other colonial structures, specifically the colonial educational system. 
Great Britain mandated compulsory education for the Guianese in 1876 based on Christian run 
schools. Consequently, there was virtually no enforcement of the law in regards to East Indians, 
who resided predominantly on sugar estates and developed a segregated society based on 
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traditional Hindu or Muslim cultures. Therefore, the Afro-Guianese population established an 
urban based culture centered on education, Christian religion, and a moderate conformity to 
British norms and values. In contrast, East Indians resided principally in rural areas where they 
worked in sugar fields and after 1900 began cultivating rice. Many East Indians obtained small 
amounts of Crown land from settlement schemes designed to entice them to remain in the colony 
after their period of servitude expired, while others remained as wage workers on large sugar 
plantations.16 Lack of education, and strong familial ties, limited the ability of East Indians to 
migrate to urban areas.17 Other structural characteristics of the British colonial system worked in 
conjunction with the educational laws to further develop what has frequently been defined as a 
pluralistic society.18 The mining industry, for example, existed outside the spectrum of 
indentured labor, drawing its workers from the displaced Afro-Guianese community. A 
considerable number of former slaves became prospectors, or worked as laborers for the small 
industry of the colony. These individuals were paid in cities and, despite working in the interior, 
congregated in towns and villages, slowly acquiring small pieces of property and establishing a 
unique urban culture.19 British Guiana’s racial demographics and its occupational and social 
segregation framed the colony’s political evolution. East Indians were disenfranchised for most 
of the colony’s history, despite being the largest ethnic group in British Guiana and the East 
Indian community was fiercely loyal to Cheddi Jagan when he emerged a political leader.20 
Additionally, occupational segregation meant that the pursuit of a political agenda directed at 
improving conditions for field workers or urban laborers inherently resulted in alignment with a 
specific ethnic group. 
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Despite the development of several distinct ethnic cultures, racial conflict in British 
Guiana was less violently pervasive than in other culturally diverse societies, such as the United 
States. Open interracial conflict was uncommon in the colony, though as mentioned, there were 
persistent antagonisms in Guianese society, which occasionally surfaced in episodes such as the 
anti-Portuguese riots and intermittent Afro-Guianese-East Indian violence. Cultural rivalry was 
manifested in intense disdain between the Afro-Guianese and East-Indian communities and 
struggle was endemic, though generally non-violent prior to the independence period.21 The 
segregated nature of Guianese society may have acted as a veil through which passionate ethnic 
rivalry was obscured by structural separation. Self-government demanded a more integrated 
society and Guianese leaders increasingly exploited racial issues for political advantage as the 
colony neared independence. 
Venezuelan Boarder Dispute 
International conflicts during the colonial period also contributed to the complexity of the 
independence process in British Guiana. Transfers of European rule in British Guiana during the 
eighteenth century resulted in confusion over the ill defined regional borders. In 1895 a long 
standing Venezuelan territorial claim of the Essequibo region threatened to erupt into a full-scale 
international crisis when the United States moved to support the Venezuelan position as a means 
of affirming its own growing influence in the Caribbean. Great Britain asserted its right to the 
region based on Dutch secession of the territory in the Treaty of Vienna in 1815.The Essequibo 
region was meagerly inhabited; but it comprised nearly two-thirds of British Guiana and was 
believed at the time to be rich in a plethora of minerals; specifically, gold, copper, and iron-ore, 
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as well as potentially containing coastal oil deposits.22 Venezuela and Great Britain agreed to 
submit to international arbitration and the United States appointed a committee to resolve the 
matter. The council appointed to decide the matter was composed two judges from the United 
States and two from Great Britain and was presided over by a representative from Russia. 23 The 
decision strongly favored Great Britain, making the entire ordeal appear to have been a political 
play by the United States. Venezuela received Point Barima, the Orinoco River mouth, and 3,000 
miles in the interior while Great Britain was awarded 50,000 square miles of the territory when 
the decision was handed down.24 The Venezuelan congress was unsatisfied with the arbitration 
and despite the fact that they accepted the commission’s findings in 1905; intermittent 
diplomatic protests were voiced in Caracas over the ensuing half-century, culminating in a 
Special Political Committee in the United Nations in 1962.25 The diplomatic instability resulting 
from the dispute would have implications for British Guiana’s independence during the 1960s 
and eventually led to armed conflict after Guyana’s independence.26 
Colonial Economics in the Early Twentieth Century 
British Guiana’s economic development contributed significantly to its social and 
political evolution. By the early twentieth century, a disproportionate amount of influence in 
British Guiana was held in the hands of a small number of large western companies. The First 
World War served as the catalyst for the investment of American and Canadian companies in the 
bauxite mining industry in the British West Indian colonies, primarily British Guiana and 
Jamaica. The interests of these companies became crucial during the Second World War and 
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their importance grew further with the increasing tension of the Cold War in the 1950s. The 
Truman Administration passed NSC-68 in 1950, outlining a new, aggressive American strategy 
for conducting the Cold War and bauxite, the mineral used to make aluminum, was an essential 
component of the American military buildup. Additionally, the onset of the Korean War in 1950 
further increased the American demand for aluminum.27 The Demerara Bauxite Company of 
Canada and Reynolds Metals Company, based in the United States, controlled almost all of the 
bauxite industry in British Guiana.  
The most influential capital investor in British Guiana was Booker Brother’s McConnell 
and Company Limited, a British company which established a virtual monopoly on sugar and 
plantations, controlling almost eighty-five percent of the arable land in the colony.28 Bookers’ 
influence was not confined to plantations. The company also operated one of the largest 
mercantile enterprises in the colony, including drug stores, shipping lines, manufacturing 
companies, and subsidiaries in shrimping, printing, stock feeds, insurance, and distilleries.29 In 
his work, Cold War in a Hot Zone, Gerald Horne notes that Booker Brothers wielded such an 
influence in the colony that future Guianese Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan once stated: 
“[Bookers] are and indeed always have been the real rulers of our country.”30 Stephen Rabe 
notes that many Guianese made light of the situation by referring to the colony as “Booker’s 
Guiana”. By 1962 Bookers was the primary source of income for 100,000 people, almost a fifth 
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of the population.31 The global economic crisis in 1894-95, and again in the 1930s, led to a 
decline in sugar prices and a subsequent increase in the importance of rice and bauxite to British 
Guiana. However, the diversity of Bookers’ investments ensured the company’s prominence in 
the colony into the independence period. The economic monoculture and social segregation 
fermented in British Guiana from 1815-1950 helped frame the independence process from 1950-
1966.  
Organized Labor and Political Evolution 
Social conditions in British Guiana severely restricted political involvement in the colony 
and led to the rise of organized labor as the primary conduit for political voice as was 
characteristic of most of the British Caribbean. Thus, the intricacies of workers’ movements 
defined the trajectory of political development in the colony. Property requirements limited the 
voting population to a miniscule 4,300 individuals in 1915. Additionally, suffrage was entirely 
disproportionate to population demographics. Sixty percent of registered voters were Afro-
Guianese, twenty percent British, eleven percent Portuguese, and only six percent East Indian; 
despite the fact that East Indians comprised roughly fifty percent of the adult male population.32 
As a result, disenfranchised workers attempted to gain a political voice through collective labor 
movements. Several attempts were made at collective labor movements in the colony to combat 
wartime inflation without success during the 1910s. Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow, an Afro-
Guianese dock worker, established the first permanent labor union, the British Guiana Labour 
Union (BGLU) in 1919 with the assistance of British union leaders.33 Critchlow organized the 
“First British Guiana and West Indies Labour Conference” in Georgetown in 1926. The 
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conference resulted in the formation of the British Guiana and West Indian Labour Federation, 
the first regional labor movement. Critchlow’s socialist leanings laid the foundation for the 
strong connection between liberal ideals and labor unions, characteristics which defined British 
Guianese politics for the next forty years. It is pertinent to note the animosity Critchlow had for 
the East Indian community as well as the reality that union based politics contributed to further 
racial polarization in Guianese society. Gerald Horne accurately draws a connection between the 
marginalization of the East Indian community and the rise of Cheddi Jagan twenty years later.34 
Global economic depression during the 1930s was the impetus for the most significant 
changes in British Guiana during the mid-twentieth century. Sugar prices fell drastically 
resulting in extreme unemployment and decreased wages for already desperately poor field 
workers. Labor unrest increased toward the middle of the decade and climaxed in October 1935 
when sugar workers walked off of several estates in the colony’s Demerara and Berbice districts. 
Striking workers had difficulty obtaining concessions from their employers, however, due to a 
lack of effective organization.35 Thus, the establishment of the Manpower Citizen’s Association 
(MPCA) in 1936 was a critical development in the political evolution of the colony. The 
organization came to be the most powerful representation of sugar workers in British Guiana 
during the independence period.36 Cheddi Jagan worked with the MPCA early in his political 
career; however, by the late 1940s Jagan determined that MPCA leaders were loyal to Bookers, 
rather than the field workers. Jagan began organizing opposition to the MPCA and he helped to 
establish the Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU) as an alternative union for sugar 
workers. His measures against the union were the catalyst for some of the most intense violence 
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and unrest in the colony during the independence period.37In response to increased political 
organization, the British Colonial Office relaxed voting laws during the 1930s, extending 
suffrage to a few thousand additional colonists.38 
Consequences of the Great Depression and World War II on Colonial Development 
The effects of the Great Depression continued to impact the Caribbean forcefully in 
1937-38. Consistently decreasing prices of rice, sugar, and bauxite during the decade culminated 
in extensive unemployment in the region by the end of the 1930s.39 Caribbean labor 
organizations hosted demonstrations in an attempt to improve the situation in the British West 
Indies, while organized workers reacted violently as labor unrest shook Trinidad in May 1938. 
Repercussions were felt across the British West Indies and beyond. Great Britain passed the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 in large part because of the consequences of the 
economic crisis in the Caribbean during the 1930s. Colonial administrators in Great Britain 
feared that protests against poor wages, terrible working conditions, and inadequate housing 
would spread to British Guiana and Jamaica through the increasingly interconnected network of 
trade unions. In response, the government sent a commission headed by Lord Moyne to the 
region in 1938.40 The Moyne Commission found terrible conditions including a serious lack of 
educational opportunity, deep poverty, and a rapidly increasing population in the region. The 
commission advocated serious economic and social reforms, such as increasing sugar subsidies 
and diversifying the economies of the region, as well as an expansion of suffrage for the 
colonies. Jason Parker notes crucially that while the importance of political reform was noted, 
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the British government made few concessions to the internal governments of the region.41 
Despite the intentions of the commission, the outbreak of World War II made investment in the 
colonies and attempts at reform impossible for Great Britain for nearly a decade.  
World War II also affected the region by drastically increasing the presence of the United 
States in British colonies. In 1940 Great Britain and the United States concluded the Destroyers 
for Bases Deal, assuring an amplified United States military presence in the region and in 
November of that year Franklin Roosevelt sent Charles Taussig to the Caribbean to survey the 
region. Taussig drew conclusions similar to those of Lord Moyne; deciding that overpopulation, 
disproportionate economic conditions, racial issues, and an abysmal infrastructure made the 
region susceptible to pro-Berlin forces.42 It is pertinent to note Taussig’s conclusion that the 
region was ripe for subversion simultaneously with his identification of active socialist labor 
movements in the region. The end of World War II did not result in an easing of American 
apprehension about security issues in the Caribbean. United States policymakers increasingly 
feared communist subversion in the region as the Cold War grew more intense. The conclusions 
drawn by the Taussig Commission actually became more relevant twenty years after the study.   
In 1942 the United States constructed Atkinson Airfield in British Guiana as part of the 
Destroyer for Bases Deal.43 The presence of a modern airfield on the South American continent 
and the Caribbean rim had implications which far exceeded its purpose during the Second World 
War, despite the fact that the base was closed after the Japanese surrender.44 British Guiana came 
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to take on a critical role in Anglo-American geo-strategy as the Cold War took the place of 
World War II as the primary Western security concern. 
Post-War Political Development 
During the early 1940s, British Guiana continued to make slow political progress as the 
general population became more actively involved in organized labor unions. In 1943 the 
constitution was liberalized decreasing the property qualifications for officeholders and further 
increasing the number of qualified voters in the colony. Also in 1943, the East-Indian Cheddi 
Jagan returned to British Guiana along with his newlywed American wife, the former Janet 
Rosenburg, after finishing dental school in the United States.45 The Jagans quickly became a 
political force in British Guiana and irreversibly altered the trajectory of the colony’s political 
history. Like most East-Indians in British Guiana, Jagan grew up on a sugar estate where his 
father worked as a cane-cutter and eventually foreman of a sugar gang.46 Cheddi Jagan had lived 
in the United States since 1936 when he left his home to attend Howard University with his 
entire family’s savings of $500.47 Jagan had begun to develop strong political views by the time 
he returned to the colony, and in 1945 he was sent as British Guiana’s representative to the 
newly founded Caribbean Labour Congress.48 In 1946 Cheddi and Janet Jagan formed the 
Political Affairs Committee (PAC) with the help of the Afro-Guianese trade unionist Ashton 
Chase and H.J.M. Hubbard, a white Marxist.49  Jagan won a seat on the colony’s legislative 
council in 1947 after the Colonial Office eased voting requirements increasing the electorate to 
60,000. The support of Sidney King, an Afro-Guianese school teacher, was crucial to his victory. 
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Janet Jagan and Hubbard unsuccessfully campaigned for seats on the council.50The PAC 
attempted to draw from this victory a multi-racial support base to advance an agenda of self-
government and universal adult suffrage.51 
The PAC was strengthened by its response to labor unrest in the colony in 1948. By the 
mid-1940s, the leadership of the MPCA had become corrupted by the interests of Bookers 
Brothers and ceased working for the wellbeing of the field workers. Membership dropped from 
20,000 in 1940 to 5,000 in 1948.52 There were two primary reasons for the disillusionment of 
workers. The first was that the union permitted Bookers to censor the material in the union 
periodical. The second was that the union’s expenses were almost entirely covered by 
advertisements by Bookers.53 The diminishing influence of the MPCA created a vacuum which 
allowed for the emergence of the GIWU, which pursued a more active role attempting to gain 
concessions from large sugar cooperatives.54 Throughout the spring, sugar workers organized a 
strike incorporating all of the sugar estates on the East Coast of Demerara. Five striking workers 
on the Enmore Sugar Estate were killed and another fourteen wounded by police on June 16. The 
Jagans responded by organizing a mass march for workers rights.55 The members of the PAC 
also began to work on the organization of a political party which they modeled on the 
Progressive Party in the United States and Norman Manley’s People’s National Party in Jamaica. 
                                                            
50 Ibid, 25Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 27. 
51 Spinner,  Political and Social History of Guyana, 24. 
52 Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in the English –Speaking West Indies, 348, 365. 
53 Ibid, 358. 
54 Ibid, 354. 
55 Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone, 163; Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 27; Spinner, Political and Social 
History of Guyana, 27. 
41 
 
Cheddi Jagan strengthened his political ties in 1949 when he became head of the Sawmill 
Workers Union and most importantly when he met Lyndon Forbes Burnham.56 Like Jagan, the 
Afro-Guianese Burnham left the colony to obtain a higher education and graduated from the 
University of London in 1947 with a degree in law. During his time in England, Burnham 
worked closely with the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) in London and fostered ties with the 
Communist Party of Great Britain. Before returning to British Guiana in 1949 Burnham helped 
the League of Coloured Peoples organize demonstrations against racism in the colonies.57 
Burnham set aside the strong sense of Afro-Guianese superiority for which he was known, and 
joined with the Jagans to form the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) on January 1, 1950.58 The 
organizational structure of the PPP was impressively multi-racial considering the contentious 
history of race relations in British Guiana. Both Jagans held prominent positions; Cheddi as party 
leader and Janet as general secretary. Forbes Burnham was named party chairman and Sydney 
King became assistant secretary. Clinton Wong, of Chinese heritage, was named senior vice-
chairman.59 
In Great Britain, Prime Minister Clement Atlee’s Labour Party began to advance a policy 
of guided decolonization throughout the British Empire, progressively granting internal self-
government to its colonies to in preparation for independence. In 1950 sent a commission to 
British Guiana headed by Dr. E.J. Waddington to assess the state of the colony. The Colonial 
Office was concerned about the residual effects of the violence in 1948 as well as the social and 
economic issues identified by the Moyne Commission. The Waddington Commission’s 
recommendations to the Colonial Office led to important changes in the political structure of 
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British Guiana. Universal adult suffrage was extended to the population of the colony, 
eliminating previous property and income restrictions in place in 1950. Additionally, a lower 
House of Assembly comprised of elected Guianese was added to the colonial legislature within 
the colony. The majority of the Executive Council of the colony would be drawn from the House 
of Assembly; however, the colonial governor retained veto powers over the colony as well as the 
authority to certify elections.60 
By 1952 Cheddi and Janet Jagan’s political ideology was becoming a point of concern for 
administrators in both Great Britain and the United States as well as within the colonial 
governments of the British West Indies. A British report on the PPP in late 1951 noted the 
party’s alignment with the CLC and labeled it a socialist party. Consequently, colonial 
authorities increasingly restricted the Jagans’ movement throughout the region between 1948 and 
1952.61 Trade unions in the United States with strong connections to the American government, 
such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), 
and Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT), labeled the Jagans communists in 1951. Jay 
Lovestone, Secretary-treasurer of the AFL, made the crucial determination that although the 
Jagans were communists, elements within the PPP were not so ideologically inclined and 
included Burnham in the second group after sanctioning a fact-finding mission on the situation to 
British Guiana. That information was passed on to the State Department in Washington D.C.62 
The anti-communist organized labor front in the United States became a conduit for the 
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American acquisition of intelligence on British Guiana, especially after the United States 
consulate was closed in 1953.63 
Internal Self-Government and British Resumption of Direct Rule 
In April 1953 British Guiana embarked on what seemed to be the beginning of a 
transition to independence when Great Britain oversaw the first national election in Guianese 
history.64 The results of the election, and the consequences which resulted from the actions of the 
PPP in its aftermath, set the precedent for the independence process in the colony.  The PPP won 
eighteen of twenty-four contested seats in a decisive victory that took the British by surprise. In 
an attempt to maintain racial solidarity the party sent three East Indians and three Afro-Guianese 
party members as its representatives to the governor’s Executive Council.65The Jagans moved to 
implement a number of social reforms in British Guiana in light of the overwhelming nature of 
their victory. The PPP targeted support for low-cost housing, workmen’s compensation, land 
reform, and public education. Scholars have generally interpreted the measures pursued by the 
PPP as relatively modest. However, British officials and contemporary political opposition, 
specifically members of the MPCA who were fearful of losing power under a Jagan-led 
government, interpreted Jagans moves as an attempt to consolidate support for the PPP and 
undermine his political opposition. The MPCA soon began to suggest that the Jagans were 
attempting to implement a communist government in the colony.66 The allegations grew when 
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the PPP overturned the Undesirable Publications Act which banned subversive literature, 
creating a legal means for the PPP distribution of communist literature in the colony.   
In September 1953 the GIWU called a nationwide sugar strike halting production of the 
colony’s chief form of revenue.67 Jagan hoped to use the strike to argue for the necessity of a 
Labour Relations Bill to expand workers rights by permitting laborers to certify unions of choice 
and decertify existing unions. If the bill was passed the PPP could use it as the legal structure for 
the GIWU to supplant the MPCA, diminish the power of Bookers in the colony, and consolidate 
support for the PPP among the sugar workers.68 Lionel Luckhoo, head of the MPCA and 
instigator of the previously overturned Undesirable Publications Act, was outraged. As a 
consequence of the attempted reform the colony became mired in open political warfare.69 
British officials became increasingly concerned that the PPP was orchestrating a communist 
takeover and British troops landed on October 4 to establish order. The bill passed on October 8 
and on October 9 Governor Alfred Savage suspended the constitution and took direct control of 
the colony. 70 The main thrust of British opposition to the internal government was aimed at the 
Jagans. While the Colonial Office distrusted Forbes Burnham and other PPP leaders, no one in 
British Guiana was considered as much of a threat as Cheddi and Janet Jagan in 1953. 
Sir James Robertson headed the British Parliamentary Commission sent to investigate the 
1953 crisis in British Guiana. The Robertson Commission’s conclusions were released in late 
1954. The commission drew that same conclusion that the official Parliamentary report, or White 
Paper, had the previous year, determining that the PPP was comprised of a “very powerful 
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communist element” lead by the Jagans. 71 The commission also concluded that the Jagans 
“unreservedly accepted the classical communist doctrines of Marx and Lenin and were 
supporters of the most modern communist movements.” Meanwhile, Robertson classified 
Burnham as a moderate social democrat, opposed to British rule, but not communist.72 The 
commission placed the blame for the suspension of the constitution squarely on the PPP and did 
not set a timeframe for the restoration of self-government in the colony. Finally, the commission 
foresaw increasing racial confrontations as the growing East Indian population asserted control 
over the Afro-Guianese of the colony.73 
The suspension of the constitution in 1953 set in motion a series of events that redefined 
the political scene in British Guiana. Governor Savage attempted to assert control in the colony 
by minimizing the influence of the Jagans. Cheddi Jagan was sentenced to six months of hard 
labor after violating a travel ban imposed on him and his wife by the Governor. Janet was 
imprisoned five months later for conducting a public meeting and being in possession of an 
illegal Police Riot Manual. Simultaneously, fissures began to develop within the PPP. Moderate 
party members thought Jagan’s policies were responsible for the suspension of the constitution 
and attempted to redefine the party’s ideological positions. Unable to reconcile their differences, 
the party split into competing and increasingly contentious camps. Jagan held together many of 
the traditional leaders of the party, crucially maintaining the support of the Afro-Guianese 
Ashton Chase, Sydney King and Martin Carter. Burnham fronted the opposition, a moderate 
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group of politicians including Clinton Wong and the East Indian Jai Narine Singh.74 Jagan and 
Burnham understood the critical importance of maintaining a multi-racial base of support and 
worked tirelessly to win the approval of both East Indians and Afro-Guianese. Both men 
managed to retain multi-racial support initially, but that victory was short lived.  
The PPP splintered further in late 1956. The swift and conclusive British response to 
reformatory policies in 1953 convinced Cheddi Jagan that it would be necessary to approach 
change within the colony more cautiously. He moderated his stance on several issues and was 
vaguely critical of the rhetoric of individuals in the party three years prior. His altered 
perspective, especially his decision not to pursue inclusion in the proposed West Indies 
Federation, alienated several key members of his faction of the PPP and ended his alliance with 
King and Carter.75 It is somewhat unclear whether Jagan expelled King and Carter upon the 
urging of the British or if they chose to leave the party on their own. Regardless of the 
circumstances, by the end of the year the political situation had degenerated into increasingly 
racially segregated party alliances. 
The Development of Racial Politics in British Guiana 
The United States returned its consulate to British Guiana in 1957 just as Great Britain 
was preparing to return partial sovereignty to the colony. The Colonial Office eliminated the 
restrictions placed on the Jagans upon the repeated suggestion of Governor Patrick Renison and 
prepared the colony for the elections to be held in August. Meanwhile, colonial politicians 
increasingly appealed to loyalty based on ethnicity. The PPP initially used the expression “Apan-
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Jhaat”, or vote for your own, in the East Indian community.76 Leo Despres explains that properly 
contextualized the expression encouraged cooperation between people of similar cultural values. 
The slogan did not have an explicit racial connotation in its initial manifestation; rather it was a 
means of identifying certain nationalistic ideals. However, it came to be understood by many 
within the Afro-Guianese community and especially British and American observers as an 
expression of divisive racial politics.77 Internal self-government returned to British Guiana in 
August 1957 with the PPP again dominating the elections, establishing Cheddi Jagan as the most 
viable political figure in the colony. In response, Forbes Burnham announced the formation of a 
new political party, the People’s National Congress (PNC) after the election, acknowledging 
Jagan’s leading role in the PPP.78  
The increasingly racial aspect of politics in British Guiana has held a place of primacy in 
traditional explanations for the degeneration of the nationalist movement in the decade prior to 
independence. Scholars have shown that racial identification became increasingly connected 
with identification to specific political parties after the Jagan-Burnham split in 1955. However, 
Rishee Thakur postulates that ideological differences were the most significant factor in the 
schism in the PPP and the further fragmentation of the Guianese movement.79 He argues that the 
disintegration of the PPP in 1955 was a left-right split, based on the need to formulate a new 
political agenda after the suspension of the Constitution in 1953. The inability of the party 
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leaders to collaborate on a new strategy led to the split, followed by realignment of their 
supporters. 80 Gordon Oliver Daniels suggests that Jagan pursued domestic policies which 
inherently benefited the East Indian community after the PPP victory in 1957. Daniels suggests 
that even if the policies were not racist in design, they were in effect.81 However, Thakur notes 
that irreconcilable racial differences within the nationalist movement were not evident until at 
least 1959, suggesting that racial tensions during the 1950s and 1960s were not predetermined.82  
It is also pertinent to acknowledge the individual political rivalry between Jagan and 
Burnham and the debate over British Guiana’s future participation ion in the proposed West 
Indies Federation. Both Jagan and Burnham had strong personalities and harbored intensions of 
being the father of Guyana. Their rivalry in itself contributed greatly to the schism in the party.83 
Finally, increasing racial tensions were exacerbated by the debate over whether British Guiana 
would join the West Indies Federation. The Afro-Guianese community welcomed the 
opportunity to establish a closer relationship with the predominantly black Caribbean nations, 
such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. East Indian Guianese feared that association with the 
Caribbean nations would lead to migration of blacks to Guiana, and a marginalization of the East 
Indian community.84Thus, as British Guiana neared independence, its two most important 
political leaders pursued opposing policies on the critical issue of alliance with the West Indies 
Federation, based on racial prerogatives and increasingly engaged in racial politics. 
                                                            
80 Ibid, 85-86. 
81 Daniels, “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan”, 143. 
82 Ibid, 378. 
83 Colin A. Palmer, Eric Williams and the Making of the Modern Caribbean (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006). 
84 Daniels, “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan”, 111, 116-117. 
49 
 
The Impact of the Cuban Revolution in British Guiana 
Cheddi Jagan pursued moderate policies and attempted to foster economic progress 
through interaction with the United States and Great Britain after the election of 1957. However, 
he also promoted policies aimed at linking the interests of the East Indian community with those 
of all British Guiana, exacerbating the tensions between the East Indian and Afro-Guianese 
communities.85 Unfortunately for Jagan, the Americans were increasingly preoccupied with the 
events in Cuba. The United States believed Fidel Castro to be a moderate reformer and supported 
the Cuban Revolution in its early years. However, after taking over the seat of government in 
Havana in 1959, the Cubans moved toward alignment with the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
Bloc. Consequently, the United States’ was staunchly opposed to further social movements in the 
hemisphere and grew even more skeptical of reformist regional leaders. Consecutive American 
administrations came to understand British Guiana in terms of their experience with Castro in 
Cuba. The PPP misinterpreted the consequences of Castro’s success and attempted a similar, 
aggressive foreign policy, increasingly opposing the United States. In April 1960 Cheddi and 
Janet Jagan visited Cuba and met with Cuban leaders. The Jagans hoped that a show of support 
for the Cuban Revolution would provide a boon in negotiating for financial aid and economic 
deals, specifically the sale of rice to Cuba. Meanwhile, the Jagans continued to pursue relations 
with the Soviet bloc and rhetorically support Marxist ideology.86 Cheddi Jagan’s actions 
solidified the American opposition to his leadership of the colony upon independence. 
Great Britain was considerably less skeptical of the threat posed by Castro and Cuba; 
however, preserving Anglo-American cooperation was a primary concern for the British. Despite 
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serious disagreements and occasionally contentious exchanges about the situation in British 
Guiana, the United States and Great Britain formulated a coordinated policy for the colony. After 
John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency of the United States in January 1961, supporting a 
staunch policy of anti-communism, both nationalist leaders and colonial governors in British 
Guiana were forced increasingly to consider the impact of American influence on British plans 
for decolonization.  
Racial Violence, Anglo-American Intervention, and the Progression to Independence 
 The stability of British Guiana began to decay as the colony prepared for another round 
of national elections in August 1961. Stephen Rabe notes that 1961 was a year of hope for the 
colony. There was relative peace and the promise that the colony would soon be independent.87 
Jagan and the PPP again were victorious in the elections and the British prepared to grant the 
colony independence sometime in mid-1962.88 However, racial politicking had been a growing 
factor in Guianese politics, and drastically increased as the elections approached. Ethnic rivalry 
in the colony would prove to be an ominous sign of events soon to follow. Burnham and the 
PNC were not content to watch idly as the Jagans and the PPP led the colony to independence. 
They began organizing a vocal opposition against the Jagans, eventually with financial and 
strategic support from the United States. 
 The fate of Cheddi Jagan lay potentially in a visit he made to the United States in October 
1961. Jagan was given a spot on the weekly political television news program Meet the Press 
and slated for an audience with President Kennedy, despite strong resistance from anti-
communist hard-liners in the White House. Kennedy had at least verbally agreed to make an 
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effort to work with Jagan after the elections in September.89 The October visit provided Jagan 
with a much needed opportunity to foster beneficial relations with the United States and obtain 
economic aid crucial for development if the colony was to successfully prepare for 
independence. Scholars have interpreted Jagan’s visit in several ways; however, the most 
complete explanation is put forth by James McDonald. McDonald explains that in August 1961 
several prominent members of the Kennedy Administration, along with the President, decided 
upon a two-track approach to British Guiana. The first track was used as a manner of placating to 
British primacy in the colony. It advocated accepting Jagan and minimally cooperating, while 
“play[ing] political hardball”, in an effort to convince Jagan to pursue alignment with the West. 
The second track, advanced in conjunction with the first, was to unleash the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) in the colony and pursue a broad program of subversion, aimed at exploiting 
Jagan’s vulnerabilities and undermining his government by raising questions about his ability to 
govern in an independent Guyana. Theoretically the second track would be called off if Jagan 
chose to reconcile with the Anglo-American camp and renounce his communist ideals and 
support for Cuba.90  
Jagan’s visit conclusively undermined any opportunity he had of averting American 
intervention, if in fact he had a chance at all. His interaction with broadcaster Lawrence Spivak 
on Meet the Press was disastrous. Spivak attacked Jagan for his ideological views, drawing the 
Guianese leader into a philosophical debate which destroyed his credibility to the American 
public. It is unlikely that the Kennedy Administration would have worked with Jagan unless he 
agreed to sever ties with Cuba. Jagan’s performance on Meet the Press alone nearly sealed his 
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fate.91 Independence for British Guiana during the Cold War would depend in large part on the 
ability of the colonial leaders to foster cooperative relations with Great Britain and the United 
States. Jagan’s position as the preeminent politician in British Guiana began to erode quickly 
after his trip to the United States. 
The domestic environment in British Guiana for the next three years was characterized by 
violence. Endemic racial animosity which had been held at bay for nearly a decade exploded in 
the capital city of Georgetown after Cheddi Jagan’s budget proposed a restructured tax system 
which would include several new taxes and a compulsory savings plan. Levies were proposed on 
capital gains, property, and gifts. A duty proposed on total sales, intended to minimize the ability 
of firms to avoid income tax by claiming losses each year, was especially incendiary to 
businessman.92 The business community interpreted the scheme to be a redistribution of wealth 
that was anti-capitalist and argued forcefully against the plan.93 Opposition to the budget was not 
limited to upper class businessmen. The Trades Union Council (TUC), a collective comprised of 
most of the Guianese labor organizations, also opposed portions of the budget. Specifically, the 
TUC disproved of the compulsory savings plan in which the government would take a 
percentage of salaries over $100 a month and self-employed persons incomes in exchange for 
government bonds. Additionally, the TUC opposed taxes on luxuries, alcohol and tobacco.94 The 
Jagans’ political foes took advantage of the widespread opposition to his proposals. Realizing 
that they could not defeat Jagan at the polls, Forbes Burnham, Peter D’Aguiar, the Portuguese 
head of the United Front (UF), and union leader Richard Ishmael took their political opposition 
to the streets as Afro-Guianese mobs attacked East Indians, burned their businesses and looted 
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stores. Seven blocks of the business section of the city burned, and the economy spiraled into a 
steep decline.95 
In the United States, most of the high level correspondence on British Guiana remains 
classified. However, the consensus among respected historians is that the CIA, at the behest of 
President Kennedy, provided financial assistance for approximately 40,000 striking civil service 
workers in an effort to undermine Cheddi Jagan.96 Stephen Rabe suggests that the CIA used 
international labor unions as a cover to send financial aid to Burnham.97 Ultimately, the domestic 
crisis compounded the foreign policy issues Jagan’s administration was facing and raised further 
questions about Jagan’s ability to head an independent Guyana. The scheme almost worked as 
Jagan’s government only survived the crisis when British troops arrived to re-establish order in 
the colony two days after the violence had begun.98 
The Kennedy Administration responded to the unrest in British Guiana by stepping up its 
pressure on British policymakers for eliminating Jagan as head of the Guianese government. In 
February 1962 United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk told British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Alexander Home that the United States would not accept an independent Guyana led by Jagan. 
He insisted that action had to be taken to avert granting independence until a new government 
could be placed in office. Rusk’s statement elicited a strong response from British officials who 
were surprised, angered, and offended by the suggestion that they should subvert a 
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democratically elected government in their colony.99 A series of forceful correspondences were 
fired back and forth across the Atlantic asserting the inability of the United States to “put up with 
an independent British Guiana under Jagan” and the astonishment of the British at the 
Americans’ “Machiavellianism”.100 Despite considerable animosity toward the hubris of United 
States officials, Prime Minister Macmillan and the British Government slowly consented to 
American demands. The independence conference scheduled for May was postponed until 
October and when it finally took place, there was no discussion of independence.101  
Tensions remained high into the early months of 1963 and Georgetown was riddled with 
violence once again, after Jagan passed a labor relations bill intended to ensure workers’ ability 
to endorse unions of their choice. In mid-April, MPCA and TUC leader Richard Ishmael called 
for a general strike in the colony. The TUC feared that the bill was a cloak for the PPP to 
neutralize the influence of the MPCA, which had long represented the colony’ sugar workers, 
and was opposed to Jagan.  The TUC suggested that if the bill passed, the PPP would make the 
Guiana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU), which was loyal to Jagan, the official union of 
Guianese sugar workers.102 British Guiana was still suffering the damage incurred from the 
violence of the previous year and the strike further ravaged the economy. Even more devastating 
to Jagan’s position was the inclusion in the strike of a substantial portion of the Civil Service 
Association. Most of the civil services were manned by Afro-Guianese who had become 
politically polarized by the racial nature of politics in the colony. The degradation of essential 
services in British Guiana led to food and oil shortages and by May 9 a state of emergency was 
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declared by the colonial governor, Sir Ralph Grey. 103  The strike ended on July 8; however, over 
the subsequent eighteen months, hundreds of Guianese became victims of the racial violence 
which continued unabated as a consequence of the decimated economy.104 Burnham continued to 
strengthen his ties to the United States in early May by visiting the United States and meeting 
with several prominent leaders within the Kennedy Administration, including Arthur 
Schlesinger, Special Advisor to the President. Burnham argued his case to government officials 
as well as the general public and garnered considerable support before returning to British 
Guiana.105  
Stephen Rabe effectively describes the critical role of American covert assistance in 
financing Jagan’s opposition. However, it is pertinent to note that Burnham and D’Aguiar were 
opportunistic politicians who would likely have exploited the conditions of racial animosity 
which existed since the mid-nineteenth century regardless of United States intervention, though 
it is likely that American assistance significantly increased their effectiveness. Additionally, the 
United States was not responsible for the disproportionately large percentage of Afro-Guianese 
who made up the armed civil services. It is important to acknowledge that the United States 
contributed greatly to Jagan’s opposition and unquestionably hastened the elimination of the 
PPP; however, it is overly simplistic to attribute the racial violence of the independence period to 
the actions of the United States. Thus, American assistance provided the heat that intensified the 
fires of tension caused by cultural and social conditions, and ultimately ignited racial warfare as 
a consequence of the politics of opportunistic Guianese politicians.  
                                                            
103 Spinner, Political and Social History of Guyana, 100-102. 
104 Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 110- 112. 
105 McDonald, “Overriding Interests”, 411-413. 
56 
 
The British Guiana Constitutional Conference, held in October 1963, proved to be the 
coup de grace for Cheddi Jagan. It was clear that discussions between Jagan, Burnham, and 
D’Aguiar were pointless. The cooperation between the AFL-CIO and Guianese labor unions led 
Burnham and D’Aguiar to accurately conclude that the United States would support their efforts 
against Jagan and eliminated the necessity of compromise between the PPP and the emerging 
PNC/UF coalition. Jagan responded to the stalled negotiations surrounding the proposed new 
electoral scheme of proportional representation by appealing to the virtue of the British, asking 
Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys to arbitrate and resolve the deadlock.106 Burnham and 
D’Aguiar adamantly supported a new system of proportional representation, which increased the 
possibility of success for a coalition between the two, over the traditional “first past the post” 
system which favored the population advantage of the East Indians and the PPP. They also 
vehemently opposed Jagan’s proposal to lower the voting age to eighteen which would have 
proven a boon to the PPP because of the large population of East Indians between eighteen and 
twenty-one. Sandys decided in favor of Burnham and D’Aguiar on both issues and called for 
new elections in November 1964, essentially assuring that a PNC/UF coalition would lead the 
colony to independence if they could cooperate during the upcoming year.107 
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Domestic unrest in British Guiana worsened in the early months of 1964 as East Indian 
sugar workers and staunch PPP supporters took to the streets in response to Sandys’ decision. On 
May 25 Afro-Guianese mobs, retaliating for the mutilation of a black couple, descended on the 
East Indian village of Wismar raping and pillaging the local population. Over 1,800 people were 
left homeless as a result of the violence. Despite pleas for assistance, the Afro-Guianese police 
force failed to control the situation. Janet Jagan resigned her position as Minister of Home 
Affairs on May 22 in response. She alleged that the police force was no longer operating under 
the authority of the government and was in fact a tool of the PNC. Cheddi Jagan refused to name 
a successor to the position as a way of supporting his wife and making a political statement.108 
On May 27 the new colonial governor, Richard Luyt, declared a state of emergency in the 
colony. The violence was far from over and political warfare continued at a heightened intensity. 
Statistics of the year’s political violence are telling. Over 200 Guianese died and more than 800 
were wounded in 368 racially motivated conflicts during 1964. Some 13,000 Guianese found 
themselves refugees, most victims of one of the 1,600 cases of arson.109 Neither side seemed 
likely to concede in the midst of the destruction. In fact, the brutality begat only more hostility. 
Forbes Burnham’s response was a reminder that he controlled the Afro-Guianese population and 
consequently the majority of the armed police force, concluding that his supporters could: “do 
more killing than [East Indians] could.”110 Once again the violence was only halted by the 
deployment of British troops to the colony.111 
The Colonial Office scheduled elections for December 7 and the United States 
government worked diligently to ensure that Cheddi Jagan would not be victorious at the polls. 
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The AFL-CIO financed anti-Jagan organized labor, primarily in the MPCA, and ran a 
disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Jagan. The CIA added to the propaganda 
operation and organized opposition parties in an attempt to fragment East Indian loyalties, 
simultaneously advising the PNC and UF and helping them to organize more efficiently. 112 The 
British acquiesced to the American tactics, despite strong assertions of opposition to American 
influence and to proportional representation voiced by the Labour Party in Great Britain.113 
The election unfolded as the United States and Great Britain had planned. The PPP won 
more seats than the PNC or UF, but did not obtain the majority which would have given them 
charge of the government. Governor Luyt requested Burnham and D’Aguiar form a coalition 
government after an Order in Counsel from London removed Jagan from office.114 The United 
States approved grants to support the coalition within two weeks of its electoral victory, while 
making it clear to Great Britain that assistance was conditional on Jagan being kept out of any 
coalition. United States Consul, Delmar Carlson, began advising Burnham and D’Aguiar during 
1965 and the Americans pressured Great Britain to grant independence now that Jagan was out 
of power. 115  
In Great Britain, the Colonial Office and Foreign Office debated throughout the first half 
of 1965 about the future of British Guiana. The Colonial Office was determined to see 
progression toward racial cooperation in the colony before granting independence, while the 
Foreign Office was focused on nurturing the Anglo-American alliance. These competing 
objectives were complicated by the political rivalry between Burnham and Jagan. Both Guianese 
leaders made it clear that they were unwilling to work toward any alliance or unification so long 
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as their opponent was included in the government. The Colonial Office conceded that realistic 
racial reconciliation was unattainable in the near future and international pressure for the British 
to leave the colony was increasing. Labour Party Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, agreed and 
determined to convene an independence conference on November 2. The British and Americans 
either took Burnham at his word that he would work to create a racially integrated society in 
independent Guyana or they turned a blind eye.  Burnham refused to set quotas for civil service 
employees and made no tangible effort to improve the inequalities in the colony, offering only 
vague rhetoric suggesting that he would attempt to improve the situation.116 The Anglo-
American alliance sacrificed racial collaboration for Cold War imperatives by setting a date for 
independence without confronting structural issues certain to result in repression of the East 
Indian population. 
The independence period in British Guiana was defined by racial violence and foreign 
intervention. Domestically, the impact of colonization, both its influence on immigration and 
social structures, provided the kindling which fueled racial conflict amongst the populace. The 
geo-strategic importance of the region during the Cold War, examined in detail in the following 
chapter, led to increasing intervention from the United States and limited the ability of the 
Guianese to pursue a truly autonomous form of self-government, intensifying the burning 
discontent of the Guianese people. The fires of racial warfare were ignited when those 
combustible factors combined with the political opportunism and egoism of Cheddi Jagan and 
Forbes Burnham, damning British Guiana to a period of intense racial violence and poisoning the 
independence process in the colony. The following chapter will explore the strategic imperatives 
of the United States and Great Britain in the Caribbean which framed Anglo-American policy in 
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British Guiana. The subsequent chapter after that will examine the role of Guianese politicians in 




Chapter 3: Anglo-American Cooperation and Strategic Objectives During Decolonization 
in British Guiana 
 The dismantling of the British Empire after 1945 was heavily influenced by the close 
Anglo-American relationship which grew out of the Second World War. The United States 
began pressing Great Britain to grant independence to its colonial possessions during the war and 
by the late 1950s, Great Britain was liquidating its empire.1 However, in the early 1960s, United 
States policymakers adjusted their anti-colonial policy as a response to Cold War developments 
in the Caribbean, specifically, the Cuban Revolution. American rhetorical support of the right of 
self-government in colonial areas was subordinated to its Cold War imperatives and American 
policymakers encouraged British intervention in British Guiana’s domestic politics. The 
American position shifted toward support for a British policy of slow, closely guided, 
decolonization. However, by 1961, economic constraints and strong international opposition to 
European colonization led the British to seek a quick withdrawal from British Guiana.2 Thus, in 
British Guiana, traditional roles were reversed as Great Britain sought a quick road to Guianese 
independence and the United States encouraged a slower approach to decolonization. Both the 
United States and Great Britain placed the utmost importance on maintaining their special 
relationship during the Cold War, and negotiating a compromise in order to develop a 
coordinated policy toward British Guiana was a critical goal of both British and American 
officials. Ultimately, racial violence, domestic instability, and ineffective Guianese leadership 
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resulted in converging Anglo-American imperatives and the decision by American and key 
British officials to intervene in the colony’s domestic politics. 
 As seen in the previous chapter, British Guiana’s political and socio-cultural development 
led to domestic racial conflict, and left-leaning, anti-colonial politics, as the colony progressed 
toward independence. Domestic violence in British Guiana and heightened Cold War tensions in 
the post-Cuban Revolution Caribbean led to increasing Anglo-American intervention into 
Guianese politics. The impact of the Cold War on strategic policymaking in the United States 
and Great Britain was one of the key factors impacting the trajectory of Britain’s decolonization, 
especially in British Guiana. Anglo-American actions in British Guiana would appear to 
contradict rhetorical objectives of those nations in regard to ending colonial rule; however, 
British and American decisions in the colony are best understood by examining the 
interconnected relationship of the Cold War and decolonization.  
 This chapter will explore the strategic objectives of the United States and Great Britain in 
British Guiana within the context of the Cold War and global decolonization. It will discuss how 
Cold War imperatives influenced the relationship between the United States and Great Britain 
and how they coordinated a collective strategy in British Guiana. The United States sought to 
assure that British Guiana established a stable, anti-communist government, aligned with the 
United States, before it was granted independence. Great Britain’s primary goals in British 
Guiana were to establish a stable government, capable of quelling racial violence after the 
withdrawal of British soldiers from the colony, and maintaining the special relationship with the 
United States. Ultimately, the United States determined that its Cold War objectives in the 
Caribbean could be met only if Cheddi Jagan and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) were 
removed from power in British Guiana. Key British policymakers, specifically Commonwealth 
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Secretary Duncan Sandys, also concluded that Jagan and the PPP were incapable of effectively 
leading the government. His decision was based on a combination of American pressure and 
Jagan’s inability to control domestic violence.3 Thus, the United States and Great Britain came to 
a mutual decision to pursue a course to eliminate the PPP government and replace it with a 
coalition government between Forbes Burnham’s People’s National Congress (PNC) and Peter 
D’Aguiar’s United Front (UF). 
Despite scholarly criticism of United States fears in Latin America as overblown, there 
existed a legitimate threat of communist infiltration in British Guiana, and a real concern for 
instability spreading throughout the region. Scholars such as Richard Barnet and Stephen Rabe 
suggest that American policymakers were blinded by a Cold War lens, which doomed them to 
misinterpret the intricacies of politics in developing areas.4 Rabe’s U.S. Intervention in British 
Guiana suggests that American policymakers convinced themselves that Cheddi Jagan would 
attempt to turn British Guiana into a replica of Fidel Castro’s Cuba if he were allowed to be the 
head of an independent government in British Guiana.5 Rabe notes that high level American 
officials based their opposition on circumstantial evidence which led them to draw conclusions 
about Jagan that were not corroborated by their British counterparts or even some lower-level 
American officials in British Guiana.6 This chapter will expand on the American 
contextualization of British Guiana as a key component of Cold War geo-political strategy. It 
suggests that American concerns about instability in British Guiana were based on a logical 
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assessment of regional Cold War imperatives and domestic unrest in British Guiana itself. 
 This chapter suggests that the British decision to subvert the PPP cannot simply be 
attributed to their acquiescence to American demands. It is not a justification of Anglo-American 
intervention; rather, it is a more nuanced explanation for the reasons behind the opposition to 
Jagan which led to such a policy. British Guiana is a useful microcosm with which to understand 
the complex dynamics involved in developing and instituting a coordinated Anglo-American 
foreign policy in the Caribbean. Great Britain toiled diligently in an effort to prepare British 
Guiana for independence in a manner that facilitated stability in the colony and enhanced British 
standing in the international community. International pressures and fiscal realities demanded the 
utmost efficiency and speed from British administrators in granting independence to British 
Guiana. This chapter will focus on the broad geo-strategic reasons for the Anglo-American 
decision to support Forbes Burnham, rather than Cheddi Jagan, as the individual best suited to 
lead the Guianese government during the transition to independence. 
Anglo-American strategic imperatives after World War II were framed by the dual 
dynamics of the Cold War and global decolonization. In the wake of the Second World War, 
many former colonies of European powers rapidly attained sovereignty. The aftermath of the war 
also led to the global power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, 
the Cold War and decolonization cannot be understood without considering how each 
phenomenon influenced the other. Each newly independent government represented an 
ideological and strategic battleground in the struggle for dominance between the Soviet Union 
and the Western bloc nations, primarily the Anglo-American alliance of the United States and 
Great Britain. Economic alliances, ports, military bases, and raw materials were at stake in each 
former colonial area when it gained independence. The Anglo-American alliance and the Soviet 
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Union were competing for global influence during a period which saw the world’s political 
structures reordered with a totality and speed unparalleled in history. The uncertainty, internal 
power struggles and instability inherent in the process of decolonization provided the fertile 
ground on which the Cold War was fought, and the Cold War framed the nationalist struggles 
which emerged during global decolonization. Thus, the dual dynamics of the Cold War and 
decolonization created a global power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
former colonial powers, and nationalists in the developing world.  
It is relevant to consider briefly the global climate during the decolonization period in 
British Guiana, defined in this paper as 1953 to 1966, when evaluating British and American 
involvement in the colony. Beginning in 1952 and surging forward in early 1953, the Mau Mau 
uprising in Kenya stressed to British officials the potential for instability in colonies as they 
prepared for independence.7 In July 1953 the Korean War was suspended with the signing of an 
armistice between communist North Korea and the Western supported South Korea. There was 
no peace treaty signed, however, and the region was still quite volatile. The Korean War 
dramatically increased Western fears of communist expansion. Simultaneously, fears of a 
communist infiltration in Guatemala resulted in a United States intervention in 1953-54, for 
some of the same reasons which caused the British to intervene in British Guiana in 1953; 
namely, left-leaning social reforms.8 The Cold War and the decolonization process increased in 
intensity throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The interrelation of the two global trends, as this 
chapter shows, led to a concurrent increase in British and American concern with the political 
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development of British Guiana, reaching a fever pitch during the final stages of decolonization in 
the colony. 
The Anglo-American Special Relationship 
 The collaboration between the United States and Great Britain which came to be known 
as the special relationship began during World War II.  The Allied Nations, specifically the 
United States and Great Britain, coordinated policy and military efforts out of necessity to defeat 
Nazi Germany, Italy, and imperial Japan during the war. Throughout the war, the Anglo-
American alliance overcame several contentious issues, none more intense than the debate over 
the post-war fate of European colonies.9 The United States and Great Britain maintained their 
wartime alliance as a deterrent to post-war Soviet expansion. The issue of colonialism, 
contentious during the war, resurfaced in its aftermath as the issues which were suspended to 
combat the threat at hand emerged with even more force during the early Cold War.  
The union forged between Great Britain and the United States emerged from the ashes of 
the Second World War altered, but intact, despite severe disagreement on the future of the 
British Empire. As the inevitability of decolonization became increasingly apparent, the United 
States and Great Britain faced the dual challenge of simultaneously dismantling the British 
Empire and waging the Cold War. The role of being the leading global power was no longer the 
preserve of Great Britain as it had been prior to World War II. However, the British maintained 
considerable input into the global strategy of the Anglo-American alliance during the Cold War, 
despite ceding the leadership role to the United States by mid-1943. It is crucial to understand 
that neither the United States, nor Great Britain, developed a foreign policy independent of the 
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other. They maintained a close, though at times contentious alliance, cooperating on most major 
issues relating to decolonization and Cold War strategy. The Anglo-American relationship in 
British Guiana took a form similar to competing departments within a government. Each 
advanced its own interests, within an established framework, and ultimately they formulated a 
collective policy. The United States and Great Britain were cognizant of the broad, strategic 
imperatives of their trans-Atlantic partnership.  
In British Guiana, Cheddi and Janet Jagan posed a serious challenge to British and 
American strategic interests during the Cold War and the decolonization of the British West 
Indies. Cheddi Jagan was outspoken in his belief in Marxist ideology, and Janet had been an 
active communist party member in Chicago before marrying Jagan and moving to British 
Guiana. The United States strongly opposed the implications of the Jagans leading a post-
colonial Guianese government, especially after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The British 
considered the Cold War implications of post-Castro Caribbean, but were primarily influenced in 
their actions by the effect the government would have on preparing the colony for independence. 
Great Britain’s concern with Cold War strategy was tempered by the need to establish a popular, 
stable government in Guiana. Great Britain, more so than the United States, needed to strike a 
balance between Cold War strategy and the realities of decolonization. 
The United States was more singularly focused on Cold War imperatives; however, they 
took into account British interests, as well as the international consequences for their ally, should 
the British acquiesce to American imperatives in the region. United States officials understood 
that Great Britain’s primary objective was to leave British Guiana in a quick and dignified 
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manner, and they at least considered British aims during the policymaking process.10 British 
officials were equally conscious of the American imperatives in the region, such as the 
significance of the American relationship with Venezuela.11 Thus, Great Britain and the United 
States sought to understand each other’s interests and accommodate them in order to create a 
more stable Anglo-American cooperation during the Cold War. 
Anglo-American Perspectives in British Guiana 
The prism through which the United States and Great Britain interpreted regional events 
framed Anglo-American imperatives in the Caribbean. Instability and subsequent violence in the 
Congo during its transition to independence, and memories of the partition of India weighed 
heavily on British administrators. Cold War perspectives in the United States were greatly 
skewed by contemporary experiences with the revolutionary government in Cuba, the geo-
strategic significance of British Guiana, the economic importance of Venezuela, and were 
compounded by the increasing activity of communist parties in the region. Cold War ideology 
provided the overarching perspective with which the United States formulated its policy toward 
British Guiana. Consequently, Great Britain had to consider the Cold War implications of an 
independent Guyana to a much greater degree than other regions of its empire undergoing 
decolonization during the decade. The British held a more nuanced understanding of the 
subtleties of domestic politics in their colony, as well as of Burnham and Jagan as individuals. 
Ultimately, despite harboring deep reservations, they actively supported Burnham, acquiescing 
to pressure from the United States.  
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Vice-President Richard Nixon’s South American tour in 1958 contributed considerably to 
how the United States viewed Latin America. Regional opposition to United States policies was 
strong, specifically in British Guiana’s western neighbor, Venezuela, where Nixon was attacked 
by a mob. American policymakers interpreted the negative response to the Vice President’s trip 
within the context of the Cold War. The United States Information Agency concluded that 
Nixon’s poor reception was due to the increased influence of the Soviet Union and China, who 
the Americans suspected of providing significant material and moral support for regional 
communist parties.12 That the most intense opposition to Nixon’s visit occurred in British 
Guiana’s western neighbor, Venezuela, was not lost on policymakers in Washington. The United 
States State Department noted that legalization of communist parties in Colombia, Venezuela, 
and Chile, stimulated similar movements in neighboring countries and that the Communist Party 
of Venezuela was: “the most vociferous and fastest-growing legal communist party in the 
Western Hemisphere.”13 In the minds of United States policymakers, the presence of active 
communist threats in Venezuela and British Guiana reinforced the importance of both areas to 
the overarching Cold War strategy.  
The Cuban Revolution and the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress in Havana in 
1959 persuaded the United States to take a more proactive position to assert its aims in the 
region.  In January 1959 the State Department concluded that the Soviet Union would attempt to 
use Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution as a means of undermining the United States position in 
Latin America and that the logical response was a more stringent opposition to regional anti-
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American movements.14 The harder line the United States took after 1960 is increasingly evident 
in British Guiana. Simultaneously, the success of the Cuban Revolution implanted within United 
States policy an ever-present trepidation that further revolutions in the hemisphere could occur. 
Cuba’s active role in the exportation of revolution in the early 1960s resulted in an increasingly 
strict anti-communist mentality in United States politics.15 The fear that Cheddi Jagan was 
another Castro; “a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” dominated the decision making process of 
American policy makers as British Guiana marched toward independence in the early 1960’s.16 
Ultimately, the Cuban Revolution narrowed the American perception of what constituted 
legitimate nationalist movements, specifically in the Western Hemisphere.  
United States policymakers interpreted the PPP’s foreign policy, specifically its 
communist associations and rhetorical support for the Cuban Revolution, as a clear indication 
that American inaction would lead to a second communist government takeover in the 
hemisphere, this time on mainland South America.17 While British policymakers were less 
confined by Cold War perceptions than their American counterparts, they too acknowledged the 
Jagans accumulating ties to international communism. British colonial officials noted, with 
concern, the establishment of closed mail bag service with Communist China, the presence of 
Venezuelan and Cuban Communists advisors to the PPP, the British Guiana Electricity 
Corporation’s decision to purchase fuel exclusively from Cuba, the presence of Cuban rice 
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vessels in Georgetown, and the flow of Cuban political and technical advisors in and out of the 
colony.18  The communist leanings of Cheddi and Janet Jagan and mounting domestic instability 
in British Guiana altered the British perspective on how to best withdraw from the colony by 
1963, shifting their views closer to those of the United States, who sought to establish a working 
relationship with Forbes Burnham. 
The most important aspect of American preoccupation with British Guiana was the 
colony’s ideological significance. Policymakers in the United States feared that the perception of 
having lost a second Western Hemispheric nation to communism would severely damage the 
standing of the United States among other Latin America and Caribbean nations.  The British, 
also concerned with the ideological significance of British Guiana, feared that permitting a 
communist government takeover in the colony could set a precedent for other decolonizing areas 
where economic ties were considerably more important, such as Singapore. Thus, British Guiana 
represented a threat to British control of the decolonization process in their colonies and the 
ability to define post-colonial relationships.19 Additionally, British officials feared that if a 
communist government in British Guiana nationalized private companies it would lead to further 
nationalization within the region, specifically in Britain’s other West Indian colonies. In fact, this 
fear was substantiated in 1974 when the former West Indian colonies, led by British Guiana, 
nationalized the Caribbean bauxite industry.20 
British Guiana held other significance for Great Britain. The British were knee deep in 
the dismantling of their empire, and wanted nothing more than to rid themselves of the burden of 
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what had become an economically draining, politically obstinate West Indian colony. The British 
struggled to determine how best to prepare the colony for independence, at the earliest possible 
date. Great Britain took pains to preserve a sense of national pride while their empire was being 
deconstructed and the British were anxious to achieve a stable and democratic conclusion to their 
colonial legacy, specifically in a relatively insignificant territory like British Guiana.21 British 
officials were conscious of the potential for violent consequences resulting from prematurely 
granting independence, as they had in India, which resulted in ethnic warfare which left millions 
dead.22 Thus, British administrators sought to grant independence only when the Guianese were 
prepared to maintain a stable self government. 
Internal politics within Great Britain and the United States contributed to the 
development of the foreign policy objectives of each nation. If British Guiana established a 
communist government, the American public likely would perceive the incumbent government 
as having lost the country to communism. The domestic political ramifications to the 
administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson would have been even more 
disastrous than the perceived loss of stature in the international community. British officials were 
aware that neither Kennedy nor Johnson could hope to be re-elected if a communist government 
was established in British Guiana.23 Deputy Director for the CIA, Richard Helms, wrote to 
National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, in July 1964: “when the British inquired what 
policy might be should Jagan win, we reiterated that such a situation would be politically 
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intolerable in the United States.”24Thus, the strength of American opposition to Jagan made 
cooperation between the United States and Great Britain difficult. British leaders were forced to 
make concessions to American leadership to maintain the special relationship with the United 
States without appearing to kowtow to American interests. 
Finally, British imperatives in their colony were framed by fiscal realities. Great Britain 
was financially incapable of supporting Guyana’s development alone. Efforts were made to 
incorporate the former British Dominion of Canada into British Guiana’s future development 
plans on the premise that the Canadians had substantial investments in Guianese bauxite and the 
Canadians appear to have shown an interest in exerting influence among former British colonies 
in the hemisphere.25 British documents, however, belie a certain realization by the British that 
Canadian cooperation could never replace the level of assistance that the United States could 
offer. Thus, it was necessary for British officials to appease American policymakers to obtain 
financial and material aid from the United States for post-independence development.26 
Additionally, British policymakers maintained a certain level of anxiety about the United States 
response if Great Britain failed to account for American objectives in British Guiana.27 British 
officials maintained a persistent fear that if British Guiana became independent with the PPP and 
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Cheddi Jagan in power, the colony could follow a pattern similar to Cuba and result in U.S. 
intervention.28  
Therefore, despite the pretense on the part of both the British and the United States of the 
British developing an independent policy in the colony, the reality was quite different. While the 
British formulated plans which assumed disagreement with their North American partner, they 
never pursued policies that did not work in conjunction with United States interests in the 
region.29 For their part, United States policymakers understood that despite its geographical 
proximity to the United States, Guiana was a British colony, and the British would be required to 
implement any strategy agreed upon. Internationally, the situation was delicate. Neither nation 
wished for it to appear, in the eyes of the international community, as though the United States 
was intervening in British-Guianese relations.30 
  Internal policy, international pressure, and the geographical importance of the colony to 
the United States at the height of the Cold War, as well as British pride,  made proper 
preparations for independence imperative. Neither the United States nor Great Britain would 
accept that a former British colony was fated to be an unprepared, unstable, developing nation on 
the Caribbean. Great Britain strived to ease racial violence and stabilize the domestic situation 
within the colony, and to establish an efficient, functioning government that could avert the 
instability and violence that plagued many other post-colonial areas. The United States was 
conscious of its partner’s difficult situation. American officials were prepared to consider the 
British desire for a rapid transition to Guianese self-government while discussing how to avoid 
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post-colonial violence, as in the Congo, prior to the United States-United Kingdom talks in 
March, 1961.31  
 United States policy makers were well aware of the value Great Britain placed on 
successfully leaving its colonies, and sought to avoid unnecessary conflict with the British. 
Assistant Secretary of State William Burdett made clear in a position paper for the State 
Department in 1962 that he understood that the British hoped to leave British Guiana in an 
honorable fashion. However, he also realized that the British would not strain Anglo-American 
relations to achieve their aims in the colony.32 Similarly, United States officials valued their 
alliance with Great Britain above achieving the totality of their own strategic imperatives. 
Initially, this goal seemed an undertaking best achieved by working with Cheddi Jagan and the 
PPP, as evidenced by the Kennedy Administration policy of working with Jagan put forth in 
September, 1961.33 United States reluctance and eventual outright refusal to accept this policy 
impacted British planning. From 1953 to 1966 the United States and Great Britain gave 
increasing consideration to the Cold War implications of decolonizing in the Caribbean. 
Working within the framework of the Anglo-American relationship of the Cold War, the British 
began exploring options in the colony which were more palatable to their partner.  Jagan’s 
continual pursuit of communist ties and the increasing instability in the colony which resulted 
from his domestic policies, pushed the British further into the American camp. Eventually, 
British concerns over the instability which would surround a Jagan-led government at 
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independence coupled with American pressure, led the British to acquiesce and support the 
Burnham coalition to lead the colony to independence. 
Instability 
The United States interpreted racial violence, and perhaps abetted it, within the context of 
their Cold War strategic concerns, while the British considered how domestic unrest in British 
Guiana would affect decolonization. The United States saw instability as a potential opening that 
communist subversives could exploit to gain support, while the British were alarmed at the 
possibility of post-colonial internal instability, and perhaps even civil war.34 The coming of 
independence in the colony heightened existing racial tensions, and made the resolution of 
instability crucial to the successful implementation of an autonomous government in the colony. 
British officials were primarily concerned with the international consequences if violent 
instability followed independence in the British Guiana. British prominence in the international 
community hinged on the efficient and peaceful transition of its colonies to independence. The 
British felt a strong need to maintain strong international support during the period of the Cold 
War and decolonization.35 International support could be seriously compromised if Guianese 
independence led directly to racial warfare. British Guiana’s instability had different implications 
for the United States. The American fear that communist subversives would exploit domestic 
instability in British Guiana was largely a consequence of the geographic importance of British 
Guiana to the American Cold War strategy. American officials feared the regional repercussions 
if British Guiana established a communist government after independence, specifically the 
possibility of Venezuela, Brazil, and the Caribbean, especially Cuba, becoming destabilized. 
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The consequences of inadequately confronting sectarian tensions in the Indian 
subcontinent prior to independence contributed significantly to British perspectives on 
decolonization. Great Britain condemned the region to a period of incredible violence followed 
by persistent tensions between India and Pakistan by prematurely granting independence to the 
region.36 British fear of instability in British Guiana was heavily influenced by the violent 
conflicts which erupted in the Congo following its independence from Belgium as well.37 The 
Guianese themselves were fearful of internal instability. Racial tensions had increased over the 
decade preceding independence and were boiling over by 1962. The primarily urban Afro-
Guianese community and the rural East Indians who comprised the majority of the population 
were increasingly in conflict. Guianese leaders, specifically Jagan and Burnham, exploited racial 
dissension by engaging in race-based politics hoping to gain a political advantage. The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) contributed to the strife in hopes of undermining the Jagan-led 
government. Although the precise beginning of American involvement is uncertain, it clear that 
by February 1962 at least some elements of the American government were actively working to 
subvert the PPP.38 The result was an increasing racial polarization of Guianese society.39  Several 
influential members of the Corentyne East Indian community met with Vice Consul Joseph 
Johnson in March 1963 and voiced their concerns. The Guianese were hesitant to push for an end 
to British rule due to conditions of racial animosity in the colony, as well as minimal educational 
opportunities, and the lack of a diversified economy.40 Johnson felt that the only means of 
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establishing stability was to implement the controversial system of Proportional Representation 
prior to independence and eliminate Jagan as the head of the government. He determined that the 
PNC would attempt to wrest control of the government from the PPP if Burnham lost a 
traditional election, making proportional representation necessary to avoid civil war.41  
In addition to strong fears of a communist takeover of the government, the Kennedy 
Administration was apprehensive about the domestic consequences of instability in British 
Guiana. There was a legitimate threat of civil war if the Guianese people were granted 
independence under a PPP government. British Guiana’s segregated population, discussed at 
length in chapter one, helped create this instability. Forbes Burnham used the Afro-Guianese 
population which dominant the capital city of Georgetown to maintain control over organized 
urban labor unions as well as the vast majority of the civil services. British colonial officials and 
Jagan thought it critical to correct racial imbalances in the police force before independence.42 
However, Jagan’s efforts to implement a predominantly East Indian security force were met with 
opposition from the PNC as well as the United States.43 Burnham made clear that he was willing 
to use force to gain power if Jagan attempted to develop an armed East Indian security force after 
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independence.44 Additionally, British documents indicate independence under Burnham brought 
the possibility of a similar conflict.45 Cheddi Jagan sought to strengthen the East Indian position 
in the event of armed struggle by importing automatic weapons, almost certainly from Cuba, and 
seeking military assistance from Israel.46 Thus, the Anglo-American decision to support 
Burnham was a pragmatic way to avoid violent instability, since Burnham already controlled the 
armed forces, in what was a geographically strategic region. 
The somber consequences which faced the colony if the civil services remained racially 
segregated became clearer as violence became endemic. By 1962, domestic violence in British 
Guiana was no longer a threat, it was a reality. Labor unrest had devolved into racial violence, 
spreading from the capital city of Georgetown to New Amsterdam and throughout the colony. 
The racially polarized civil services proved inadequate for combating this violence. Frequently, 
the uneven racial composition of the police force was the cause of much of the conflict. East 
Indians directed most of their aggressions against the predominantly Afro-Guianese police force 
and the police force was the source of considerable violence toward the East Indian 
community.47 The PPP perpetuated the cycle of violence in the colony by supplying arms to the 
East Indian community and organizing strikes. 
In 1963 several East Indians were arrested with machine guns, weapons which were not 
regularly available in British Guiana. British intelligence surmised that Jagan’s government was 
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smuggling the weapons into the British Guiana from communist nations in the region.48 The 
violence and instability in the colony in 1963 was quelled by the arrival of British troops, as it 
had been the previous year. The PPP’s inability to maintain internal stability eroded British 
confidence in the Jagan-led government.49 By 1964 bureaucratic strain resulted in the splintering 
of the civil service structure, and racial tensions between the police force and the government 
resulted in Janet Jagan’s resignation as Minister of Home Affairs.50 The instability of 
governmental institutions was compounded by the fact that Burnham was openly considering the 
possibility of armed revolt if the PPP remained in power after independence.51 Correcting the 
racial imbalance in the Guianese civil services prior to granting the colony independence was of 
paramount importance to the British and the significance of this issue increased as that time 
approached and violence increased. Thus, while the Colonial Office hoped to grant independence 
to British Guiana as quickly as possible, structural issues worked in concert with American 
pressure to slow down the process of decolonization.  
In addition, Great Britain’s fear of communist subversion in the colony was coupled with 
apprehension at the possibility of the United States intervening to counter that threat. Prime 
Minister Macmillan’s briefing prior to meeting President Kennedy noted that: “The British 
Guiana government has been increasingly in contact with Cuba, Russia and other bloc countries 
and there can now be little hope that on independence it would not follow the pattern of Cuba. 
This would no doubt evoke a strong reaction in Latin America (as well as in the U.S.) with the 
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possibility of intervention.”52 British suspicions of United States intervention were well founded.  
Formerly classified United States State Department records indicate that: “…if the PPP makes an 
effort to take over the country by force, the U.S. government will not stand by and see opposition 
crushed by terror.”53 Failed attempts at intervening in Cuba and the subsequent international 
embarrassment tempered calls for intervention in the United States, but it did not eliminate them. 
Geo-political Significance of British Guiana 
British Guiana held a geo-strategic importance for the United States beginning with the 
acquisition of Atkinson Airfield as a result of the Destroyer for Bases Deal with Great Britain in 
1940.54 Atkinson Airfield was a significant aspect of United States hemispheric military 
hegemony critical to American Cold War strategy.  American officials felt that the United States 
could not afford to lose the base in the event of a communist government coming to power in 
British Guiana. In an internal memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
William Lang wrote: “…the Air Force is concerned with the need to retain available military 
‘toe-holds’ on the South American continent for possible use in contingency operations in the 
area,” and he continued: “…while there is no present need for the facilities in B.G….a future 
requirement for their use may arise either in connection with developments  in our missile and 
space programs or with respect to contingency operations in Latin America.”55 Here again, 
British Guiana is seen as a crucial aspect of the United States Cold War regional strategy.  
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Even more important to the United States was British Guiana’s geographical proximity to 
important Latin American nations, specifically Venezuela and Brazil. The United States Anti-
Communist Campaign Task Force determined in 1958 that communist party membership in 
Venezuela was 20,000 and the nation was the primary target for communist subversives in Latin 
America.56 After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Venezuela harbored the largest and most active 
communist party in the hemisphere outside of Cuba and Venezuelan communist party members 
held a considerable number of leadership positions within the international communist 
movement.57 In the early 1960s, Venezuela was the primary Latin American destination for 
private capital flowing from the United States by a considerable margin.58 By 1962 the 
Venezuelan Communist Party had embraced armed struggle as a vehicle for social change, and 
eastern Venezuela, which had been the point of entry for previous subversive activity, became 
strategically crucial once again.59 Thus, the Venezuela-British Guiana border was a point of 
concern for the United States making British Guiana invaluable to the overarching geo-strategic 
imperatives of the United States, especially in light of Cuba’s active exportation of revolution in 
Latin America.60  
Venezuela presented an additional problem for Great Britain. As noted earlier, the 
Essequibo region, encompassing the border between British Guiana and Venezuela had been 
contested since the mid-nineteenth century. The dispute was temporarily resolved with American 
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mediation in 1895; however, Venezuela never fully accepted the decision and the dormant 
dispute threatened to explode once the colony was granted independence.61 The British 
government could not withdraw from the colony in a dignified manner if that withdrawal meant 
an immediate conflict with its neighbors. The small Guianese security force would be 
insufficient to protect the new nation’s sovereignty if Venezuela pressed its claim to Guianese 
territory.62 Ultimately, the resolution of the Venezuelan claim prior to independence was 
achieved through a complex diplomatic dynamic involving contentious behind the scenes deals 
between the United States and Great Britain. The Johnson Administration used its close 
relationship with Venezuela as leverage to convince the British to station troops in British 
Guiana after independence. American officials agreed to convince the Venezuelans to forego 
their claim in return for a temporary British military presence in British Guiana. British officials, 
however, were offended by what they perceived as blackmail by the United States.63 Despite 
British anger over the American suggestion, they agreed to the arbitration and a relatively 
cooperative dynamic continued between Great Britain and the United States in coordinating 
policy toward British Guiana.  
Considerably more threatening to Anglo-American geo-political strategy was news that 
claimed Cuban arms were flowing through British Guiana into Venezuela and Brazil. Brazil, the 
largest nation in Latin America, was long thought to be on the verge of asserting itself as a global 
power. Brazil’s stability was essential for the United States hemispheric strategy during the Cold 
War. As with Venezuela, Brazil’s shared border with British Guiana was a region of instability 
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and subversive activity. According to a Washington Daily News report on August 7, 1963, arms 
and ammunition were being smuggled from Cuba through British Guiana into Venezuela and 
Brazil. The sources said that the supplies were delivered by planes using dirt landing strips near 
the Venezuelan and Brazilian borders.64 While there is no evidence that the Soviet Union was 
directly assisting the PPP, Soviet assistance could have reached the colony with Cuba acting as 
intermediary. Relations between Jagan and the Castro government were limited; however, it is 
significant that Jagan openly pursued closer ties with the Cuban government and welcomed 
Cuban assistance whenever it was available. The United States could not easily dismiss these 
overtures as insignificant when developing policy during the Cold War. Thus, the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations concluded that the threat posed by a Jagan-led PPP government aligning 
with Cuba, and by default with the Soviet Union, was legitimate. Consequently, American 
officials applied diplomatic pressure, engaged in economic sanctions and covert action, and 
staved off the British attempt at granting independence, until a more suitable government could 
be established in Georgetown.  
 Although it is generally advisable for historians to avoid engaging in counterfactual 
arguments; it is worth pausing for a moment to consider what might have happened. When 
evaluating the American fear of communist subversion in British Guiana, it is critical to 
contextualize the Cold War imperatives involved in the decision making process in the United 
States, and to a lesser extent Great Britain.  In 1967 Che Guevara led a small band of rebels 
through Bolivia in an attempt to foment Cuban-style revolution in the country as the precursor to 
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a continental-wide communist revolution. Historians have generally agreed that Bolivia was a 
poor choice for Guevara to begin.65 
What if British Guiana had been granted independence under a Jagan led PPP 
government friendly to Cuba? Geographically, politically, and ideologically, an independent 
Guyana would have provided a much more advantageous starting point for advancing the Cuban 
revolutionary strategy across the continent than Bolivia. Politically, a Jagan led government may 
have been supportive or willing to turn a blind eye to Cuban activities. Cuban arms likely were 
already smuggled through British Guiana, even while the British maintained a colonial presence. 
In the absence of British oversight, under considerable stress to counter the PNC and attempts by 
the United States at subversion, and with an explosive border dispute to the west; Jagan would 
likely have increased his ties to the Castro regime in Cuba to maintain control of the country. 
The Cubans would have had a supportive government, albeit with a nominally stable populace, 
on mainland South America through which they would have had access and jungle cover to 
infiltrate Venezuela and Brazil. The proximity of communists in Venezuela and northeastern 
Brazil would have offered a springboard for expanding the revolution. The acquisition of 
Atkinson Airfield would have been a boon for the communist movement as well as an immense 
ideological loss for the United States. Additionally, instability in the far more economically 
relevant nations of Venezuela and Brazil would have been an ideological victory of far more 
consequence than a few unsupported rebels traversing the mountains of tiny Bolivia. While this 
scenario involves a considerable amount of speculation, it also accentuates the intricate frailty 
and uncertainty of South America in the 1960s. This is precisely why the United States was 
compelled to confront every perceived threat in the region as crucial to the nation’s interest. It is 
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exactly the possibility of such a scenario that led the United States to fear what was at the time a 
possibility.66  
Economic Considerations 
Great Britain was aware of Jagan’s communist ideals and his attempts to court Cuba, as 
well as Eastern bloc nations; however, the British were more concerned with British Guiana’s 
economic viability than of communist subversion. The British exerted considerable effort to 
ensure that capitalist investment would continue to flow into British Guiana after independence. 
Booker Brothers, the primary investor in the colony, was confident that Jagan was best suited to 
lead an independent government in British Guiana.67 The American based Reynolds Metals 
Company, one of the largest aluminum companies in the world, had considerable investments in 
Guianese bauxite, which it supplied to the United States, which needed the raw materials to 
sustain the Cold War military buildup. Walter Rice, Vice President of Reynolds Metals, became 
concerned in June 1962 when he learned that Jagan had been in contact with Poland and other 
Eastern Bloc countries attempting to broker trade agreements for Guianese bauxite. Jagan’s 
alleged dealings were predicated on the nationalization of some or all of Reynolds Metal’s 
holdings in British Guiana.68 British concerns over the prospect of Jagan nationalizing private 
capital were tempered, despite Jagan’s intentions, because of the significant cultural value East 
Indian farmers placed on the rights of private property. The British concluded that Jagan could 
never pursue government ownership of private property without losing his base of political 
                                                            
66 It is worth noting that Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago feared the possibility of Jagan 
permitting communist subversives to make British Guiana a staging point for forays in the hemisphere. See: Colin 
A. Palmer, Eric Williams and the Making of the Modern Caribbean (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006), 210-211.  
67 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington 17 March 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, 12: 273. 
68 Walter Rice to Griffith Johnson, 19 June 1962, Br. GU.-Mining and Minerals 6.7, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 
87 
 
support.69 Ultimately, American preoccupation with the PPP’s foreign policy and British 
Guiana’s significance as a crucial part of the regional Cold War strategy, trumped British 
analysis of domestic programs and resulted in a persistent fear of Jagan’s communist leanings. 
American pressure combined with Jagan’s ineffective leadership culminating in Anglo-American 
support for Burnham. 
Contention and Cooperation in the Anglo-American Alliance 
The United States and Great Britain envisioned a stable, pro-Western government being 
established in British Guiana after independence; however, there was not a consensus on how to 
achieve these aims. Thus, the United States and Great Britain exerted a considerable effort to 
formulate a coordinated policy in British Guiana before independence was given to the Guianese. 
The level of cooperation in developing a coordinated British Guiana policy between Great 
Britain and the United States cannot be understated. It is perhaps best exemplified in an internal 
memorandum regarding the post-independence stationing of British troops in Guyana, which 
stated: “In reaching this difficult decision, we took fully into account United States views as 
expressed by Mr. Bundy (your telegram under reference) and again by Mr. Rusk in his talks with 
the Colonial Secretary.”70 The same was true of policymakers in the United States. American 
policy considered British imperatives at every turn.71 
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Initially, the United States deferred to British strategy in British Guiana and in mid-1961 
President John F. Kennedy outlined a strategy for working with Cheddi Jagan. The decision was 
founded on the idea that the British should take the lead in formulating policy in their colony, 
despite its geographic proximity to the United States. The State Department indicated that the 
United States government was pursuing a: “whole hearted, across the board effort to work with 
Cheddi Jagan.”72  The American policy was the result of a careful consideration of British 
concerns and the desire to have a coordinated policy with British officials. The necessity of 
maintaining a strong Anglo-American alliance compelled the United States to attempt to work 
with Jagan, despite strong misgivings about his intentions once independence was granted. 
Jagan’s foreign policy decisions undermined this policy by June 1962, but the significance of 
working within a cooperative framework remained. 
The brief for Prime Minister Harold MacMillan’s visit with President John F. Kennedy at 
Birch Grove in June 1963 exemplifies the importance of United States imperatives to British 
policy. Likewise, it shows how Great Britain played an active part in the formation of United 
States policy in an effort to create a functional alliance. MacMillan’s talking points acknowledge 
the fact that the British had no strategic interest in British Guiana and their overriding goal was 
to withdraw from the colony as soon as possible. The British withheld independence despite their 
general approval of Jagan and were willing to work with the United States to establish an 
alternative government under Burnham to quell American anxieties.73 MacMillan sought to 
appease both British and American interests in British Guiana. The overall significance of British 
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Guiana to relations between the nations was acknowledged in the Joint Assessment by U.S. and 
British Officials that was agreed upon during Kennedy and Macmillan’s talks. The assessment 
made clear that Anglo-American relations would suffer considerably if a communist government 
emerged in British Guiana after independence.74Therefore, Great Britain framed its 
decolonization policies within the broader context of United States Cold War strategy. 
Simultaneously the United States, while pushing its geo-strategic objectives in British Guiana, 
accepted that British imperatives in the colony would inevitably impact the direction of policies 
made in Washington. 
The appropriate level of intervention within the British Guianese domestic scene was an 
area of frustration and, occasionally, contention between British and American policymakers. 
John Henning, Colonial Office attaché at the British embassy in Washington, joked: “…it is 
difficult for [American policymakers] to realise how impotent the colonial power is. This 
reluctance is traditional: it is somewhat of a national heresy for Americans to believe that the 
colonial power against which their patriots rose and battled so heroically was really rather 
powerless.” He continued: “…you would think that a nation that resented imperial legislation as 
vigorously as they did would be among the first to recognise the consequences of legislating by 
Order in Counsel over the headx {sic} of Dr. Jagan…Knox admits this, but suspects that there is 
something wrong in a world in which what was good for Sam Adams must be good for Cheddi 
Jagan!”75 This tongue in cheek statement hints at the challenge for the two nations. The relative 
power of Great Britain in controlling the events within their colony was considerably less than 
what the United States imagined. The United States expected British support of American Cold 
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War policies and Great Britain backed the United States as much as was possible; however, 
decolonization presented a challenge to the special relationship.  
The geographical significance of British Guiana for the United States tempted them to 
pursue policies which were more aggressive than what Great Britain was willing to engage in. 
The British, adjusting to the new international environment of the post-World War II era, were 
reluctant to intervene too aggressively in the decolonization process in their own colony. 
Additionally, the British were restrained by the practical realities of decolonizing an empire. 
Colonial officials needed to understand and consider the local conditions which varied in each 
colony and ensure that the incoming government was prepared to maintain stability when the 
British withdrawal from the colony was final. Finally, the entire decolonization process was 
complicated by Great Britain’s need to incur minimal financial drain as they liquidated the 
empire. For both ideological and practical reasons, the United States and Great Britain were 
never entirely in agreement about how to best decolonize British Guiana and were each forced to 
make concessions to assure the success of their partnership.  
 The United States offered financial aid, diplomatic pressure, and vocal support for British 
policies in the international community as a means of generating compromise with British 
officials. Deputy Director of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Gordon 
Knox, explained to Assistant Secretary of State, William Burdett that: “If the U.S. could promise 
substantial aid, e.g., not less than $15,000,000 per year HMG would be inclined to accede to our 
wishes…and if the British felt that Burnham would get arms from the USG or from agencies of 
the US government…it might prefer to postpone its departure temporarily. If the British felt that 
their wishes would be heeded by the U.S. with regard to certain other problems in other parts of 
the world…in return for British compliance to U.S. wishes in BG, the British Government might 
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strive more energetically to bring about in BG a pre-independence PR election.”76 Thus, the 
delay of independence for British Guiana and the British institution of proportional 
representation in the colony before the December 1964 election can be seen largely as a 
successful negotiation between the United States and Great Britain and between the imperatives 
of Cold War and decolonization.  
 British and American imperatives coalesced as it became clear that a Cheddi Jagan led 
PPP could not establish domestic stability in British Guiana. It is critical to acknowledge that 
Jagan’s inability to control the civil services, and thus maintain order in the colony, weighed on 
the British decision to support Burnham. It is not coincidental that the determination by the 
British that Burnham could maintain the loyalty of the police force preceded their decision to 
compromise with the United States.77 It is also critical to acknowledge that British and American 
officials had come to a near agreement about what the PPP’s foreign policy designs would be for 
the post-colonial government. Both Great Britain and the United States were certain that Jagan 
would move to establish a Castro-styled communist government after independence. They 
disagreed only in that the United States felt that intervention was necessary to keep Jagan from 
succeeding, while British officials thought that internal opposition in British Guiana may be 
strong enough to impede the PPP’s plans.78 Thus, Burnham’s adroit diplomacy, which addressed 
specific American concerns about British Guiana’s post-colonial foreign policy, gave the Anglo-
American alliance a way to keep the colony from establishing a communist government. 
Burnham explained to American Consul, Delmar Carlson, that once the PNC assumed power, he 
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would not recognize the Soviet Union or Castro, he would cut trade with Cuba, and British 
Guiana would apply to join the Organization of American States (OAS).79 Supporting Burnham 
would provide the internal stability necessary to fulfill the British objective of stabilizing the 
Guianese government prior to independence and concurrently absolve the United States of the 
worry of a communist government springing up in a geographically crucial region of the world. 
The Anglo-American strategy was not without its potential problems; however, fear of 
post-colonial political oppression in British Guiana was less of a concern to British and 
American policymakers than addressing strategic concerns. British officials were aware that the 
PNC would seek to suppress the PPP and its supporters once they colony had achieved 
independence. Colonial Governor Richard Luyt was equally disturbed at the notion that the PNC 
would not address racial imbalances in the civil services and thus further oppress East Indians in 
British Guiana.80 However, post-colonial pitfalls were judged to be less of a risk than supporting 
the Jagan-led government.  Luyt concluded that the PPP had proven itself incapable of governing 
British Guiana. The Jagans could not hope to assert their authority over a predominantly Afro-
Guianese police force. Additionally, the PPP foreign policy assured that British Guiana would 
not receive American development aid after independence if the Jagans were in power. Finally, 
instability would be assured in the colony and the PNC and UF in opposition would be capable 
of undermining the government because of their supporters in Georgetown.81 Thus, British 
decolonization imperatives began to align with American goals in British Guiana and an Anglo-
American compromise became possible for the colony. 
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 The United States applied persistent pressure on Great Britain to support Burnham and 
once obtained, that support proved decisive. Burnham was the leader British and American 
officials were forced to work with, and certainly not the leader with whom they desired to work. 
State Department records indicate that the United States made an ongoing effort to find a viable 
anti-communist alternative to Jagan to lead the East Indians.82  Great Britain and the United 
States made pragmatic choices in British Guiana based on a strategically poor set of possibilities. 
Burnham and Jagan, as will be explored in the following chapter, played a crucial role in 
determining British Guiana’s destiny. However, local conditions in British Guiana worked 
against the establishment of a PPP government in British Guiana. 
 Ultimately, Great Britain and the United States coordinated their policy based on mutual 
interests in British Guiana. Each pursued individual interests, while being cognizant of the 
imperatives of its ally. The United States was primarily concerned with waging the Cold War, a 
struggle occurring most often and intensely in previous European colonies. Great Britain, in turn, 
was engaged heavily in disassembling its erstwhile empire, an exercise never divorced from its 
Cold War implications. Despite what was at times a contentious relationship, the two nations 
forged a decolonization policy which, at the time, achieved both nations’ goals in the region. The 
British established an independent government in British Guiana that maintained stability after 
British troops and administrators left, and the United States set in place a leader willing to work 
within an American approved Cold War framework. The consequences for the Guianese people 
were less positive. Burnham implemented an increasingly repressive government, supported by 
fraudulent elections and American aid.83 Thus, the United States and Great Britain won a 
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complex Cold War victory in British Guiana. Having established British and American 
objectives in British Guiana, the following chapter will elaborate on the role of the Guianese 




Chapter 4: Participants in the Cold War: The Impact of the People’s Progressive Party’s 
Foreign Policy in British Guiana 
Since 1898 the United States has held a dominant position in the Caribbean and has 
helped define Western inter- hemispheric relations. Throughout the twentieth century, American 
strategic and economic imperatives in the region were advanced through frequent and diverse 
forms of intervention. Through the Good Neighbor Policy, Presidents Herbert Hoover and 
Franklin Roosevelt attempted to minimize the role of direct intervention during the 1930s and 
1940s. However, heightened international tensions during the Cold War provided the impetus for 
a return to interventionism in the Caribbean with the aim of preserving American ideals and 
security. The previous chapter discussed the strategic objectives of the United States and Great 
Britain in British Guiana. This chapter will narrow the focus and examine how Guianese leaders 
made foreign policy decisions which impacted American and British policy toward British 
Guiana. Specifically, the chapter will show how the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) 
squandered an opportunity to work with the United States between August 1961 and June 1962, 
effectively ending its chances of being the party that would lead British Guiana to independence. 
Additionally, this chapter will briefly discuss how and why the United States and Great Britain 
determined in June 1963 to eliminate the PPP as the party of the government in British Guiana 
before the transfer of power.  
Policymakers in the United States perceived the growing power of the Soviet Union after 
World War II as a serious threat to the region that required an increased assertion of American 
influence to thwart international communist subversion. The United States government had 
determined to tighten security in its backyard. However, despite the relatively diminutive size of 
Caribbean nations, and the strength of the United States, it is critical not to underestimate the 
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impact of less powerful hemispheric leaders on policy in the United States. Some adroit 
hemispheric officials successfully pursued independent policies in the shadow of their neighbor 
to the north, while the others wrought their own demise by failing to engage the United States 
with effective diplomacy. This chapter will explore the failure of the Cheddi and Janet Jagan led 
PPP government in British Guiana from 1961-1963. It will explain the PPP’s failure as a result 
of Jagan’s inability to conduct an efficient foreign policy, specifically in relation to the United 
States. 
The Influence of the Cold War on Interpreting Decolonization in British Guiana 
The historiography of British Guiana speaks to the issue of racial politics and the 
important role played by Great Britain and the United States in determining the course of 
Guianese independence. While several authors have made a connection between internal politics 
and foreign intervention, the crucial role played by the colony’s political leadership in 
influencing Anglo-American foreign policy has been largely overlooked. Domestic politics in 
British Guiana increasingly degenerated into racially polarized blocs after the PPP split in 1955.1  
The division of the party into two distinct political-racial constituencies, East Indian and Afro-
Guianese, is well documented. Both Jagan’s PPP and Forbes Burnham’s People’s National 
Congress (PNC) struggled to maintain their ethnically diverse memberships, which had led to 
domestic success of the PPP in the early 1950s. Despite their efforts, Guianese politics diverged 
along racial lines and both men sought to enhance the façade of a multi-racial appeal of their 
parties even as their political campaigns and policies became more singularly focused on 
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appealing to their respective racial communities.2  Jagan and Burnham realized that regardless of 
which party controlled the government at independence, social conflict was a distinct possibility. 
They also understood that Great Britain was unlikely to grant independence to the colony until 
the Guianese established a government capable of suppressing racial violence and sustaining 
domestic stability. Nevertheless, the colony remained politically divided into two racial 
constituencies, a trend Jagan and Burnham perpetuated. Jagan enjoyed a slight edge in popular 
support within the colony; however, whoever could successfully court the third constituency, 
interested foreign powers, would determine the fate of the colony. Jagan’s failure to effectively 
engage in pragmatic diplomacy coupled with Burnham’s ability to placate to the interests of the 
United States resulted in greater Anglo-American support for the PNC, and thus won Burnham 
the leading role in a newly independent Guyana. 
Scholars have traditionally explained the Jagans’ struggle in British Guiana as a David 
fighting against the Goliaths of the United States and Great Britain. They attribute the PPP loss 
of power to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) covert subversion, primarily through 
financing Guianese opposition under the cloak of international labor organizations such as the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL), Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), and Inter-
American Regional Organization (ORIT). Jagan is often portrayed as a victim of the Cold War, a 
phrase that he himself used to describe the plight of his nation.3 Academics such as Stephen 
Rabe and Thomas Spinner have suggested that the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations took 
advantage of endemic, but previously contained, racial tensions in Guianese society to 
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manipulate the domestic politics of the colony using the politics of racial discord.4 Thus, the 
Jagans would be defeated through isolation from the Afro-Guianese community and a loss of 
their multi-ethnic coalition. According to these interpretations, the United States government 
used the ensuing social unrest to pressure Great Britain into manipulating the electoral system of 
British Guiana as a way of achieving the desired outcome, a government fronted by Forbes 
Burnham. There is ample evidence to suggest that the United States maintained a consistent 
strategy of opposition to Cheddi and Janet Jagan in British Guiana between 1953 and 1966 and 
the British Colonial Office’s imposition of proportional representation on the colony was a 
transparent attempt to remove the Jagans through ostensibly legal means.5  
Similarly, Richard Barnet sees developments in British Guiana as being the consequence 
of overzealous American anti-communism. Barnet is prescient in noting the complexity of 
relations between the United States and Great Britain in the Cold War world. He notes that the 
United States saw the decline of the British Empire as an economic opportunity; however, after 
World War II, American policymakers also viewed the drastically changing global power 
structure as a threat to their national security. The power vacuum in post-colonial regions, along 
with the increasing role of the Soviet Union and localized communist movements in developing 
areas, was specifically troubling to American officials.6 According to Barnet, the United States 
sought to improve their security by eliminating governments in the developing world which they 
deemed communist. He suggests a number of qualities that American policymakers looked for in 
making such a classification, such as nationalization of private industry, radical land reform, 
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autocratic trade policies, acceptance of Soviet or Chinese aid, and insistence on following an 
anti-American or non-aligned foreign policy. According to Barnet, the existence of these 
qualities in the third world was used to justify American intervention.7  Barnet effectively notes 
the dangers faced by American policymakers, who were overly rigid in their classification of 
emerging governments, when perceiving the world through a Cold War lens. Barnet concludes 
that the United States, when it feared a communist regime emerging in the developing world, 
would undermine or even pursue its expulsion. The PPP in British Guiana exhibited most, if not 
all, of Barnet’s qualifications; however, explanations which attribute the demise of the Jagans in 
the 1960s solely to American intervention are incomplete. This chapter suggests that the PPP’s 
foreign policy, in conjunction with American subversive activities, undermined the Jagans’ 
position in British Guiana. 
The Jagans were career politicians, who although adept at building inter-Guianese 
political coalitions, failed at foreign policy. Despite the corrosive dynamic of American 
opposition and Jaganite irritation, the PPP maintained a position of dominance in British Guiana 
into the 1960s. The PPP’s victory in the August 1961 elections ushered in the decisive period of 
pre-independence politics in British Guiana. In this critical moment, Cheddi Jagan and the 
Party’s leadership squandered the opportunity to become a viable option to lead the colony to 
independence. The inability of the PPP to appreciate the degree to which the United States set 
the Cold War agenda for intra-hemispheric relations contributed to the party’s failure. More 
importantly, Jagan’s failure to accurately assess the consequences of concurrent events in the 
Caribbean, especially in Cuba, led to a failed foreign policy. Thus, despite the Jagans knack for 
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obtaining electoral victories in British Guiana, Cheddi Jagan could not retain enough support in 
Great Britain to overcome the effects of American opposition. 
A Comparison of Latin American Nationalist Leaders During the Early Cold War 
It is enlightening to compare Jagan to other regional leaders who did develop effective 
relationships with the United States, and to examine the dissimilar trajectories their political 
careers followed as a result of that association. Kyle Longley and Eric Roorda have explored 
how Jose Figueres in Costa Rica and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic were able to 
pursue nationalist policies and resist United States domination in a heightened period of 
American intervention. Figueres even managed to work with leftists and communists in Costa 
Rica to achieve his domestic goals.8 Their work lays the groundwork for political studies of local 
Caribbean leaders during the mid-twentieth century. Figueres and Trujillo thrived primarily as a 
result of their ability to conduct successful foreign relations with the United States due to several 
key advantages which they utilized effectively. Four key distinctions can be made between the 
Jagans and Figueres and Trujillo. 
First, Figueres and Trujillo were able to take advantage of a positive historical 
relationship with the United States. Longley describes Figueres as having benefited from a 
legacy of amicable exchange wherein Costa Rica had established itself as a supporter of the 
United States during major international crisis; including declaring war on Japan in 1941before 
the United States congress officially approved hostilities.9 Similarly, Trujillo survived 
considerable international opposition as well as resistance from the State Department to a great 
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degree because of relationships developed during his time working with the United States 
Marines.10 Jagan, and indeed British Guiana itself, did not inherit the benefits of previously 
successful political ties to the United States. The United State generally ignored British Guiana 
until international labor unions alleged the existence of communist elements in the colony in the 
mid-1950s. Thus, Guianese political leaders had no political capital to draw on for support from 
the United States, while they attempted to progress toward independence at odds with several 
key American ideological positions. 
Secondly, Figueres and Trujillo benefited from the support of their respective militaries. 
Trujillo initially came to power as head of the Dominican military and he maintained that role 
until his demise in 1961. Despite opposition from Rafael Calderon and small armed 
insurrections, Figueres was never in danger of losing control of the armed forces and came to 
power in part as the consequence of armed revolt.11 Jagan, however, never controlled the armed 
services in British Guiana and as a result was incapable of asserting control over the colony 
when crisis occurred. Janet Jagan’s resignation as head of the civil services in 1964 is 
characteristic of the PPP’s relationship with the mostly Afro-Guianese police force, which took 
its orders from the political opposition, namely, Forbes Burnham.12 Officials in the United States 
placed a considerable importance on the maintenance of stability in the Caribbean, especially 
during the Cold War, and the PPP was powerless to assert control without the aid of British 
troops.13 
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Thirdly, and most importantly, the United States demanded a firm commitment to anti-
communism in the Caribbean during the Cold War. Figueres and Trujillo were adamant anti-
communists, while Jagan held an ideological position opposite to that of the United States, 
supporting communist nations and praising the Cuban Revolution. Trujillo avoided repercussions 
for countless repressive measures and violence because he advanced the geo-strategic 
imperatives of the United States, assuring stability in his small nation.14 Figures initially obtained 
support from the United States after Calderon failed to discern the shift in American policy 
toward opposing left-wing politicians after the Second World War.15 American officials were 
confused about Figueres’ ideology. Indeed, he was classified at times as authoritarian and 
socialist, but he remained clearly anti-communist.16 His vocal commitment to combat 
communism provided him with the leeway to enact domestic social reforms which destroyed 
other Caribbean leaders, specifically Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Figueres nationalized banks 
and imposed taxes on the wealthy, though even in pursuing domestic reform Figures was aware 
of the need to work within a framework acceptable to the United States. Confrontation with the 
influential United Fruit Company was the impetus for the American supported overthrow of 
Arbenz, and Figueres wisely avoided challenging United Fruit in Costa Rica.17 Jagan’s domestic 
program was moderately reformative; however, when coupled with his vocal support of 
communism, it was unacceptable to the United States. The determining factor in American 
opposition to the PPP was the Jagans’ vocal support of communism and their pursuit of a foreign 
policy which seemed to support their communist ideology. 
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Finally, Figueres and Trujillo maintained the support of key elements within the United 
States. Figueres was close to liberal democratic groups and labor leaders, such as Robert 
Alexander and Serafino Romualdi.  Trujillo had ties to the United States military and individuals 
close to the White House such as Joseph E. Davis, who was a close friend of President Roosevelt 
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.18 Both men were willing to placate the American public. 
Trujillo named highways after George Washington and the United States Marine Corps and 
Figueres made frequent references to symbolically connect Costa Rica and the United States.19 
Tellingly, Romualdi, who was president of the AFL and CIO backed Inter-American Regional 
Organization (ORIT), was closely connected to the Kennedy White House, and was one of 
Jagan’s staunchest opponents. Figueres condemned radical anti-American policies during a 
speech in Havana, while Jagan continually supported the Cuban Revolution, at one point 
referring to Castro as the greatest liberator of the twentieth century and calling on his people to 
help defend the Cubans, with arms if necessary.20 The disparity between Figueres, Trujillo and 
Jagan can best be summarized in their own words. Jose Figueres angered the United States when 
he publically stated: “I know. I am a citizen of a ‘banana republic’.”21 Notwithstanding the 
irritation of American officials, the statement provides a key insight into Figueres’ ability to 
thrive as a political figure during the Cold War. He understood his political reality, made 
concessions when necessary and thus freed himself to pursue an independent course of action 
elsewhere. Conversely, Jagan was quoted in December 1961 as stating: “We don’t want to get 
                                                            
18 Ibid, xii, 122; Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 76. 
19 Longley The Sparrow and the Hawk, xii; Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 117-118. 
20 Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk, 153-154; Melby to Department of State, 29 June 1962, 741d.00/6-2962, 
Central Decimal Files Box 1668, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, National Archives II, College Park, 
MD. 
21 Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk, 132. 
104 
 
involved in the Cold War. We have been victims of it.”22 On the surface his statement may 
appear benign; however, it belies Jagan’s critical flaw as a politician. He was incapable of 
comprehending the reality of his tenuous position as the proposed leader of a soon to be 
independent Caribbean nation. Cheddi Jagan attempted to operate in an ideological world in 
which he did not have to confront real world political situations. Whereas Figueres and Trujillo 
acknowledged and manipulated their key political reality, namely, that the United States was the 
ultimate authority in the Western Hemisphere, Jagan either did not appreciate it until it was too 
late, or he ignored it. Regardless, his inability to establish an effectively functioning foreign 
policy based on a realistic assessment of his political footing doomed him to be the victim that he 
claimed to be. 
Contextualizing the Impact of American Subversion in Undermining the PPP Government 
This chapter suggests that the PPP’s foreign policy was the determining factor in framing 
American strategy in British Guiana; however, it would be remiss to overlook the effect of 
momentum on bureaucratic politics, in this instance the role of the AFL-CIO and the CIA. 
Stephen Rabe notes that American labor leaders, such as Alexander, Romualdi, and Jay 
Lovestone, were actively involved in Guianese politics throughout the 1950s, likely operating 
with covert funding from the CIA. The CIA began actively pursuing a strategy of spreading 
racial domestic unrest to diminish support for the PPP, which impacted events as early as the end 
of the 1950s and certainly by the early 1960s. Additionally, Rabe is prescient in noting that 
Alexander, Romualdi, and Lovestone had close access to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 
which presented them an opportunity to influence policymaking in Washington and advance an 
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anti-PPP agenda.23 However, the Jagans’ decision to persistently seek cultural, economic, 
military, and especially ideological, associations with communist nations reinforced American 
opposition and compounded the erosion of the PPP’s position in the colony as a consequence of 
the CIA’s manufactured internal racial discord. The foreign policy of the PPP undermined Jagan 
and perpetually antagonized consecutive administrations in the United States. Thus, it was the 
PPP foreign policy, not bureaucratic inertia, which led to the decision of the United States 
government to subvert Jagan . 
PPP Policy From 1953 to 1959 
 British Guiana was first granted internal self-government in April 1953 after a national 
election in which the PPP won a landslide victory. The Jagans overestimated the strength of their 
position, however, and pursued a course which failed disastrously and would be indicative of 
their missteps over the ensuing decade.  The Jagans chose to combine an agenda of social reform 
with a vocal espousal of Marxist rhetoric. In less than six months Great Britain suspended the 
constitution in British Guiana and reverted to direct control, fearing a communist takeover of the 
colony.24 The Jagans stubbornly refused to adapt to political realities, perhaps because they 
maintained the dominant position in Guianese politics. Other important members of the PPP did 
adapt to strategic realities and split with the party over the course of the ensuing decade. The 
most important rift in Guianese politics occurred when key members of the PPP split from the 
party in 1955, most of whom followed a faction led by Forbes Burnham. 
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The Jagans spent nearly a decade organizing and ascending within the Guianese political 
structure before the election in 1953. They interpreted their astounding victory as a confirmation 
that they were indeed representative of the Guianese people and increasingly infused their 
personal political beliefs into the governing of the colony, identifying the nationalist cause of the 
Guianese with the anti-colonial aspirations of other colonized areas of the world. More 
importantly, the Jagans proceeded with social reforms and sought to develop ties with left-wing 
governments. Decisions made in the immediate aftermath of the election came to the attention of 
international trade unions with ties to the United States government. Serafino Romualdi, Inter-
American Representative of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) derided the Jagans for 
importing what he called subversive literature over a number of years. In an article for the AFL’s 
Free Trade Union News, Romualdi noted: “When Jagan came to power his first act was to repeal 
the [Anti-Subversive Literature] Bill.” The bill was the first of a number of controversial reforms 
passed by the PPP over the summer of 1953. Romualdi also thought it important to note that: 
“…two weeks after the elections which the PPP won, Mrs. Jagan went to Russia according to the 
newspapers.”25 British Colonial governor Alfred Savage had already suspended British Guiana’s 
constitution and reasserted direct control over the colony by the time Romualdi’s concerns were 
heard in the United States.26 However, the Jagans maneuvers laid the basis for American 
suspicion of the PPP’s intentions for British Guiana. The PPP would have to adapt politically to 
win the increasingly important third constituency in colonial politics. 
Both Cheddi and Janet Jagan endured prison sentences in British Guiana in1954 for acts 
of civil disobedience. Cheddi Jagan violated a travel ban confining PPP members to Georgetown 
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when he visited a branch of his dental surgery practice on the East Coast of Demerara on April 3 
and was imprisoned until September 11. Janet was arrest a few days before her husband was 
released, for allegedly being in possession of a ‘Secret’ Police Riot Manual and organizing a 
political meeting. There is considerable debate over the severity of the Jagan’s offenses. Cheddi 
Jagan in fact claimed that the riot manual was planted in his home and that the supposed political 
meeting his wife organized was nothing more than an Indian religious festival, known as a 
Bhagwat.27 Regardless of the minimal nature of their offenses, the Jagans continued to receive 
negative publicity, while their erstwhile ally, Burnham, organized a new strategy for obtaining 
power in British Guiana. 
The suspension of the British Guianese government in 1953 because of British fear of a 
communist revolution and the ensuing repression against the party destabilized the PPP and by 
1955 the party split into two factions, one led by Forbes Burnham, the other by the Jagans. The 
division of the PPP can be attributed primarily to two causes, an internal power struggle between 
the Jagans and Burnham for supremacy within the party and an ideological conflict over the 
future direction of the PPP. Burnham’s faction defined themselves as moderate social democrats 
while the Jagans continued to espouse Marxists political ideals, though somewhat less fervently 
than prior to the British intervention in 1953.28 While somewhat tempered, the Jagans continued 
to espouse radical rhetoric in the aftermath of the split in the PPP. The political ideals of the 
Jaganite faction were elaborated on in a policy statement obtained by The Daily Chronicle. In 
December 1956 the United States Consul, A. John Cope, wrote to the State Department 
regarding this information. He interpreted the statement to be a confirmation of Jagan as “an 
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unrepentant Communist” who “remains steadfast in support of Soviet Communist policy.”29 
When national elections were held in 1957, the Jaganite faction of the PPP resoundingly defeated 
the Burnham faction and re-affirmed its position as the primary political force in the colony. 
Burnham finalized his split with the party after the election by forming the PNC. The PPP 
exercised prudence in the first two years after the election and created the opportunity for the 
Jagans to work with the United States and potentially win the third constituency. Thus, despite 
the Jagans’ radical rhetoric, they briefly showed signs of wanting to work with the United States, 
before the Cuban Revolution altered their perception of British Guiana’s political realities. 
The PPP made several requests for loans from the United States from 1957-1959, and 
though the United States was generally unreceptive to Jagan’s overtures for financial assistance, 
relations began to improve, establishing a possible basis for future cooperation.30 State 
Department officials went as far as recommending the government work with Cheddi Jagan in 
July 1959, citing “responsible” behavior after the election in 1957.However, American officials 
remained skeptical of Jagan’s intentions and encouraged moderate cooperation, “without a great 
show of friendliness.”31 Internal records indicate that Jagan impressed the officials with whom he 
met during his visit in July 1959. A summary of the meeting characterized him as: “personable, 
utterly charming, intellectually very bright, highly articulate, well informed and a most able 
narrator of his country’s problems.” Most importantly he was: “not see[n] to fit the description of 
Communist which has been applied to him.”32 It is unlikely that upper level administrators in the 
State Department shared these conclusions, considering Jagan did not meet with anyone above 
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the Office Director Level; nonetheless, the fact remains that for a fleeting moment in 1959, 
Cheddi Jagan began to make inroads toward reconciliation with the United States.33 However, 
attempts to appease the United States were half-hearted at best and even as Cheddi Jagan was 
charming to his hosts in Washington, he and Janet were undermining their cause with political 
activities elsewhere. 
The Increasingly Aggressive PPP Policy After the Cuban Revolution 
The Jagans continued to foster ties with Eastern bloc countries, which aroused the 
suspicion of concerned American officials between 1959 and 1960. Economic associations with 
Hungary and East Germany in 1959 were interpreted by Hugh Cumming as an effort to obscure 
aid coming from Communist nations and in April 1960 Jagan spoke openly of a potential trade 
agreement with Cuba. The fact that Jagan had just visited the revolutionary nation was not lost 
on Cumming.34 Cheddi Jagan returned to British Guiana in May 1960 after stopping in Trinidad 
to give a speech in which he spoke openly and strongly of supporting the Cuban Revolution and 
making the Cuban cause the cause of the rest of the Caribbean. He went so far as to suggest that 
the Guianese should take up arms to defend the Cubans against an attempted invasion by 
“imperialists”.35 United States Consul Everett Melby wrote to the Department of State in July 
summarizing the “communist situation in British Guiana”. The new American Consul had 
numerous and varied concerns including PPP rhetoric printed in the party’s periodical Thunder; 
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the importation of communist literature; communist contacts; Soviet Bloc trade, aid, and 
scholarships; and ties with Cuba.36  
It is important to recognize that the PPP’s foreign policy became notably more aggressive 
in 1959. Apparent policy changes, including attempts at moderating domestic reform and 
reconciling with the United States, were reversed two years after the Colonial Office 
reintroduced internal self-government to British Guiana. It is possible that American indifference 
toward Jagan’s requests for aid influenced the Guianese leader to seek assistance elsewhere; 
however, further explanation is required to illustrate why Jagan turned to the communist world at 
that specific time. The success of the Cuban Revolution in early 1959 and its strong opposition to 
the United States appears to have been the catalyst for a reinvigoration of Jagan’s belief in 
Marxism. Jagan immediately moved to create economic ties with Cuba and voiced strong 
support for Fidel Castro in the ensuing five years. His positive response to events in Cuba, 
especially after Castro defined the Revolution as socialist, is consistent with his purported 
Marxist ideology. In an April 1960 speech in Trinidad, Jagan declared that Castro was “beloved 
by everyone” and suggested that British Guiana should come to the aid of Cuba if the United 
States intervened on the island. He continued to interpret the Cuban experience as proof that 
British Guiana could also effectively pursue independence without collaborating with the United 
States and sought solidarity with the Cubans. 37 Thus, Jagan’s altering of the PPP foreign policy 
toward greater association with the Eastern Bloc was a combination of a failure to obtain 
American aid and a reaction to the Cuban Revolution. The success of the Cuban Revolution 
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proved to Jagan that an independent course was possible with support from the Soviet Union and 
Cuba to counter American dominance.  
Melby’s opinion of Jagan deteriorated further on October 7, 1960 when newspapers in 
the colony reported on a meeting between Jagan and East Indian businessmen quoting Jagan as 
having told the businessmen that he would pursue ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union after 
independence and that he would not assure free elections after independence. Jagan’s response to 
these accusations was simply to state that no newspapermen were present at the meeting.38  Thus, 
while questioning the legitimacy of the article, Jagan did not refute the claims of the article itself. 
His ambiguous response was typical and increasingly his indirect public statements were 
destructive to his image. Further damaging to the PPP’s position was the establishment of 
educational relations between British Guiana and Eastern Bloc nations. In April 1960 Brindley 
Benn, a close associate of the Jagans and leading member of the PPP visited Berlin and on 
October 14, 1960, Cheddi Jagan announced at a press conference that the results of Benn’s visit 
would soon be made public. He proudly proclaimed that six scholarships were to be awarded to 
Guianese students to be educated in East Germany.39  
The relationship between the Jagans and Cuba was further emphasized as the State 
Department prepared for talks with British officials in 1961. In a position paper prepared by 
United States officials, the State Department directly referenced the Cuban loan offer as evidence 
that the Jagans were receiving financial support from Communist bloc countries. The report also 
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characterizes the Jagans politics as persistently flirting with the Sino-Soviet bloc.40 The flirtation 
cited included the maintenance of mail contact with communists in the West, frequent travel to 
communist groups in Western countries, relationships with people connected to Soviet 
embassies, and visits to communist nations. Also disconcerting to the State Department was the 
plethora of communist literature in the PPP library in British Guiana and the active promotion of 
Communist bloc nations in the party’s weekly newspaper Thunder. This pattern of flirtation with 
communist groups was concerning enough to American officials, but there was more. Jagan’s 
Achilles heel was his penchant for vocally supporting the international communist cause.41 The 
State Department was also aware of the fact that the PPP had received financial aid and 
organizational support for the upcoming Guianese elections from Chinese and Hungarian 
sources.42 
The extent to which Cheddi Jagan misunderstood the effect of global events on his 
position is evidenced in a statement made in July 1961. With elections in the colony a month 
away, Jagan attempted to explain his position toward foreign relations. He claimed that he would 
continue a friendship with the United States under the condition that there were no strings 
attached and the Americans accepted his principles of economic planning.43 While this statement 
was not as incendiary to United States officials as his praise of the Cuban Revolution or his 
attempts to develop ties to Eastern Bloc nations, it belies an elemental flaw in Jagan’s political 
philosophy. The most important figure in Guianese politics overestimated his political leverage 
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and ability to chart a non-aligned course of action, especially because of British Guiana’s 
geographic proximity to the United States. The inability of the United States to control events in 
Cuba altered the American foreign policy and Jagan misinterpreted the consequences for his 
soon to be independent nation. The Cuban association with the Soviet Union solidified American 
opposition to further hemispheric social revolutions and minimized the latitude with which local 
politicians could conduct independent foreign policies, making the pursuit of a non-aligned 
policy virtually impossible. The American decision to organize anti-Castro Cubans to invade at 
the Bay of Pigs showed how adamantly the United States would try to squelch out any revolution 
in the hemisphere that might become communist. Jagan may have hoped to pursue a non-aligned 
foreign policy using his clientage as leverage to court the superpowers. However, American 
policymakers were adamant that regional leaders take sides in the Cold War, especially after the 
Cuban Revolution. 
Furthermore, Jagan never fully understood the importance Great Britain placed on the 
Anglo-American relationship. If Jagan hoped that Guiana’s status as a British colony would give 
him latitude unavailable to independent hemispheric nations, he was incorrect. Relations with the 
United States superseded the British desire to permit their colonial subjects truly autonomous 
self-rule. In July 1961 Jagan simply did not comprehend that self-government for a British 
colony in the Caribbean would be predicated on ties to the United States. Ultimately, Jagan never 
seemed to understand that he had to take sides in the Cold War; and the consequences of taking 
sides with the Eastern Bloc would cause anger in the United States and lead them to undermine 
his regime. This fundamental flaw in Jagan’s political view was crucial to decisions made over 
the subsequent two years by Britain and the United States, culminating in the Anglo-American 
meeting at Birch Grove, England in June 1963. There, key British and American officials 
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decided to remove Jagan as head of the Guianese government and establish an independent 
Guyana under a coalition government made up of Burnham’s PNC and Peter D’Aguiar’s United 
Force (UF).44 
The Opportunity and Failure of PPP Policy from August 1961 to June 1962 
The Kennedy Administration reassessed its policy toward British Guiana after failing to 
thwart the PPP victory in August 1961. In early September Kennedy proposed a policy described 
as an “across-the-board, whole-hearted attempt” to work with Jagan.45 The complete nature of 
Kennedy Administration policy toward British Guiana is somewhat unclear due to the fact that a 
substantial number of high level documents on the matter remain classified. However, the PPP’s 
electoral victory gave Jagan a legitimate opportunity to win the third constituency, the United 
States, and secure his position as head of an independent Guyana. In September 1961 the 
dominant position in the new government was still in the hands of the PPP, even if the American 
courtship of Jagan was half-hearted. 
It is critical to note that President John F. Kennedy proposed a wholehearted diplomatic 
attempt to work with Cheddi Jagan in August 1961, at the behest of Great Britain, after the PPP 
won another colonial election.46 While the Kennedy Administration did not eliminate active CIA 
operations against communist elements in the PPP, it appears the attempt to remove Jagan 
temporarily became a contingency plan. Thus, Jagan was given a small window of opportunity to 
prove to key American policymakers that he was a capable leader who was willing to work 
within the constraints of the Cold War western hemispheric conditions. Between August 1961 
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and June 1963, Jagan’s decisions were increasingly damaging to his political image. At a 
meeting in Birch Grove, London, in June 1963 United States and British officials finally 
determined to eliminate Jagan as head of the Guianese government.47 Poorly disguised covert 
intervention displaced the PPP as the leading party in British Guiana and paved the road to 
independence under a coalition government headed by Forbes Burnham. Ultimately, it was the 
PPP’s actions, coupled with the adroit diplomacy of Burnham and the lack of a viable third 
political figure, which solidified the American position and created the conditions under which 
intervention would be successful. 
A crucial caveat to the explanation set forth in this thesis is that much of the supporting 
information is subject to refinement after further declassification of records from the United 
States government. There is some reason to suspect that the Kennedy administration’s temporary 
policy of cooperating with Jagan was a stall tactic meant to appease British officials who were 
intent on granting independence to their colony at the earliest opportunity. Dean Rusk, the 
United States Secretary of State, sent a strongly worded message to Lord Alec Home of the 
Foreign Office in February 1962, mere days after the riots in Georgetown concluding that the 
Kennedy Administration had: “tr[ied] your policy” of working with Jagan and that “…I have 
reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana 
under Jagan.”48 Rusk’s comments could be interpreted as a way of seeing the riots as an excuse 
to abandon a policy never truly embraced by the Kennedy Administration. However, Rusk seems 
to have held an extreme view within the Kennedy Administration, and the evidence suggests that 
most American officials embraced the opportunity to work with Jagan, if reluctantly and only for 
a time. 
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There is more evidence that Kennedy’s stated policy change and decision to work with 
Jagan was really a stall tactic to placate British officials eager to grant independence to the 
colony. Correspondence between President Kennedy and Fowler Hamilton, Administrator for the 
Agency of International Development is interesting in light of other circumstantial evidence. 
Arthur Schlesinger, Special Assistant to the President, indicated on January 12 that delays in 
promised aid to British Guiana were threatening to undermine the president’s proposed policy of 
“…an across-the-board,  whole-hearted effort to work with Jagan.” Schlesinger feared that Jagan 
would conclude that the United States had determined not to work with him if aid was not soon 
forthcoming.49 Kennedy responded the same day with a memorandum for Hamilton demanding 
immediate steps to be taken reassuring Jagan and sending an economic mission to the colony. 
Kennedy set a deadline for this action of February 15.50 Riots erupted in Georgetown on 
February 12. This exchange could be interpreted in two ways. It is possible that Kennedy 
sincerely intended to work with Jagan and the riots were the result of the most unfortunate timing 
for Jagan. It is also possible, and there is some evidence to suggest, that the CIA was already 
working to undermine Jagan, and that Kennedy’s deadline was strategically chosen to fall after 
the riots had begun.  
The most plausible explanation is that Kennedy attempted to establish a relationship with 
Jagan, while instructing the CIA to continue operations in British Guiana in order to subvert the 
PPP government if diplomacy failed. It is also important to note that the Kennedy Administration 
was not unified in its opposition to Jagan until late June, 1962. For about a year, most of his 
advisors adopted a view somewhere between the extremes of Rusk, who adamantly opposed 
Jagan, and Schlesinger, who sought a diplomatic resolution to ideological disagreements with the 
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PPP leader. Kennedy seems to have drifted toward Rusk after meeting with Jagan in October, 
1961 and the rest of the administration followed over the next eight months. 
There is some suggestion in the historiography that suggests Kennedy’s stated attempt to 
work with Jagan was insincere, as the above examples illustrate; however, such an assumption is 
overly deterministic.51 Regardless of the genuineness of the Kennedy Administration’s attempt to 
work with Jagan there are two key conclusions to be drawn which are essential to the premise 
that Jagan himself played a crucial role in losing his position in British Guiana. First, at least 
some key members of the Kennedy Administration were under the impression that working with 
Jagan was, in fact, genuine policy. It is possible that Schlesinger was simply in the dark about 
Kennedy’s true intentions; however, that would suggest a disjointed foreign policy in 
Washington at the highest levels. Secondly, the British response to Rusk’s letter was a fiercely 
worded rebuttal to the Secretary’s conclusions and their implications.  Foreign Secretary Alec 
Home strongly criticized Rusk’s suggestion that the British could undermine Jagan while 
upholding the vestiges of a democratic government in the colony. The exchange was intense and 
it is clear that the British were offended and, more significantly, opposed to Rusk’s suggestion 
that intervention was possible in British Guiana.52 British administrators were squarely behind 
Jagan in early 1962 and despite having some suspicion of Jagan, they felt he was the most 
adequate leader in the colony. Thus, despite subversive efforts by the United States, strong 
opposition from some upper level members of the Kennedy Administration, and a series of 
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political missteps following his electoral victory in August 1961, Jagan was far from defeated 
politically in early 1962. 
Finally, it is important to qualify the impact that United States-inspired subversive 
attempts may have had in British Guiana. Much of the high level State Department 
correspondence which could clarify the exact nature of the United States role in subverting the 
PPP remains classified. Former CIA operative Philip Agee suggests that American backed covert 
operations began at least in 1959 and the work of scholars such as Stephen Rabe, Thomas 
Spinner, and Gordon Oliver Daniels has focused heavily on the role of American intervention as 
the determinant factor in the decolonization of British Guiana.53 However, this chapter suggests 
that even if there was a sustained covert attempt to dislodge Jagan, the likelihood of success 
would have been far from certain and while American inspired subversive attempts played a 
crucial role in effecting the trajectory of Guianese decolonization, they alone do not explain why 
the United States chose to undermine Jagan in the first place. The goals of covert interventions 
were achieved in instances such as Guatemala and Iran; however, they often failed disastrously, 
the clearest example of such failure being the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. Schlesinger gave the 
probability of success for operations in British Guiana as less than fifty percent even after the 
Kennedy Administration shifted internal discussion from strategy, to tactics and determined to 
pursue solely a course of subverting Jagan.54 This chapter will suggest that after the PPP’s 
electoral victory in August 1961 Jagan retained the support of Great Britain and the most critical 
capitalist investors in the colony. Additionally, it suggests that Jagan had an opportunity to 
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establish an effective relationship with the Kennedy Administration until mid-1962. Therefore, 
while the exact beginning of CIA operations in British Guiana is uncertain, their existence alone 
did not guarantee the demise of the PPP. The PPP position became untenable only after Jagan 
failed at establishing an effective relationship with the Kennedy Administration and finally lost 
the support of British colonial officials. Ultimately, the Jagans’ attempts to develop closer 
relations between British Guiana and the communist world was the primary factor which 
influenced Anglo-American policymaking and combined with external Cold War events, 
specifically in Cuba, to create an untenable situation for the PPP in British Guiana.  
Kennedy invited Cheddi Jagan to Washington D. C. in October 1961 as an indication that 
the United States sincerely hoped to work with the Guianese politician, and more importantly as 
a way to determine Jagan’s true ideological position. Jagan’s trip to the United States would 
prove to be the best opportunity he had to win the support of Washington, as well as an 
American public increasingly interested in international events in the Caribbean. The State 
Department “saw no real alternative to British policy” in early October and envisioned working 
with Jagan, if he could have a successful trip to the United States, according to Schlesinger.55 
Jagan’s visit would revolve around two key issues and his inability to comprehend the 
importance of the second issue proved to be a disastrous error. Jagan’s primary goal in visiting 
Washington was to obtain economic aid crucial for the development of British Guiana. The 
Americans intended on determining once and for all Jagan’s political ideology and intentions for 
an independent Guyana. Melby summarized the American view clearly in a telegram to 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. He stressed: “Ideological issues should be met fully at outset at 
high level…We should tell him frankly our concern about Communist involvement and tell him 
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we expect equally frank statement from him on his position.”56 Melby also noted that Jagan’s 
visit would prove to be: “an unparalleled opportunity to sell himself and his country to the U.S.”, 
while providing the ominous warning that: “U.S. newsmen are hard-headed pros who will needle 
him to see how he stands up under questioning.”57  
The Prime Minister’s visit began with an introduction to the American public on the 
weekly news program Meet the Press. Jagan’s performance was a public relations debacle that 
tainted his trip to the United States and signaled the beginning of a final erosion of the working 
relationship Kennedy had hoped to establish. He responded to his interviewers with inept and 
ambiguous answers, dodging simple ideological questions posed to him, rather than providing 
frank statements to clarify his ideological position as American officials had hoped.58 When he 
did attempt to engage in ideological conversation, Jagan resorted to making statements that 
sounded like pure Leninist ideology.59 Kennedy’s response was predictable in light of the 
circumstances.  According to Schlesinger, the President responded to the interview by: “call[ing] 
for a re-examination of all aspects of the problem.” Jagan had placed himself in a difficult 
position before he gathered himself to meet the President the following day. 
Kennedy and Jagan met on October 25, and the first order of business for the American 
President was to determine Jagan’s political ideology. Jagan evaded questions of doctrine, 
claiming that he was too unfamiliar with theory to distinguish between the various forms of 
socialism, which appeared to administration officials present to include communism. The 
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Guianese leader also claimed that he was uncommitted in the Cold War and he did not wish to 
become engaged in the conflict.60 Kennedy was discontented with Jagan’s evasiveness and the 
fact that he also requested a massive aid package, which Schlesinger described as: “all out of 
proportion to the size of his country.” Nonetheless, Kennedy was aware of the British contention 
that Jagan remained the only viable option for leadership in a soon to be independent Guyana.61 
Ultimately, the first and most outstanding failure in Jagan’s attempt to establish himself as a 
legitimate head of state in the immediate years prior to independence was the direct result of his 
inadequate statesmanship, not operations conducted against him by a foreign power. American 
foreign policy in the Caribbean after the Cuban Revolution demanded that regional leaders 
rhetorically support the United States. Jagan’s refusal to commit to supporting the United States 
convinced American officials that he was actively working against them. 
Before the Kennedy administration had time to digest Jagan’s visit, the Guianese leader 
and his party embarked on a relentless series of political maneuvers which added to the suspicion 
of United States officials. After returning to Georgetown the first week of November Jagan was 
quoted in the Trinidad Guardian suggesting that he would soon seek financial aid from the 
Soviet Union.62 Later that month, Melby forwarded information to the Department of State 
elaborating on the travels of six important PPP members, all of whom traveled to Cuba, Moscow, 
or Eastern Bloc nations.63 In closing an independence motion debate for the colony, Jagan 
referred to capitalism in the United States as a dying system, which he elaborated on in an 
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attempt to prove the evils of such an economic structure and later was quoted refusing to assure 
free elections after independence.64 Beginning in December, Jagan actively sought a solution to 
the racial discrepancy in the colony’s armed civil services. His pursuit of arms and training from 
various sources was a constant cause of suspicion from United States officials.  
Resolving the drastic racial imbalances in the police force was a legitimate concern. 
Increasing polarization of politics on ethnic grounds between 1955 and late 1961 was beginning 
to manifest itself in violent ways. A racially diversified police force was essential for the colony 
to maintain order in the post-independence period. However, Jagan’s decision to pursue training 
from Israel and arms from a number of Eastern Bloc sources, rather than the United States, 
represents another failure of Jagan to properly contextualize his political reality. The reaction of 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk in response to an article in the Jerusalem Post is useful in 
understanding the key problem with Jagan’s policy. Rusk sent a telegram to American Embassies 
in London and Tel Aviv and the Consulate in Georgetown seeking further information about 
Jagan’s pursuit of Israeli military assistance in conjunction with rumors of a PPP attempt to form 
youth camps in British Guiana for physical training and political indoctrination.65 Melby 
confirmed that the PPP had intentions of creating a supplemental police force loyal to the party.66 
Jagan had failed to realize that actively seeking arms and military training, and keeping the 
United States in the dark about it, would only result in more suspicion from Washington. His 
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actions reinforced the fears held by American policymakers that he was secretly attempting to 
establish a communist beachhead on mainland South America.  
The foreign policy of the PPP continued to antagonize the United States during the first 
month and a half of 1962, even as the domestic situation in British Guiana became increasingly 
volatile. The American Embassy in Warsaw informed the Department of State on January 18 that 
Janet Jagan visited Poland and was interviewed by Slowo Powzechne en route to Moscow.67  An 
article in the PPP newspaper Thunder earlier in the month attributed inflammatory comments 
about capitalism to the party’s Parliamentary Secretary, Jack Kelshall, who claimed that the PPP 
would “ultimately destroy” big business. Melby forwarded this information to the Department of 
State, adding that the Secretary was a close associate of Cheddi Jagan and his comments should 
be assumed to be party dogma.68  
By mid-January 1962 five months had passed since Jagan won re-election and the 
Kennedy Administration had agreed to attempt to work with the Prime Minister. Rather than 
engaging in insightful statesmanship during that period, Jagan’s actions in fact reinforced the 
American perception that he was a communist conspirator who was seeking to establish a second 
Cuba on the South American mainland. Posterity suggests that American fears were considerably 
overblown and perception obscured by what is frequently referred to as Cold War lenses. 
However, in January 1962, Jagan was proving that he lacked the ability to conduct a realistic 
foreign policy and effectively promote his party’s cause.  Despite Jagan’s imprudent dealings, he 
was still the colony’s leading political figure and his only legitimate rival, Burnham, was 
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unappealing to both the United States and Great Britain. Therefore, Jagan retained a clear 
advantage over his opposition when the Georgetown riots began on February 12. 
Demonstrators took to the streets of Georgetown on February 12, ostensibly objecting to 
Jagan’s proposed budget and a compulsory savings scheme. Within four days the city was ablaze 
as racial antagonisms exploded and protests turned violent. Burnham and D’Aguiar used the 
budget and increasing unrest as an attempt to oust the Jagan government from power.69 It is 
almost certain that Burnham was receiving financial assistance from the United States, or at least 
American labor unions, to prolong the strike.70 Unrest was finally quelled by the arrival of 
British troops in the city, not by any action of the PPP-led government. The implications of 
American involvement in the disturbance are somewhat misleading. The most likely explanation 
is that the Kennedy Administration’s contingency plan of subverting the PPP government took 
on a new level of urgency with the prospect of independence for the colony in the very near 
future. Violent unrest could be used as a pretext for delaying self-government until the United 
States could determine what to do about Jagan. However, it would be premature to allege that 
differences between Jagan and the United States had become entirely irreconcilable or that the 
Kennedy Administration had established a definitive position of opposition to Jagan.  
Despite Rusk’s conclusion on February 19 that the United States could not accept a 
Jagan-led government, Kennedy stated plainly that no decision had been made on policy toward 
British Guiana almost a month later.71 Alec Home’s biting response to Rusk and Ian MacLeod’s 
strong assertion that Jagan was not a communist and: “infinitely preferable to Burnham” makes 
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clear that British officials still considered Jagan the legitimate leader of the colony and had no 
intentions of subverting his government.72 Retrospectively it is apparent that the United States 
was in the process of assuming the lead role in British Guiana; however, in early 1962 British 
Guiana remained under the authority of Great Britain. The British Colonial Office was 
responsible for making the final determination of who would lead the colony upon independence, 
and in March 1962, the British did not seriously entertain the thought of eliminating Jagan in lieu 
of Burnham.  
Finally, Jagan retained the support of the primary capital investors in the colony, Bookers 
Brothers and ALCON, who stated plainly that he was preferable to any alternative leader.73 Their 
support was more of an indictment against Burnham than confidence in Jagan; nonetheless, even 
after the riots, Jagan remained the most likely prospect to lead the colony to independence. His 
hold on the government was slipping and the opportunity to achieve the necessary support of the 
United States was eroding at a quickening pace; however, he held the support of virtually every 
other powerful group interested in the future of the colony. Rusk’s opinion can be taken as an 
indicator of a strengthening opposition at the highest levels of the United States government; 
however, it was not an indication that Jagan’s government had become unsustainable. It was not 
even an indication of a unified policy opposing Jagan within the United States government. 
From a political standpoint, the most damaging aspect of the riots for the PPP was the 
realization that without British assistance, Jagan was incapable of maintaining order in the 
colony. Colonial officials were increasingly fearful that British Guiana would degenerate into 
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open racial warfare and even civil war after Her Majesty’s troops were withdrawn.74 The 
international community, specifically the United Nations (UN), was increasingly concerned with 
the humanitarian effects of global decolonization in the wake of disastrous European 
withdrawals from Africa. While many British officials had sincere concern for their former 
colony, international pressure to depart in an orderly fashion was the greatest factor impacting 
British withdrawal strategies. Great Britain did not want to lose standing in the international 
community by granting premature independence to the colony if the consequence was domestic 
strife.75 Burnham’s best opportunity to gain British support was by proving that a Jagan-led 
government would lead to instability and internal discord. The riots placed that idea in the minds 
of British officials for the first time. 
As damaging as the riots were to Jagan, the response of his party had a worse effect on 
his standing, both in the colony and internationally. An article in Thunder attributed the riot to a 
plot by “fascists” in Washington and claimed that it was a: “dismal failure on the part of the CIA 
and its stooges.”76 The consequence of aggressively condemning the United States was further 
antagonizing an already hostile administration, regardless of the accuracy of the claim that 
elements in Washington were behind or involved in the violence.  Jagan himself made no public 
reply to the challenge of his authority, confirming to many his impotence as a leader. The only 
statements from the PPP were made were passing remarks by Kelshall and Janet Jagan.77 Finally, 
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the PPP increased its attempts to establish a police force loyal to the party as an alternative to the 
current Afro-Guianese dominated civil services. This maneuver appeared reasonable on the 
surface; however, Jagan’s decision to act without consulting Great Britain or the United States, 
served only to arouse suspicion about his intentions.78 
Conversely, Forbes Burnham was working diligently to gain the support of United States 
officials. Burnham requested arms from the United States base at Atkinson Airfield during the 
February crisis, allegedly to stop the violence. Melby was quick to criticize Burnham’s actions as 
irresponsible and the PNC leader as more dangerous than ever; however, his negative response 
obscures one critical fact: Burnham had looked to the United States for assistance in the crisis.79  
The considerable number of classified documents in United States government records leaves 
open the possibility that Burnham was acting under the advice of American agents, and he 
certainly was responsible in part for stimulating the violence in the first place. Regardless, the 
crucial conclusion to be drawn from the comparison is that Burnham had begun to actively seek 
allegiance with the United States while Jagan seemed politically lost and responded to the crisis 
by lambasting the Americans. From the perspective of the Kennedy Administration, the Cuban 
Revolution made Western Hemispheric unity more vital than ever by early 1962. Burnham took 
advantage of this political reality and vehemently sought to win approval in the United States on 
every level. He worked to appease diplomats while appealing to the African-American public by 
vocally supporting Martin Luther King, Jr.80 Foreign policy dynamics would ultimately 
determine which Guianese leader would win the third constituency and lead the colony to 
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independence and Burnham was beginning to prove that he had the advantage in diplomatic 
ability. 
The spring of 1962 saw two important developments in Guianese politics which further 
exemplify the opposing courses being pursued by Jagan and Burnham. On April 28 the PPP held 
its annual party elections with the result being a radicalization of the organization. Balram Singh 
Rai, Minister of Home Affairs, either left or was expelled from the party allegedly because he 
opposed the strong communist direction the party was moving toward.81 While Melby kept the 
State Department informed of developments within the PPP, Burnham was working with AFL-
CIO president George Meaney and pushing for a visit to the United States.82 Despite misgivings 
from some officials in the State Department about how such a meeting would be interpreted by 
the British, Burnham arrived in the United States in early May and met with Schlesinger on May 
3. Burnham achieved a rousing success where Jagan had failed miserably six months earlier. 
Burnham spoke at length about developing ties to the United States and explained that he 
advocated private enterprise in an independent Guyana, while inquiring about obtaining 
educational scholarships for Guianese students to travel to the United States. Burnham also 
claimed to have begun to resolve the Venezuela border crisis, which remained an international-
relations concern for the inter-American community after British Guiana achieved independence. 
Finally, Burnham told Schlesinger that he knew from personal experience that the Jagans were 
international communists and that Janet Jagan had been in Cuba as recently as February.83 
Schlesinger was so impressed by Burnham that he invited him for drinks the following 
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evening.84Adding to Burnham’s success was the fact that Jagan visited the UN in New York 
during the same month, and met with Soviet and Polish diplomats, while never approaching 
anyone from the United States.85  
There is a stark contrast between Burnham’s visit in May and Jagan’s visit six months 
earlier and the difference is telling. Jagan’s insistence on defending his ideological position and 
his inability to successfully engage important American officials was the catalyst for his lost 
opportunity with the United States. Burnham, in contrast, whose personal character was highly 
suspect to British and American officials alike, won over American diplomats during his visit.86 
Burnham did not permit his socialist ideology to hamper his persistent courtship of the third 
constituency over the summer of 1962. Like Figueres in Costa Rica and Trujillo during the 1930s 
and 1940s, Burnham adapted his ideology to political realities while Jagan struggled through the 
Royal Commission hearings into the February riots. Most notably, Burnham understood the 
declining influence of Great Britain and the overwhelming significance of acknowledging the 
primacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Slowly, Burnham’s political 
opportunism and Jagan’s struggle to keep to his ideals convinced the Kennedy Administration 
that Burnham was the necessary, if far from ideal, choice to lead British Guiana to independence.  
The political climate in British Guiana increasingly favored Forbes Burnham into the 
summer of 1962 and by the end of June, Cheddi Jagan had finally destroyed his changes of 
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reconciliation with the United States. On June 4 Burnham repeated his request to the United 
States for educational scholarships for Guianese students, to counter his opponents attempt to 
send students behind the “Iron Curtain”.87 Meanwhile, PPP Acting Premier Brindley Benn was 
quoted on several occasions praising the impending success of communism and criticizing the 
United States.88 Rai left the PPP for good on June 21, indicating to Melby that the PPP was 
moving in a more radical direction.89 Despite these developments, British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan told Kennedy that he hoped the United States would continue to try and work with 
Jagan if he remained the choice of the people.90 It is imperative to note that even in mid-1962 
Jagan held the political high ground on every front except with his relationship to the United 
States. Jagan had spent nearly a decade as the head of, or primary figure in, Guianese politics and 
he had consistently engaged in political moves indicating a communist inclination. For nine 
months after Kennedy’s call for cooperation, Jagan pursued poorly conceived foreign diplomacy, 
yet he had not entirely isolated himself from the United States. Jagan’s Waterloo occurred during 
the Riot Commission Hearings in late June, and this time, his blunder was one from which he 
would not recover. 
From June 22-28, 1962, Great Britain held a public inquiry into the disastrous riots of the 
previous February in Georgetown. Lionel Luckhoo, an East Indian lawyer, questioned Cheddi 
Jagan’s political ideology during the proceedings in a manner similar to Jagan’s interview on 
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Meet the Press the previous October. Jagan’s ability to withstand difficult questioning had not 
improved. After several inconclusive responses to Luckhoo’s interrogation, Jagan finally uttered 
the phrase which annihilated his chances of ever working with the United States: “I am a 
communist.”91 To the Kennedy Administration, those words spoken by a man who was a 
political liability at best, and perhaps an international communist, combined with a long list of 
suspicious relationships with the Eastern Bloc, confirmed their worst fears. American reaction 
was immediate and conclusive. Connecticut senator Thomas Dodd reiterated Jagan’s remarks on 
the floor of the senate the first week of July, including further statements made during the 
hearings where Jagan referred to Castro as “the greatest liberator of the twentieth century.”92 
United States senators received thousands of letters from American citizens objecting to the idea 
of sending aid to British Guiana so long as Jagan remained in charge of the colony.93 The same 
week Jagan’s personal secretary, Jack Kelshall, stated flatly that both he and Jagan were 
communists, which only served to further confirm to Melby that Jagan’s assertion should be 
taken seriously.94 Jagan’s statement was the culmination of a decade of ill-conceived diplomacy 
and ideological statements and the result was a final severance with the United States. 
The Kennedy Administration never again entertained working with Jagan and that policy 
continued through the Johnson Administration until Jagan was effectively defeated through an 
engineered electoral scheme in which Burnham ascended to the primary position of authority in 
British Guiana, and in time, led the colony to independence. By mid-July 1962, United States 
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officials had ceased discussing strategy in British Guiana and began discussing tactics, 
committing themselves completely to a covert program to overthrow Jagan. The determination 
that Jagan would be subverted was final, what remained was convincing Great Britain to go 
along with the American plan.95 
The Loss of British Support and the Anglo-American Decision to Remove the PPP 
Jagan’s political strategy remained consistent throughout the subsequent year. He 
continued to pursue arms and training deals with Israel, provoking the ire of British officials who 
were displeased with Jagan’s attempt to circumvent the colonial government in his effort to 
improve the police force.96 PPP members continued to negotiate closer ties to communist nations 
and travel between the colony and communist nations went on unabated.97 The Jagans still spoke 
affectionately of Castro and the communist world, even after the Cuban Missile Crisis.98 More 
importantly, Jagan continually put the British in an awkward position vis a vis the United States. 
Meanwhile, Burnham worked tirelessly to foster ties with the United States, traveling to New 
York to reassure American officials that he would remain anti-communist after Jagan was 
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defeated.99 In December he pressed Melby for the third time to obtain scholarships for Guianese 
students to study in the United States.100 
Despite the totality of the American aversion to Jagan, a number of British colonial 
officials, and members of Parliament, remained adamantly opposed to Burnham. The majority of 
British officials, specifically those in the Colonial Office, believed that the best scenario for an 
independent Guyana was a government under Cheddi Jagan.101 There continued to be 
contentious exchanges between the British Foreign Office and the State Department in 
Washington over the future of British Guiana throughout late 1962 and early 1963. Some 
members of the Colonial Office never agreed with the American decision to back Forbes 
Burnham. However, the overriding imperative for Great Britain in British Guiana was preparing 
the colony for independence. Since the early 1960s, the British had been eager to shed the weight 
of an economically draining relic of imperialism and sought to establish a stable, sustainable 
government in British Guiana.102 By 1963 Jagan’s failure to maintain multi-racial support in the 
colony, in part because of inter-racial conflict fostered by the United States, had rendered the 
PPP incapable of sustaining social order. The primarily Afro-Guianese police force simply 
stopped accepting orders from the elected government, effectively leaving Jagan the head of a 
government which did not function. While it is important to acknowledge that elements of the 
United States government worked to achieve this end for several years, the British took care to 
note that: “Jagan and his party have constituted the government of the colony for the last six 
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years [and thus] they and their policies must bear a share of the blame.”103 Inequalities in the 
racial composition of the Guianese police force left Forbes Burnham the only Guianese leader 
capable of ending the social unrest and stabilizing Guianese society in a short amount of time. 
Thus, British and American imperatives in British Guiana began to run parallel and made the 
British decision to work with the United States possible.  
After delaying independence for a year, British officials came to the realization that the 
schism between Jagan and the United States was irreparable, and that regardless, Jagan was 
incapable of establishing stability in the colony. British and American officials agreed that the 
PPP would move to establish a communist government based on the Cuban model after 
independence. American officials were confident that intervention was necessary to thwart the 
communist threat, while the British suggested that there was a possibility of internal opposition 
in British Guiana being strong enough to keep Jagan from succeeding.104 Despite misgivings 
about Burnham, the British acquiesced to American wishes. Britain’s desire to withdraw from 
the colony and the strength of the United States Cold War imperatives superseded British 
hesitation to support Burnham. Anglo-American talks were held at Birch Grove, England on 
June 30, 1963 and Kennedy, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy traveled from the United States to 
meet with Macmillan, Home, and Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys. The discussion shifted 
between British opposition to Burnham and American refusal to work with Jagan until Sandys 
finally concluded that a: “Burnham-D’Aguiar government will collapse by 
itself…unless…United States was prepared to shore it up, this would change the situation.”105 
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The United States contingency caught the insinuation and Jagan’s fate was sealed. Despite 
Labour Party opposition, Sandys began working on implementing a plan of proportional 
representation for the next round of colonial elections, which led to a victory for the Burnham-
D’Aguiar coalition and Jagan’s defeat in the final elections before independence in British 
Guiana.106 
The defeat of the PPP in British Guiana prior to independence was the culmination of 
several important factors. Cold War imperatives effected Anglo-American strategy in the 
Caribbean. Covert intervention by the United States destabilized the colony and challenged PPP 
authority in Georgetown. Great Britain’s decision to pursue electoral change and a final election 
before independence resulted in Jagan’s loss at the polls in December 1964 paving the way for 
Burnham to lead the colony to self-rule. However, the PPP’s attempt to move British Guiana into 
the communist camp, and Forbes Burnham’s timely courting of the United States, provided the 
most important basis for the policies pursued by the United States and Great Britain. The actions 
of these men ultimately framed the policy options available in Washington and determined the 
future of their country. Politics do not occur in a vacuum, a reality which is obvious in two ways 
for Guyana. Cheddi Jagan’s inability to conduct a foreign policy based on his political reality 
condemned him to ideological policymaking and political failure. Additionally, United States 
officials determined to implement a more forceful anti-communist policy after the Cuban 
Revolution and Castro’s seizure of power in Havana. Their opposition to Jagan was not based on 
a McCarthy-esque witch hunt. Rather, it was predicated on Jagan’s persistent Marxist ideology 
and the PPP’s foreign policy which was increasingly antagonistic toward the United States. It 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 This thesis examined the end of colonial rule in British Guiana as a microcosm to explore 
how changes in the global power structure were manifested in the collective dynamics of the 
Cold War and global decolonization during the mid-twentieth century. Decolonization in British 
Guiana was similar to that which was occurring simultaneously across the globe as European 
empires prepared their colonies for independence after the Second World War. Nationalist 
leaders maneuvered to pursue the most independent form of government available within the 
context of the post war world, always framed by the superpower struggle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union as well as the interests of colonial powers trying to end their 
domination of developing areas in the most advantageous manner possible. Guianese leaders 
were free to pursue self-government, but only within a specific framework acceptable to the 
United States, which sought to assert itself as the hemispheric leader by pressuring decolonizing 
Caribbean nations into alignment with the West, specifically after the Cuban Revolution and its 
subsequent alignment with the Soviet Union. British Guiana’s geographic proximity to the 
United States ensured that the American government would wield a strong influence on the 
decolonization process of the colony. Guianese politicians aimed to achieve independence as 
quickly as possible, but only under circumstances which would benefit them as individual 
leaders. Cheddi Jagan’s attempt to establish either a non-aligned or communist oriented foreign 
policy directly conflicted with the United States and led to American intervention in the colony. 
Conversely, Forbes Burnham pursued a foreign policy aligned with the United States. By 
courting American leadership, Burnham assured his position as the head of British Guiana after 
independence. At varying points in the decolonization process, the United States, Great Britain, 
and each individual Guianese leader were motivated to push for an increase or decrease in the 
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pace of British withdrawal from the colony. Thus, the story of Guianese independence is the 
story of the competing interests of nationalist leaders, former colonizers, and a Cold War 
superpower.  
 This thesis is also a study of United States Cold War policy in the post-Cuban Revolution 
Caribbean. American policy in the hemisphere underwent significant changes in the early years 
after Fidel Castro’s government took power in Havana. The complexity of these changes is 
evident in British Guiana. President John F. Kennedy took a harder line against communism as a 
result of the Cuban association with the Soviet Union; however, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, 
Kennedy sought to pragmatically work with regional leaders who engaged in moderate domestic 
policies.1 Thus, the United States presented regional leaders with the latitude to engage in some 
programs of domestic reform if they could conduct an effective foreign policy with the United 
States.2 Comparing the foreign policies of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and the People’s 
National Congress (PNC) provides an excellent example of the American policy in the region. 
 The first chapter examined how the colonial history of British Guiana created a volatile 
society with distinct political, economic, and social characteristics which defined the manner in 
which the colony progressed toward independence. Colonial structures and immigration patterns 
created a culturally pluralistic society in British Guiana which nationalist leaders and foreign 
powers exploited with violent consequences during the independence period.3 British Guiana’s 
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political development was also the result of its colonial development and the nature of political 
organizations and ideology in the colony resulted in conflict with the United States.4 Thus, the 
decolonization process in British Guiana was the culmination of its colonial legacy of ethnic 
segregation and union-dominated leftist politics. 
 The second chapter examined the complex relationship between the United States and 
Great Britain in coordinating policy in British Guiana. Each nation pursued individual strategic 
objectives in the colony; however, both nations placed the Anglo-American special relationship 
above their individual interests in the region and ultimately worked together to develop a unified 
policy toward British Guiana. United States officials were concerned with British Guiana as an 
aspect of American Cold War geo-strategy while British officials were principally concerned 
with the logistics of decolonizing their empire. The Cold War and decolonization were two 
aspects of a global shift in power structure away from European nation states and as such they 
were intricately related. British Guiana is an excellent example of how the Cold War and 
decolonization dynamics functioned together in a cyclical relationship. Most importantly, the 
Cold War and decolonization begat instability; thus, establishing a stable government in British 
Guiana became the primary concern of both the United States and Great Britain. The Anglo-
American decision to undermine the PPP in British Guiana is best understood as the consequence 
of the need for stability and American insistence with assuring pro-Western governments in the 
post-Cuban Revolution Caribbean. 
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 Finally, the third chapter examined the PPP foreign policy and how it impacted American 
and British decisions in British Guiana. The foreign policies of Guianese nationalist leaders 
contributed significantly to the independence movement in the colony. Most historians have 
focused on two aspects of the decolonization process in British Guiana: domestic reform 
movements and foreign intervention. Their argument has been that the democratically elected 
PPP government, led by Cheddi Jagan, pursued mild social reform movements and became a 
victim of American communist paranoia. Most scholars acknowledge that Jagan espoused 
Marxist ideology, but subordinate the impact of such rhetoric on American policymaking to the 
significance of upholding a staunch anti-communist ideology.5Thus, traditional historiography 
has been critical of American intervention in British Guiana. This thesis does not seek to be an 
apologist for interventionist policies, or to in any way suggest that American interference with 
the self-determination of developing nations was or is justified. However, this project does 
suggest that the American decision making process was more complex than has been suggested 
in the historiography. While this thesis certainly does not blame Jagan for American 
intervention, it does suggest that the PPP foreign policy was primarily responsible for the 
Kennedy Administration’s decision to support Forbes Burnham. Regardless of the moral 
judgment history will hold for American Cold War policy, it still needs to be understood why 
such a policy was pursued. This thesis is primarily concerned with the reasons that the United 
States and eventually Great Britain were opposed to Cheddi Jagan, and why they chose to 
subvert his government. United States opposition to Jagan grew in intensity as Jagan’s foreign 
                                                            
5 Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1968); Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana; Spinner, A Political and Social History of 
Guyana; James L. McDonald, “Overriding Interests: Subversion as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy” (Ph.D. 
diss., American University, 1997; Jennifer Dale Kibe, “Presidents as Kingmakers: U.S. Decisions to Overthrow 
Foreign Governments” (Ph.D. Diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2002); Gordon Oliver Daniels, “A Great 




policy became more openly communist. It is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate 
subversion as an aspect of American policy; however, it is important to acknowledge that 
American intervention was successful in large part because of the complicity of key Guianese, 
specifically Burnham. Thus, this thesis considers the crucial role of nationalist leaders in British 
Guiana in creating their own history. 
 A brief look at Forbes Burnham’s policies after independence will serve as a final 
testament to the agency of nationalist leaders in the developing world and dispense with the 
notion that Burnham was simply Washington’s pawn. During the 1970s Burnham nationalized 
the economy through the expropriation of foreign enterprises, such as Booker Brothers and 
Canadian and American bauxite companies. He described his economic policy as a “cooperative 
socialism”, and it was the exact type of anti-capitalist system that British and American officials 
hoped to avoid by subverting the PPP and supporting Burnham’s government before 
independence.6 Additionally, Burnham actively participated in the non-aligned movement, 
beginning in 1970, and by the middle of the decade he had established diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union, Cuba, China, and most of Eastern Europe.7 However, the true tragedy of 
Burnham’s government was the misery it inflicted on the people of Guyana. Burnham 
maintained power through fraudulent elections and the repression of the populace. He 
strengthened the armed forces and used them to suppress the East Indian population with 
extreme violence. Guyana was one of the poorest, most crime-ridden nations in the world by the 
end of the 1970s.8 Thus, the sad irony of Anglo-American intervention is that in subverting the 
PPP government to avoid a repressive, corrupt, single party, communist oriented government, 
                                                            
6 Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 164. 
7 Ibid, 166-167. 
8 Ibid, 163-169. 
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British and American officials were largely responsible for its establishment. However, the 
Guianese did not sit idly and watch as the United States manipulated the future of their colony. 
Guianese leaders were actively engaged in international politics and Anglo-American 
intervention was largely the result of their actions. 
Future Research 
 There is considerable room for further research on the topics discussed in this thesis. 
Historians will continue to refine the story of decolonization in British Guiana as more United 
States documents become declassified. Clearly United States intervention had considerable 
influence on decolonization in British Guiana; however, the specifics of American involvement 
remain imprecise due to the considerable number of upper level State Department records on 
British Guiana which remain classified. Scholars have made use of other archival resources to 
explore the role of American subversion in the colony; however, the declassification of 
governmental records will improve on current research.9 Scholars will be better able to quantify 
the effects of American involvement as they more accurately determine the timing and nature of 
American intervention.  
 Similarly, there has been little to no research conducted in the archives of the communist 
nations with which the United States suspected the PPP of having relations. As this paper has 
shown, there was a significant level of correspondence and travel between PPP members and 
some Eastern Bloc nations. Examining archives in Cuba, East Germany, Russia, China, and 
Poland, would allow historians to better ascertain the nature of PPP interaction with those 
nations and shed light on the Jagans’ intentions for a post-colonial British Guiana, either 
                                                            
9 The AFL-CIO Archives at the George Meaney Library in Silver Spring Maryland, for example, provide an 
alternative means of obtaining information on the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and 
American based international labor unions.  
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strengthening or weakening criticism of Anglo-American decisions in the colony. Historians 
have tended to ignore the possibility that the Jagans were in fact attempting to pursue the type of 
Castro-like communist government the United States claimed. A comparative study of the early 
Castro government in Cuba and the Jagans’ plans for British Guiana could be equally 
enlightening. Evidence which supported the American claims would be cause for a re-evaluation 
of the criticism surrounding American intervention, even while such studies would not excuse 
interventionist policies.   
 Cold War history is becoming increasingly inclusive as historians such as Odd Arne 
Westad and Jason Parker expand on previous interpretations to incorporate the impact of 
developing nations on the trajectory of the era.10 The trend of de-emphasizing the role of 
superpower actors will likely continue as more research is conducted in what were previously 
considered peripheral areas and a more nuanced understanding of the twentieth century will 
emerge. Additionally, the close relationship between the Cold War and European decolonization 
will continue to merge as historians explore the shift away from European centers of power after 
World War II.11 Colonized people were always an integral part of global European colonization 
through collaboration and resistance; however, by the mid-twentieth century, they were affecting 
the structure of that system of global order unlike any time since the mid-fifteenth century.  
 Future research will likely strengthen our understanding of the connections between the 
struggle for autonomy in formerly colonized areas and the efforts of the United States and the 
Soviet Union to resist drastic change and establish influence in developing areas. British Guiana 
                                                            
10 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK: 2005), 3; Jason Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire 
in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
11 Nial Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (London: Penguin 
Press, 2006). Ferguson’s work explores the twentieth-century as a period of global transition describing the violence 
of the period as the death throes of a dying world order. 
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is useful as a historical study in the manner in which it is unique; however, it is most significant 
because it is not entirely exceptional. The twentieth-century was a period which saw a 
redefinition of the global power structure and the struggle for supremacy in the re-ordering world 
took place most actively in formerly colonized areas. The two primary global powers after World 
War II, the United States and the Soviet Union maneuvered for dominance through ideology and 
occasionally proxy wars while nationalist leaders sought self-government absent the influence of 
any foreign power. International organizations such as the United Nations wielded what 
influence they could to maintain global peace to resolve the conflict of interest resulting from 
superpower influence and nationalist sentiment. Thus, simultaneously the world fragmented and 
came together.12 The story of the twentieth-century will increasingly cease to be two stories of 
East-West relations and North-South relations and become an amalgamation of North-South-
East-West dynamics.
                                                            
12 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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